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CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN CASES: A STUDY IN THE USES OF *STARE DECISIS*

WALTER F. MURPHY

The Brookings Institution

THE UNHAPPY STORY of the treatment of Americans of Japanese descent during World War II has been told and retold.[1] In early 1942, pursuant to an Executive Order[2] and a later Act of Congress,[3] Lt. General J. L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, imposed curfew restrictions on German and Italian aliens and on all persons of Japanese ancestry. Shortly thereafter DeWitt ordered the exclusion of both alien Japanese and American citizens of Japanese descent from zones which included most of the three West Coast states. After a short experiment with a voluntary exodus, a compulsory system of evacuation and detention in Relocation Camps was put into effect.

In 1943, the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to review this military action. Gordon Hirabayashi, a senior at the University of Washington, had been convicted in a district court for failing to report for evacuation and for disobeying the curfew order. He had been sentenced to three months in prison on each count, but the sentences were allowed to run concurrently.

The Supreme Court seized on this fact of concurrent sentences to rule that if conviction could be sustained on one of the charges, it would be unnecessary to test the validity of the other accusation. The Court then considered the easier count, that of violating the curfew. In a narrowly defined opinion Chief Justice Stone held that the military commander might reasonably have concluded that a curfew had been needed, and under emergency conditions such a mild device was a legitimate exercise of the war power. The Chief Justice emphasized that nothing was decided regarding the constitutionality of the evacuation program. "It is unnecessary to consider whether or to what extent such findings [of danger of espionage and sabotage] would support orders differing from the curfew order."[4]

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[1] The literature on this subject is vast. Among the better accounts are: Morton Grodzins, *Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949); Jacobus ten Broek *et al.*, *Prejudice, War, and the Constitution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954); Nanette Dembitz, "Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions," 45 *Col. L. Rev.* 175 (1945); Eugene Rostow, "The Japanese American Cases — A Disaster," 54 *Yale L. Rev.* 489 (1945); and Harrop A. Freeman, "Genesis, Exodus, and Leviticus — Genealogy, Evacuation, and Law," 28 *Cornell L. Q.* 414 (1943).

[2] Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407.

[3] Pub. L. No. 503, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; 56 Stat. 173; see also Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165.

[4] *Hirabayashi* v. *United States*, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943).

A year later, the Court had a second occasion to review the judgment of the West Coast Commander. In *Korematsu* v. *United States*, the constitutionality of the evacuation program was directly challenged. Fred Korematsu, a native-born citizen of alien Japanese parents, had been convicted in a federal district court of remaining within the prohibited area after the date set by General DeWitt for evacuation. The government had not accused Korematsu of disloyalty: the only charge against him was disobedience of the evacuation order. The trial court sentenced Korematsu to five years in prison, but immediately placed him on parole. He was then taken by the military authorities to an Assembly Center, and later to a Relocation Camp at Topaz, Utah.

In argument before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General was embarrassed by the blatant racism of DeWitt's various public statements and even more so by the prevalence of strong racial overtones in the General's official report on the evacuation program.[5] Nevertheless, the government relied primarily on a claim of "military necessity." While admitting that other commanders might have made a different decision, the Solicitor General contended that the evacuation was a "reasonable" program under the circumstances.

Korematsu was represented by his own counsel, but the Japanese American Citizens League entered the case and filed a massive brief attacking the legality of the whole evacuation program. In two hundred heavily documented pages the JACL brief vivisected every factual point the government had tried to establish to buttress its claims of the existence of a military necessity.

On December 18, 1944, as the Battle of the Bulge was beginning along the Luxembourg border, while American troops were in the final stages of resecuring the Philippines, and Mariana-based B–29's were hammering the Japanese home islands, the Supreme Court announced its decision. The limited approach of the Chief Justice in *Hirabayashi* which had kept the division among the justices to a minimum could not work again. The Court split badly with five opinions being written, three of them in acid dissent.

Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. He began by noting that all legal restrictions which curtailed the civil rights of a single racial group were immediately suspect and therefore must be subjected to the closest scrutiny by the courts. This promise, however, was not to be fulfilled. When the opinion ended eight pages later, Korematsu could look in vain for any scrutiny, close or distant, of the reasons behind the evacuation orders. The Court, without any substantial evidence other than the

[5] U.S. Army, Western Defense Command and IVth Army, *Final Report of Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 34 and *passim*.

word of the commanding general, accepted every contention of the government.

Justice Black held that Congress and the President had authorized the evacuation. Therefore, in light of the principles announced in *Hirabayashi*, the Court could not conclude that exclusion was beyond the combined war powers of the political branches of government. "The military authorities, charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded that curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion." [6] He added: "It was because we could not reject the finding of the military authorities that it was impossible to bring about immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal that we sustained the validity of the curfew order. . . . In the instant case, temporary exclusion of the entire group was rested by the military on the same ground." [7] The Court could not hold the military's decision unfounded. Justice Black was aware of the hardships this program imposed and offered the consolation that hardships were a part of war, and war was "an aggregation of hardships." [8]

The majority opinion concluded with an affirmation of the "reasonable man" thesis. The military had feared invasion and had evidence that some Japanese Americans were disloyal. "We cannot — by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight — now say that at that time these actions were unjustified." [9]

Justice Frankfurter wrote a short concurring opinion in which he took issue sharply with Justice Jackson's dissent. Frankfurter accepted, without attempting to demonstrate, the existence of a rational basis for the military decision.

Justice Roberts filed a biting dissent, accusing the majority of deciding a hypothetical case rather than the one actually before the Court. What was involved was the criminal conviction of a citizen because he had refused to go to a concentration camp and submit to imprisonment based solely on his ancestry.

Justice Jackson delivered a dissenting opinion which has been described as a "fascinating and fantastic essay in nihilism." [10] While feeling that the Court should reverse Korematsu's conviction, Jackson admitted that he could not say that DeWitt's orders were reasonable or unreasonable. Indeed, by their very nature "military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal. . . . Hence courts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authority that issued

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[6] *Korematsu* v. *United States*, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 219.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 224.
[10] Rostow, *loc. cit.*, p. 510.

the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint." [11] Jackson would order the prisoner discharged, but he did not mean to "suggest that the courts should have attempted to interfere with the Army in carrying out its task." [12]

Whatever its other shortcomings, the Jackson dissent did rip the rug of *stare decisis* from under the Court's decision. The majority opinion had cited *Hirabayashi* as the controlling authority for all issues before it. But, Jackson pointed out, in *Hirabayashi* the Court had not decided the very things it was now being said it had. Chief Justice Stone had specifically reserved the question whether measures more drastic than a curfew could be sustained.

The only member of the Court to challenge directly the judgment of General DeWitt was Justice Murphy. Murphy agreed that judges must accord great respect to military decisions but at the same time he thought it essential that limits be set to military discretion. There was a satisfactory judicial test of military necessity; whether that action was "reasonably related to a public danger that is so 'immediate, imminent, and impending' as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger." [13] On the basis of the evidence submitted by both sides, the orders of the Western Defense Command failed this test. "I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination . . . is unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States." [14]

The Loaded Weapon

The reaction of most constitutional authorities has been an echo of Jackson's warning that these cases established a principle which "lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need." [15] Morton Grodzins has given a typical evaluation in his comment that the whole evacuation program, including the decisions of the Court, was "less important for what it did to Japanese Americans than for what it might do to all Americans." [16] He added that the evacuation's "legacy is the lasting one of precedent and constitutional sanctity for a policy of mass incarceration under military auspices. This is the most important result of the process by which the

[11] *Korematsu* v. *United States*, 323 U.S. 214, dis. op., 245 (1944).
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 248.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 234.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 242.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 246.
[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

evacuation decision was made. That process betrayed all Americans." [17] In the same vein, the most recent study of the nisei cases concluded that the Court had "elevated racism to a constitutional principle." [18]

Considering *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* alone or in the context in which they are written, these evaluations seem both accurate and fair. Yet there is more to the story. The Supreme Court has utilized what is usually considered the most conservative of its doctrines, that of *stare decisis*, to undermine these cases. Chief Justice Stone had added to his curfew justification the general statement that: "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." [19] And in *Korematsu*, Justice Black had prefaced his opinion with the warning that restrictions which hit at one racial group were constitutionally suspect. In neither case, obviously, was the logic of these general pronouncements carried through. In spite of this immediate failure, however, it has been these pieces of dicta and not the specific holdings of the decisions which have been chiseled into constitutional law in the last dozen or more years. Where *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* have been cited by the Court in cases involving questions of civil liberties, the startling fact is that with few exceptions they have been used to bolster libertarian opinions.[20]

The exceptions are the easiest place to begin a discussion. If the com-

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 374.

[18] Jacobus ten Broek *et al.*, *op cit.*, p. 334. For similar views see: E. S. Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution* (New York: Knopf, 1947), p. 98; C. Herman Pritchett, *The Roosevelt Court* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 122; A. H. Kelly and W. A. Harbison, *The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development* (New York: Norton, 1948), II, 821–22; and the conclusions of Rostow, Dembitz, and Freeman, *supra*. One of the few scholarly articles which took a favorable view of the evacuation policy was Maurice Alexandre, "The Nisei — A Casualty of World War II," 28 *Cornell L. Q.* 385 (1943).

[19] *Hirabayashi* v. *United States*, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).

[20] A methodological note must be injected here. *Shepard's Citations* lists every occasion in which a given case is cited in later opinions. This provides a mass of raw data which is often indigestible. What has been attempted here is the rooting out of citations in Supreme Court cases involving civil liberties questions, where the determination of those questions has depended on a use of *Hirabayashi* and/or *Korematsu* as precedents. These two cases have been cited in numerous Supreme Court decisions, including civil liberties cases, not mentioned here. However, if Shepard is accurate, the cases discussed in this article are the only ones in which the determination of a civil liberties *issue* was supported by a citation from *Hirabayashi* or *Korematsu*. *Hirabayashi* was cited three times by the Court as one of the chief authorities for holding that if a multiple count conviction for which concurrent sentences were imposed can be justified on one of the charges, then it is unnecessary to consider the other counts. *Pinkerton* v. *United States*, 328 U.S. 640, 641 (1946); *United States* v. *Sheridan*, 329 U.S. 379, 381 (1947); *Roviaro* v. *United States*, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). This issue is not pertinent to the substance of the subject of this paper, being more a technical point than a question of constitutional law. For the sake of clarity, the uses of these two cases in concurring and dissenting opinions have been omitted in the discussion, although this facet was thoroughly researched. This use was found to be interesting, but had little direct bearing on an analysis already overburdened with details.

panion case to *Hirabayashi*, *Yasui* v. *United States*, [21] is excluded, *Korematsu* is the first offspring of *Hirabayshi*; although as Jackson showed, it was not a legitimate child. Indeed, in this regard it is interesting to observe that the *Hirabayashi* decision was supported in essence by no prior decision of the Supreme Court and that Stone's opinion seemed to rely most heavily on a profound off-the-bench remark by Charles Evans Hughes that the power to wage war meant the power to wage war successfully.

In 1950, six years after *Korematsu*, Chief Justice Vinson invoked the *Hirabayashi* holding in *American Communications Association* v. *Douds* in a logically proper manner. For a badly divided Court, Vinson sustained the constitutionality of the Taft–Hartley non-Communist affidavit. The Chief Justice admitted that the statute identified persons by their affiliations and beliefs, factors which were ordinarily beyond the permissible scope of governmental action. But, he argued by analogy, even racial distinctions had been allowed during World War II; and "if accidents of birth and ancestry under some circumstances justify an inference concerning future conduct, it can hardly be doubted that voluntary affiliations and beliefs justify a similar inference. . . ." [22]

Two years later in *Harisiades* v. *Shaughnessy*, the Court refused to reverse an order for the deportation of a resident alien because of prior membership in the Communist party, even though that membership had been terminated before the passage of the deportation legislation in question. Justice Jackson wrote for the majority that any policy toward aliens was vitally interwoven with policies involving the maintenance of a republican form of government, the control of foreign relations, and the waging of war. These areas were declared to be largely immune from judicial inquiry. In a footnote Jackson offered the Japanese American cases as examples of the scope of the war power over rights of citizens, let alone aliens.[23]

Douds and *Harisiades* are almost universally considered to be illiberal decisions, and are in accord with the antilibertarian tenor of *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu*. But in all other civil liberties controversies, the Supreme Court has used the Japanese American cases to effect results favorable to individual rights.

On the same day that *Korematsu* was decided, *Ex parte Endo*[24] ordered the release from a relocation center of a nisei girl whose loyalty had been established. The Court distinguished *Hirabayashi* as applying to curfews and not to detention. This was certainly a proper citation, as was

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[21] 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
[22] 339 U.S. 382, 391 (1950).
[23] 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
[24] 323 U.S. 283 (1944).

that in *Duncan* v. *Kahanamoku* (1946) [25] which overturned the trial by court-martial of civilians in Hawaii during the war. *Hirabayshi* was again distinguished, this time on the grounds that it had sustained a conviction obtained in a regular district court, not before a military tribunal. More important, the "reasonable man" theory behind *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* was quietly dropped, and the Court availed itself of that "calm perspective of hindsight" it had earlier eschewed. The majority justices expressed little hesitation in second-guessing wartime military judgments concerning the necessity of martial law in the Pacific Outpost.

Being distinguished, in one way or another, is the normal fate of any case, and such use arouses no curiosity in itself. But in *Oyama* v. *California* (1948), *Hirabayashi* appeared under a different guise. *Oyama* thwarted the application of California's alien land law. The majority of the justices refused to hold the statute unconstitutional on its face, but they also refused to allow the law to be employed to prevent an alien from acquiring land in the name of his minor citizen son. In arriving at this decision Chief Justice Vinson was quite explicit about his authority: "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality [*Hirabayashi* v. *United States*]." [26]

In the same year the Court decided the case of *Bob-Lo Excursion Co.* v. *Michigan*. Here a state law forbidding segregation was upheld, even though it had been applied to a firm operating boats between Detroit and Canadian territory. In spite of precedents holding the contrary,[27] the majority was unwilling to find this prohibition of segregation to be an interference with foreign or interstate commerce. Justice Rutledge ruled for the Court that the state policy opposing racial discrimination was clearly in accord with national policy. With a touch of irony that passed almost unnoticed, Rutledge cited *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* among his sources for such a statement.[28]

In 1948 the Court also decided that racially restrictive covenants could not be enforced in the courts. *Shelley* v. *Kraemer* is the title under which these cases are usually remembered, but the litigation which arose in the District of Columbia, *Hurd* v. *Hodge*, was handled by a separate opinion. There the Chief Justice noted that the petitioners, who were seeking to have the restrictive covenants invalidated, had cited the Japanese American cases as holding that racial distinctions were in most cases irrelevant and therefore forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. Vinson[29] obligingly supplied some dicta from *Hirabayashi* to this effect and amended a "see reference"

[25] 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
[26] 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
[27] *Hall* v. *De Cuir*, 95 U.S. 485 (1878); cf. *Morgan* v. *Virginia*, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
[28] 333 U.S. 28, 37n (1948).
[29] 334 U.S. 24, 29–30 (1948).

to *Korematsu*, then decided that it would be unnecessary to discuss this constitutional question at all since the enforcement of the covenants would violate one of the federal civil rights acts.

The years in which *Douds* and *Harisiades* were decided, partly on the authority of the Japanese American cases, were 1950 and 1952. But in 1954, the Court resumed its misleading use of these precedents. *Hernandez* v. *Texas* reversed a state conviction obtained from a jury which had been rigged to exclude persons of Mexican descent. Earlier cases had firmly held that systematic exclusion of Negroes from a jury panel would be constitutionally tainted. Regarding Texas' innovation Chief Justice Warren remarked: "The State of Texas would have us hold that there are only two classes — white and Negro — within the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decisions of this Court do not support that view." [80] Three cases were cited for this statement, including the quotation from *Hirabayashi* that distinctions based solely on ancestry were odious.

Also 1954 was the year of decision in the epoch-making School Segregation cases. *Brown* v. *Board* disposed of the consolidated cases from Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia, while *Bolling* v. *Sharpe* held racially segregated schools in the District of Columbia to be a violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment. In *Bolling*, Chief Justice Warren declared: "Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect." [81] The only two authorities cited for this statement concerning American traditions were *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu*.

The Uses of *Stare Decisis*

This use of the Japanese American cases is, to say the least, strange. With the exceptions noted, the Supreme Court has misused, or at best misleadingly used, these decisions as authorities. It has failed to distinguish between obvious dicta and the clear holding and implication of the decisions.

What does this misuse mean? First, it serves to point up the limited nature of the *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* rulings, as well as the special, if not unique, circumstances under which they were decided. Perhaps this misuse has also been a confession of moral error on the part of the Court, a series of Freudian slips. Research on the nisei evacuation has revealed the injustice of the whole program and has laid bare its real bases of hysteria and racial prejudice. The Court's role in sustaining this policy probably weighed heavily on its collective judicial conscience. This guilt feeling could hardly have been eased by the realization that the Japanese American

[80] 347 U.S. 475, 477–78 (1954).
[81] 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

Citizens League had presented to the Court in the *Korematsu* argument almost every piece of evidence which later scholars used to expose the reasons behind the evacuation.

Equally interesting is the question of the implications of the uses of *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* for a judicial process which operates within the general framework of *stare decisis*. It has long been standard practice for a shrewd lawyer to raid his opponent's citations for dicta which might support his own contentions. This was most effectively done by Brandeis in his pioneer sociological argument in *Muller* v. *Oregon*.[32] This brief would have led a reader who was not thoroughly familiar with *Lochner* v. *New York*[33] to think that had been an extremely liberal opinion. But clever legal tactics of this sort are usually left behind when a lawyer moves to the other side of the bar, and it is surprising to find the highest court in the nation resorting to such tactics. There may be a reasonable explanation, however, an explanation imposed by the very limitations of the Court's powers and at the same time made possible by the *stare decisis* principle.

Now slavish adherence to precedent has never been a hallmark of the United States Supreme Court. In fact its critics are far more likely to make the opposite charge. Cases have frequently been overruled in the past, and the future holds no different promise. Even more often than explicit overruling, the Court resorts to quiet undercutting of burdensome precedents.[34] At the other extreme, there has been the tendency noted by Justice Cardozo for the principle of a given case to extend itself to the limit of its logic.[35] *Stare decisis* is thus an instrument of change as well as of preservation. It can be used as a means to adapt the law to new circumstances just as easily as it can be employed to freeze the law into a dead mold.

The Supreme Court, although a political organ of government, is also a court of law. Since rightly or wrongly much of its prestige, and therefore its power, derives from its law court status, it must operate within the legal framework. It cannot initiate action. It cannot by its own motion bring a case before itself. Lacking the ability in the absence of litigation to revise and to qualify its holdings in *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu*, the Court has taken a long and somewhat devious way around. It has cut into those rulings in the only way it could, by emphasizing the general principle of the unconstitutionality of racially restrictive regulations.

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[32] *Muller* v. *Oregon*, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

[33] *Lochner* v. *New York*, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

[34] See, for example, the way in which the Court, prior to formal overruling, handled such precedents as *Ribnik* v. *McBride*, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), *Hammer* v. *Dagenhart*, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Though dead, *Plessy* is as yet unburied by the Supreme Court.

[35] See, for example, the way in which the Court sustained the expansion of federal power over commerce by the use of *NLRB* v. *Jones & Laughlin*, 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and *United States* v. *Darby*, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); see also the extension of the doctrine of the *School Segregation Cases*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to the fields of transportation and public recreation.

While this maneuver is not altogether a candid one, an open overruling of the Japanese American cases — assuming a suitable opportunity — would have been even less frank. No case with facts similar to *Hirabayashi* or *Korematsu* arose during the Korean War; but, if one had, there can be little doubt that those precedents would have reappeared in full regalia. The hard fact is, as the Supreme Court is the first to admit, that the Court cannot effectively defend civil liberties against determined Congressional and Presidential action. This is especially true in time of war. During a war, the Court must accede to the decisions of the elected branches of government. After the war, it may reassert the paramount authority of the Constitution, or at least the paramount authority of judicial interpretations of that document.

Looking at the role of *stare decisis* as an instrument for affecting change as well as preserving the status quo, the *Douds* opinion becomes the worst example of the use of *Hirabayashi* or *Korematsu* from the standpoint of civil liberties. By correctly using these precedents the Court gave them new life. But the *Douds* paradox becomes more understandable when the prudential factors of its own time and setting are recalled. *Douds* was argued in October, 1949, and decided in May, 1950.[36] The Korean War had not yet begun, but the "Red Scare" of the cold war was rapidly gaining momentum. McCarthy had made his Wheeling, West Virginia, speech in February, 1950. Judith Coplon and Alger Hiss were household words — of a sort. In Congress, the Emergency Detention Act [37] to provide a more efficient system of mass, nisei-style incarceration was under consideration.

The *Harisiades* decision fits even closer into this pattern. It was decided in 1952 when the Korean War was raging and McCarthyism was nearing its zenith. As John P. Frank has observed: "The dominant lesson of our history in the relation of the judiciary to repressions is that courts love liberty most when it is under pressure least." [38] Or, as Lord Bryce commented: "The Supreme Court feels the touch of public opinion. Opinion is stronger in America than anywhere else in the world, and judges are only men. To yield a little may be prudent, for the tree that cannot bend to the blast may be broken." [39]

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[36] See n. 22, *supra*.

[37] 64 Stat. 1019. The adoption of this statute is probably the most illiberal use of *Korematsu* that could be imagined. For a discussion of this statute see: L. W. Dunbar, "Beyond Korematsu: The Emergency Detention Act of 1950," 13 *U. of Pitt. L. Rev.* 221 (1952); and Cornelius P. Cotter and J. Malcolm Smith, "An American Paradox: The Emergency Detention Act of 1950," *Journal of Politics*, XIX (1957), 20.

[38] John P. Frank, "Review and Basic Liberties," in Edmond Cahn (ed.), *Supreme Court and Supreme Law* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954), p. 114. For a similar view, see Fred Rodell, *Nine Men* (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 23.

[39] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (3rd ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1893), I, 273.

Douds and *Harisiades* were double reverses: retreats from the earlier retreat involved in the use of the nisei cases. After the Korean War, the retreat was resumed in the Texas jury case and in the School Segregation holdings. Once more *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* were utilized to bolster liberal decisions.

The history of the uses of the Japanese American cases is peculiar. More research in the nature of the judicial process and *stare decisis* itself will be needed before this history can be characterized as unique. But, with the evidence at hand, two conclusions may be drawn, one specific and the other general. In this particular situation the Court employed *Hirabayashi* and *Korematsu* as a means of returning from the wartime nostrums of *salus populi suprema lex* to the peace-time normalcy of strict judicial review. On a broader plane, this history provides a thought-provoking set of examples of the flexible uses to which the technical law-court instrument of *stare decisis* can be put in the formulation of public law and public policy.

GRAHAM WALLAS' NEW INDIVIDUALISM

MARY PETER MACK*

AS HE WALKED with Lowes Dickinson in Cambridge one day, Graham Wallas suddenly stretched his hand out as if trying to seize something, and asked, "Don't you sometimes feel that the solution of the problem of democracy is just *there*, almost within reach, if only you could see more clearly and grasp more firmly?" Dickinson's eyebrows arched ironically.[1] What was Wallas looking for? Did he find it? Or was he a Don Quixote of political science, off on a chivalrous but outmoded mission? Was he seeking the impossible?

In 1908 Wallas published *Human Nature in Politics*, one of the first books to warn of the monster political force that could spring from manipulated mass opinion and of the small part played by reason in politics. He warned in order to plead for improvement. Most of his later writings are expansions of one sentence in that early book.

> If . . . a conscious moral purpose is to be strong enough to overcome, as a political force, the advancing art of political exploitation, the conception of control from within must be formed into an ideal entity which, like "Science," can appeal to popular imagination, and be spread by an organized system of education.[2]

Wallas' one defense against unreason was a kind of individual moral rearmament. He pleaded with public servants and students of government for special efforts of thought and more thought, illuminated and improved by moral passion. The explosions of the twenty-five years that have passed since he died in 1932 seem, however, to mock his kindly teachings. Many politicians began to think of the psychological facts of nonrational inference which Wallas had uneasily presented, but they often used them for their own purposes and ignored his moral exhortations.

As quixotic as Wallas' defense may now seem, he himself chose it by default. He became the apostle of resurrected individualism only very slowly, after trying and rejecting many alternatives and almost in spite of himself. He was born in 1858, the fifth child of a clergyman, and was educated at Shrewsbury and Corpus Christi, Oxford. He began his career quietly as a classics master at Highgate. In 1885 he resigned over a religious issue.

Like so many of the educated middle class in late Victorian England, Wallas was deeply stirred by social conscience. The same motives which moved Arnold Toynbee to lecture to workingmen and Charles Booth to undertake his laborious survey of the London working classes drove Wallas to join the Fabian Society in 1886. He revolted against conventional

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* New York, New York.

[1] Kingsley Martin, *Harold Laski* (New York: Viking, 1953), pp. 43–44.

[2] *Human Nature in Politics* (3rd ed.; New York: Knopf, 1921), p. 21.

liberalism and individualism, which seemed to him to have become insipid and irrelevant, and became a Socialist. He was a Fabian until 1904, at first an ardent, then a lukewarm, and finally a hostile one. He turned from Fabian Socialism to Syndicalism and Guild Socialism, which were then slowly becoming known in England through the writings of Sorel and Gierke.

World War I, however, killed his enthusiasm not only for Syndicalism but for doctrinal approaches to social problems of any kind whatever. Gradually, in all the books which followed *Human Nature in Politics*,[3] he began to work out a kind of New Individualism which he had first hinted at there. To bring the traditions of Bentham and Mill up to date he developed a liberalism-in-reverse, one which began with the facts of modern large-scale economic and social organization and analyzed the structure piece by piece, until the single thinking feeling man could be located in it.

Human Nature in Politics at once made Wallas' reputation as a political thinker. Previously he had published only "Property Under Socialism," one of the *Fabian Essays in Socialism* (1889), and his classic biography of Francis Place, the Benthamite tailor (1898). There is irony in the fate his writings have suffered. When *Human Nature in Politics* first appeared in 1908 he was already fifty years old. He had been teaching continuously for twenty-seven years, first at Highgate, then as a Fabian soap-box orator, a night school lecturer, and finally as instructor of political science at the new London School of Economics. He had been a member of the Fabian Society for sixteen years, and had had eleven years of experience as a member of the London School Board and London County Council. He had run for office and won, and knew at first-hand the maneuvers and compromises a successful administrator must make. Few political theorists can have been better equipped than he was to understand the actual workings of human nature in politics. No one before him had applied a careful study of modern psychology to politics and no one but he could have corroborated it so fully from the depths of this own experience.

In a way, Wallas' book was altogether too successful. His description of the large part played by nonrational inference in political decision and of the dangers of its unscrupulous cultivation by propagandists was so convincing that it quickly became a platitude. In the process it was ripped from its context and magnified beyond proportion to his larger argument, which was then neglected.

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[3] The date first published is in brackets. *The Great Society* [1914] (New York: Macmillan, 1919). *Our Social Heritage* [1921] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921). *The Art of Thought* [1926] (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926). *Social Judgment* [unfinished at Wallas' death in 1932] (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935). *Men and Ideas* [collected essays], ed. May Wallas (London: Allen & Unwin, 1940).

His account of the complexities and undetermined boundaries of the mind was never intended to stand by itself. It was the empirical foundation he needed to support himself both as a critic and as a moralist. From it, he drew the materials for his attack on those reductionist political theories which deduce man's political behavior from oversimplified assumptions about his psychological nature; and on it, he built his own unified normative view of the world. All his books are a blend of descriptive, critical, and normative elements and all of them are attempts to answer the questions he first raised in *Human Nature in Politics*.

What were Wallas' claims as a critic? What drove him slowly from one position to another? From orthodox liberalism to Fabian Socialism to Syndicalism to New Individualism? Why was he unhappy with each successive doctrine? What was his New Individualism and why did he consider it better than any current alternative political and social theories? Was he right or did his groping development take a wrong direction? Right or wrong, Wallas asked eternally meaningful questions and gave thoughtful sincere answers.

Wallas the Critic

Wallas saw the world humbly as a giant complex of fast-changing phenomena, and he thought all reductionist monist and dualist explanations of it were follies. The first responsibility of a political thinker was to accept complexity — of the environment, of the individual human mind, and of the relations of men to each other — as empirical fact. He always asked of any theory, what does it leave out? How far does it fall short of a complete *Weltanschauung*, a panoramic view of the world which includes the whole range of man's dispositions, emotions, thoughts, and actions? In one or another of his books, Wallas measured almost every important political and social theory against his own doctrine of psychological diversity and found it wanting.

In *Social Judgment*, the book he was writing when he died, Wallas finally tied together all the specific criticisms he had been making since *Human Nature in Politics*. The history of Western thought could ultimately be reduced to a conflict between two and only two ways of looking at the world. There is Science,[4] which represents the world of fact, and Religion, which represents the world of value. The two worlds have never met. The scientific attitude "tends to treat the world of value as unreal, and the 'religious' to treat the world of science as unreal." [5] Wallas believed as John Dewey did, that the urgent job of modern thought is to

[4] Wallas had an unfortunate habit of capitalizing abstractions which gives them a reified aura he did not perhaps initially intend. In his later writings, however, he often delivered sermons on self-improvement and he may have capitalized by design for inspirational purposes.

[5] *Social Judgment*, p. 145.

bring the two worlds together. But it was emphatically not the world of orthodox religion that he wanted to join to science. Nor was it the "science" of conventional political science that he wished to keep.

Organized religion, he felt, had contributed nothing constructive to social thought. By emphasizing dogma it encouraged men to abandon their first duty, to follow arguments wherever they led. This had been disastrous in politics, where references to Providence cloaked every kind of arbitrary action. Political problems were always immediate. They posed active choices and demanded active decisions. Appealing to the foreordained will of God or a "divine hand" at a moment of crisis was more than irresponsible; it was immoral. This is a Wallas ipsedixitism, but he also believed that the disintegration of organized religion was a fact and that our grandchildren "may drop the Palestinian mythology as easily as a worn-out garment." [6] He was premature.

Wallas discussed religious institutions because they were social facts. From his reformer's point of view, religion as an organized institution was an archaic dead weight and evil, but the emotions religion inspired were psychological facts and valuable. He wanted to detach the rich fund of "spiritual" emotions aroused by extra empirical dogmas and transfer them to the secular social world of fact. He wanted to put passion in political science, or in the language of modern ethics, to give emotive meaning to matters of fact. "One would like to hope that a . . . fusion might take place between the emotional and philosophical traditions of religion, and the new conception of intellectual duty by Science. . . ." [7]

By joining facts and values, he hoped to establish an adequate *Weltanschauung*. Though he repudiated orthodox religion as one-sided and parochial, he adopted its occasional evangelist fervor. He cried, ". . . a conviction swept through me that the special task of our generation might be so to work and think as to be able to hand on . . . the heritage of a world outlook deeper and wider and more helpful than modern Christendom." [8] Could science provide this deeper and wider world outlook? Could its disciplines and methods move men to great efforts of social reconstruction? Wallas thought so. "Men will not take up the 'intolerable disease of thought' unless their feelings are first stirred, and the strength of the idea of Science has been that it does touch men's feeling." [9] Nor could they begin too soon. In "politics, economics, literature, religion, and ethics the difficulties arising from the failure of human thought to contrive an adaptation of human society to its new environment are equally obvious. Thought,

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 162.
[7] *Human Nature in Politics*, pp. 212–13.
[8] *Our Social Heritage*, p. 291.
[9] *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 204.

therefore . . . is now required more urgently than ever before in the history of mankind." [10]

What, then, was wrong with the "science" of classical political science? Since John Stuart Mill's era the only felings it had provoked were disgust and revulsion, feelings which had driven Wallas himself to Fabian Socialism in the 1880's. Since the time of Newton English political thought had been modeled on the physical sciences. Wallas reviewed its history and found it both an intellectual and emotional failure. It assumed universal laws and there are none. This led to heavy determinism, smothering any efforts at creative reform. It was based on a primitive science of psychology which shrank the operations of the mind to one or two basic impulses and deduced political and social behavior from them. Most thoughtful people agreed that this reductionist procedure was bankrupt because it notoriously underestimated the numberless impulses which actually do move men.

More than that, the political propositions that arose from mechanistic psychological assumptions were disastrous in practice.

> . . . there is one group of thinkers who have in our own time taken the "mechanist" conception of the relation of instinct to reason as a guide for their own intellectual methods. These are the Marxian Communists in Russia and elsewhere. . . . And they seem determined to stamp out among their fellow citizens, with the thoroughness of the Spanish Inquisition, all those methods of inventive thought which originally enabled Marx to think and write *Das Kapital*." [11]

So Wallas spoke in 1926. In 1908 he had begun his career as a critic with an attack on Classical Liberalism. He soon realized he had made a false start. Though his fame rests on *Human Nature in Politics*, though it contains hints of most of the ideas he developed later, this book is not characteristic Wallas. The focus is wrong. Here the descriptive social psychologist, describing the effects of nonrational inference in politics, is in the foreground. In his later works, the normative moralist stands in front. Here his doctrinal criticism is aimed at the "intellectualist" fallacy which assumes "that every human action is the result of an intellectual process, by which a man first thinks of some end which he desires, and then calculates the means by which that end can be attained." [12] This is the deductive process often attributed to Bentham. Wallas charged Macaulay with it. In his other works, Wallas accepted nonrational inference as a fact and went on from there. It is true that people do not often calculate rationally, but if they do not, they *ought* to and they must be taught to do so.

His argument against the "intellectualist" fallacy was not, of course, that political action is entirely irrational, but that reason is only one impulse

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[10] *The Art of Thought*, p. 26.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 33–35.

[12] *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 45.

among many conflicting and perhaps inseparable impulses. He came to to see that by his attack on reason in politics he was fanning the flames of twentieth-century irrationalism. He saw, too, that the fault of Classical Liberalism was not "intellectualism" but reductionism, dividing the mind into a dualism of facts and values and celebrating facts at the total expense of values. By the time Wallas generalized his criticism of Classical Liberalism, he realized that it applied fully as well to Fabian Socialism and wondered whether "the word socialism may go the way of 'natural rights' and 'the greatest happiness principle.'" [13]

He had not always thought so. From 1886 to 1904 he had belonged to the Fabian Society. He had been one of the original triumvirate with George Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb, a contributor to the *Fabian Essays*, an enthusiastic platform proselytizer, and a member of the Executive from 1888 to 1895. Apparently he had been committed to the hilt. But already in his article, "Property Under Socialism" for the *Essays*, Wallas seemed to suggest that the Fabian equation of economic security with happiness might be a delusion. "Under the justest possible social system we might still have to face all those vices and diseases which are not the direct result of poverty and overwork; we might still suffer . . . mental anguish and bewilderment. . . ." [14]

Wallas finally broke with the Fabians, ostensibly over tariff reform and education, but actually over the much wider ideological issues which later became the subjects of his books. In his *History of the Fabian Society*, Edward Pease explained that Wallas' resignation "has been followed by . . . [no] personal and political disagreements. . . . Mr. Wallas has remained a Fabian in all except name." [15] This was both true and false. He continued to follow the Fabians as far as they went but determined to go much further.

In a way, the public figure Graham Wallas was a creation of the Fabian Society. He had a lounging, indolent temperament. Without the constant goading of his fellow-Fabians and their mighty example of tireless disinterested labor in social science, he might never have written anything. It was their practice, "Shaw's exacting passion for artistic perfection and Webb's almost incredible force and industry," [16] which later supplied him with evidence for his philosophy of mental and moral self-development. They also taught him to distrust simplified solutions and to see social problems as questions of more or less. Finally, he praised their call for scientific method in politics, but there his agreement with them ended, for

[13] "Socialism and the Fabian Society," *Men and Ideas*, p. 107.

[14] George Bernard Shaw (ed.), *Fabian Essays in Socialism* (London: Walter Scott, 1889), p. 148.

[15] New York: International Publishers, 1926, p. 156.

[16] *Men and Ideas*, p. 105.

"admirable as that plea is, it will not have its full effect unless the members of the . . . [Fabian Society] learn to avoid the habit of separating the facts of human motive into those which are scientific and those which are not." [17] Here again was reductionism. The Fabians had no vision of a comprehensive social organization which would nourish the whole man, spiritually, economically, culturally, politically. In 1916 Wallas explained why he had left them. Their Tract No. 70 in 1896, "for instance, declared that the Fabian Society 'has no distinctive opinions on the Marriage Question, Religion, Art . . . or any other subject than its own special business of practical Democracy and Socialism'. . . . In my case other things than our own special business were always breaking in. . . ." [18]

Having weighed and disposed of two competing forms of social organization which vied with each other in turn-of-the-century England, Wallas turned to the third, Syndicalism or its variant, Guild Socialism.[19] In one respect, he thought Syndicalism or vocational association was clearly superior to either of the others. It proposed a natural form of political organization based on the common activities and interests of working groups. The political structure of Classical Liberalism and Socialism, on the other hand, corresponded with no known human needs or impulses. It divided society geographically instead of functionally. One-man one-vote territorial democracy was an abstract and arbitrary creation. Wallas admitted that Syndicalism and Guild Socialism arose from legitimate dissatisfaction with parliamentary democracy, its clumsy artificial representative machinery, its emphasis on the rights of property, and its sanction of lopsided economic inequality.

Unfortunately, in operation Syndicalism took a sinister turn. Wallas had no need to return to the medieval guild economy for evil examples. Twentieth-century England was riddled with small-scale Syndicalist organizations — the trades-unions, the lawyers', teachers', doctors' associations. These professional groups no sooner became organized, he thought, than they began to ossify. They became in-groups with their own vested interests and fixed habits. They were radical levelers. They equalized rates of pay and they operated on the seniority principle. They were always conservative and resisted change.

All this was antithetic to Wallas' whole philosophy, descriptive and normative. It was a fact for him that the human mind is infinitely variable and complex. It was another fact that modern industrial society was a whirling chaos of change. The political scientist should therefore be a kind of juggler who weighed and balanced the varieties of human impulse with

[17] *Our Social Heritage*, p. 256.
[18] *Men and Ideas*, p. 106.
[19] For Wallas' fullest discussion and criticism of the competing kinds of social organization, see *The Great Society*.

one hand and technological changes with the other. He should try to bring as many of these old and new facts as possible into play by inventing, modifying, harmonizing, or adapting old or new social institutions to fit them. Institutions must be kept in motion and they must allow for the natural inequality of their members. Wallas demanded greater economic equality and initial equality of opportunity, but after that, encouraged every mark of uniqueness and creative initiative.

Since none of the three rival forms of social organization satisfied his requirements for a *Weltanschauung*, he arranged a characteristic compromise. He was a sweeping but kindly critic who believed that whatever is, is, though partly wrong, at least partly right. Every institution, however archaic, tyrannical, or otiose, reflected some one or more true human instincts. So it was with Individualism, for example, which was based on a genuine property instinct. That instinct had, however, been adapted by evolution to an environment now obsolete and Socialism was an inevitable reaction. Socialism, in turn, rested on the feeling of resentment aroused by exaggerated privilege, and Syndicalism, on man's gregarious co-operative impulses. If "neither Individualism, therefore, nor Socialism, nor Syndicalism, affords by itself a single sufficient basis for the Will–Organization of the Great Society," social scientists will have to invent a new organization, and "it is clear . . . that it will have to contain all the three elements." [20]

Wallas had come to this equilibrium by 1914. But even had there been no war, he could not have rested content with such an artificial compromise between kinds of *economic* organization. It did not begin to satisfy the full range of spiritual, intellectual, and aesthetic impulses which he himself insisted make up the human mind and which political institutions ought to reflect. Then the war came and exploded his customary ways of thinking in terms of labeled doctrines or institutional formulas. All England had to adapt itself to the sudden national emergency, and Wallas was astounded at the accomplishments in large-scale social reorganization, in heightened national morale, and above all in technical and administrative invention.[21] He mused over the possible explanations of these radical social advances. Had the trades-unions taken the initiative? Or perhaps the Socialist societies? Not at all. Both had been drags on the national effort. The trades-unions had steadily resisted conscription and "dilution" of industry by women. The more ardent Socialists, the members of the I.L.P., had refused to serve in the wartime coalition government.

What was done had been done by individuals with freed hands, either outside experts called in by government or members of the civil service. Here are the seeds of Wallas' New Individualism and of the central prob-

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 310.

[21] *Our Social Heritage*, p. 120.

lem of all his later writings. How, he asked, can thought and action, reason and emotion, be made to re-enforce each other? Those who think out a policy and those who act on it are usually two different sets of people. How is it possible for each of them to develop the moral and intellectual vision needed to imagine the full social consequences of their decisions? This is, of course, the same old search for a *Weltanschauung*, with the location changed from doctrines and institutions to the individual bureaucrat.

During the war Wallas lingered once again over the ruins of Socialism and asked a rhetorical question which he had long since answered to his own satisfaction. "One wonders . . . now that this war has shifted the centre of gravity in problems of human organization, whether when peace comes, socialism will still seem . . . to be a sufficing Weltanschauung? Or will the struggle for economic and political equality . . . come to be looked on . . . as a part only . . . of some larger conception of life?" [22] Sooner or later, consciously or unconsciously, many of Wallas' former fellow Fabians asked themselves the same question, were dissatisfied, and also began to hunger for "some larger conception of life." Already in 1889 Annie Besant had plunged into theosophy. More than forty years later the Webbs found a new spiritual universe in communism, and Shaw, some comfort in the leadership principle. Perhaps because the Webbs held on so long to their faith in political solutions of social problems, they were heavily hit when disillusion set in and reacted drastically. Wallas, who had all along been sceptical, was alone among the Fabians in turning back to tradition. He wanted to bring Individualism up to date and to take over where the Utilitarians had left off.

Wallas and the Liberal Tradition

Wallas wanted to do well what the Utilitarians had done badly — to base political science on a genuine science of psychology. "The thinkers of the past, from Plato, to Bentham to Mill, had each his own view of human nature, and they made those views the basis of their speculations on government. But no modern treatise on political science . . . now begins with anything corresponding. . . ." [23] Why? He concluded that Utilitarian psychological theory and its implications in Liberal practice, which ought to have gone hand-in-hand, were hopelessly at odds. Utilitarian psychology gave a Newtonian picture of the mind of man, mechanically operating according to the universal principle of pleasure and pain, and therefore radically equalitarian. Had Utilitarian psychological theory squared with its implied Liberal practice, nineteenth-century British society would have been a marvel of harmonious, automatic, equalitarian efficiency. It was

[22] *Men and Ideas*, p. 107.
[23] *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 35.

hardly that. The Liberal party eventually wore itself out trying to catch up with massive social movements it often neither understood nor could control, and which made a farce of Utilitarian psychological oversimplifications.

Like Bentham, Wallas believed that the phrase "good in theory, bad in practice" was contradictory. Since Utilitarianism was bad in practice, it was no good in theory. It must be discarded and a new psychology developed which kept in step with the onrush of changing social phenomena. This is what Wallas set out to do. He threw out the old Newtonian analogies and adopted the language of Darwinism instead.

> Can we learn . . . to think of the varying individuals of the whole human race? . . . the publication of the "Origin of Species" in 1859 offered an answer. Since then we have in fact been able to represent the human race to our imagination . . . as a biological group, every individual in which differs from every other not arbitrarily but according to an intelligible process of organic evolution.[24]

Wallas appreciated the fact that the Utilitarians belonged to a pre-Darwinian world which lacked the persuasive mass of biological evidence to support a subtly elaborate psychology. He pitied John Stuart Mill's floundering efforts to reconcile simplified Utilitarian psychological theory with his own complex personality on the one hand, and the turbulent "condition of England question" on the other. According to him, Mill partially succeeded in the first reconciliation and got nowhere in the second.

Mill's famous emotional crisis in the autumn of 1826, when he seemed to have nothing left to live for, supplied Wallas with a parable and he returned to it again and again.[25] If the model Benthamite, nurtured and trained from infancy in the inflexible rational mechanics of Utilitarianism, broke down under the strain, what more dramatic proof could be found of its inadequacy? Mill slumped through the winter and spring of 1827. Then one day tears came to his eyes as he read Marmontel's *Memoires*. He discovered feeling and was saved. He had broken through the monist Utilitarian world of rational calculation to a new dualism, a world of thought and a world of feeling.

This was a step in the right direction but Wallas demanded a higher synthesis which Mill never made except in his appreciation of poetry. In Wallas' psychology, the mind is an elaborate web of thoughts and feelings which interact and intensify each other. Instead of the reductionist static psychology which the Utilitarians adopted, Wallas offered a "hormic" conception of the way the mind works. "Hormé" is the Greek word for "drive" and he used it to cover all the "imperceptible gradations from spontaneous 'urge' to conscious will."[26] A hormic psychology "substitutes the

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[24] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

[25] For example, *Our Social Heritage*, p. 168; *Social Judgment*, pp. 88 ff.; *Men and Ideas*, p. 206.

[26] *The Art of Thought*, p. 223.

conception of a living and imperfect tendency towards integration for the conception of a mechanical and perfect integration. . . ." [27] Wallas called this special feeling "intimation," the awareness that a thought is coming. It is just here that thought and emotion fuse. It is one stage of the process of creative thinking which a new art of thought ought to control and modify. First come preparation and incubation, then illumination or intimation, and finally verification.[28]

Wallas wanted Mill "to produce a harmony in his soul by the deliberate cultivation and co-ordination both of thought and of feeling," [29] but "unfortunately, Mill never saw that the due balance among the faculties was a condition of logical thought as well as in other forms of human behavior." [30] In Book VI of *A System of Logic*, Mill rejected the Utilitarian "geometrical method," which held that all social phenomena result from a single property of human nature. His own analysis of social science, however, was caught in the same strait jacket of determinism, "the doctrine of what is called philosophical necessity, [that] weighed on my existence like an incubus," [31] which he had struggled to escape twenty years earlier. Mill's "physical or concrete deductive method," which deductively "infers the law of each effect from the laws of causation on which that effect depends" [32] allowed equally little scope for the bursts of informed feeling, intuition, imagination which illuminate all creative activity.

If Mill's insight into poetry were true, if his enjoyment did come from the imaginative blend of thought *and* feeling, was this not the key to all creative activity? To all forms of art? To mathematics and ethics? To the physical sciences? Wallas began to study the creative process and to collect testimony from great artists and scientists about their actual moments of creation and discovery. He found confirmation everywhere — in Plato's discussion of the control of the passions by the "spirited" and "rational" principles, in Shelley's call "to feel that which we perceive, and to imagine that which we know," [33] in the mathematical physicist Poincaré's description of the special feeling which lit up the moment of discovery. The methods of art were the same as those of science. The future of both depended upon the conscious cultivation of a kind of methodical madness by artists and scientists, working alone and making a moral commitment to do their best.

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[27] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 112.
[29] *Social Judgment*, p. 88.
[30] *Men and Ideas*, p. 206.
[31] J. S. Mill, *Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 143.
[32] J. S. Mill, *A System of Logic* (London: Longmans, Green, 1949), p. 584.
[33] Quoted from *Defence of Poetry* both in *The Art of Thought*, chapter v, and *Social Judgment*, p. 131.

Wallas insisted that political phenomena must be studied scientifically. But he also felt that they are so complex and change so rapidly that they cannot become a "science," that is, a specific body of systematized knowledge. What the political thinker must learn from the scientists is neither laws nor fixed theories but methods of invention. The creative scientist's method is the same as the artist's: both are climaxed by aesthetic illumination, a harmony of idea and impulse. Transferred to social phenomena, Wallas called it "social judgment." Politics is then a branch of morals and invention is an obligation of the political scientist. As early as *Human Nature in Politics*, Wallas had spoken of "the co-ordination of reason and passion as a moral ideal." [34]

Here we have come to the heart of Wallas' New Individualism, for if his analysis of the creative process were correct for the natural and physical sciences,[35] then any political "scientist" worthy of the name must study it and practice it. The social thinker must become a deliberate inventor. And invention is not a joint enterprise.

> In laboratories and universities and government offices we can test hypotheses and compare results by means of the subdivided labour of hundreds of observers to whom each other's knowledge is unknown. But the formation of the original hypothesis, the inventive moment on which successful action depends, must take place in an individual brain.[36]

The social thinker must give up the chimera of a fixed body of scientific doctrine, as contemporary physicists had already done, and look to science for method only. This is what Mill had never been able to do. He kept the world of value and art strictly separate from the world of fact and science,[37] and showed thereby that he simply did not understand scientific method. He had done no scientific work himself, nor had he studied the accounts of practicing scientists like Faraday and Herschel. He picked up what he he knew third-hand from popularizers like Dr. William Whewell.

Mill saved himself from determinism but he left Liberalism inert under it, unable to produce urgently needed programs of social melioration. Liberalism failed because it had taken over Mill's negative conception of liberty, which began and ended with the isolated individual as the prime fact and insisted on "the absolute and essential importance of human development in all its diversity." [38] Wallas stood Liberalism on its head. He called for a positive definition of liberty which began with collective organization as a prime fact, worked to shape each individual uniquely by

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[34] Pp. 204 ff.

[35] The importance he attached to it can be gauged by the fact that he wrote an entire book about it, *The Art of Thought*.

[36] *The Great Society*, p. 16.

[37] It is doubtful whether Wallas made a serious effort to understand Mill. If G. E. Moore is correct, Mill committed the "naturalistic fallacy" by his very inability to keep facts and values apart.

[38] *Our Social Heritage*, p. 168.

education, and then encouraged its best members in "the deliberate invention and organization of expedients for making common action effective." [39]

World War I showed what could be done by giving free rein to individual initiative in social reconstruction but, ironically, an even better example could be found in the Utilitarian and Liberal tradition itself. That example was Jeremy Bentham, whose dedicated life of disinterested social invention spread a glow over the dark mixture of oligarchy and anarchy which was early-nineteenth-century England. The Benthamite tradition was carried into government by his disciples, Chadwick, Joseph Hume, and Southwood Smith. Indeed, Liberalism governed England as long as it did only because so many Liberals in government ignored it and did their own inventing.[40]

If Wallas had a hero, that hero was Bentham; for despite his occasional triviality, his rationalism, his naïve psychology, he alone among the great political thinkers practiced that invention which is the heart and life of political science.[41] Mill, for example, had invented nothing. In the image of Bentham's example, Wallas gradually shifted and narrowed the focus of his political investigations. He went from the customary analysis of the meanings of political abstractions like natural rights and liberty in *Human Nature in Politics* to the construction of economic institutions which would mirror the whole range of human wants in *The Great Society* and finally to the development and organization of effective invention. Again in Bentham's image — the later Bentham of *Chrestomathia* and the *Constitutional Code* — Wallas began to concentrate on the schools and the civil service as the two institutional centers of social invention. An educational system must be developed which singled out talent, stimulated initiative, and gave systematic training in psychology and the processes of thought. The civil service must be made more fluid, so that the best products of the schools were smoothly absorbed into it, given time and opportunity to let their imaginations run in new directions, and encouraged to try their hands at both policy-making and administration.[42]

In still other ways Wallas was Bentham's heir. He, too, was an ardent critic of the conventional vocabulary of politics. Both felt that if abstract terms — such as rights, independence, liberty, power — mean anything, they must ultimately refer to concrete psychological facts. "The political part of our social heritage," Wallas said, "normally reaches us in the form of large vague words." [43] Bentham called himself a lexicographer because he was sure that correct definition was the starting-point of all useful

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 170.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[41] See Wallas' excellent essay on Bentham in *Men and Ideas*.
[42] See his essay, "The British Civil Service," *ibid.*
[43] *Our Social Heritage*, p. 158.

political discussion. Wallas agreed with him. "It is . . . [the] relation between words and things which makes the central difficulty of thought about politics. The words are so rigid, so easily personified, so associated with affection and prejudice; the things symbolized by the words are so unstable." [44]

Wallas thought that Bentham outshone Mill in perhaps an even more fundamental way. He never lay under the curse of determinism. He dismissed the problem briskly, "*Entre nous*, I don't care two straws about liberty and necessity at any time." [45] The uneasy dualist compromise between the world of science and the world of art which Mill evolved was alien to Bentham, who believed all along in a unified world of thought and feeling, knowing and doing, science and art. "As between *art* and *science*, in the whole field of thought and action . . . whatsoever spot is occupied by either, is occupied by both: it is occupied by them in joint-tenancy." [46] According to Bentham, value attaches to any facts the moment we are aware of their use. When we see that something can be done to what is known, science is an art. Wallas was the most undoctrinaire and untheoretical of men, and he was certainly no Utilitarian. Principles did not interest him. He cared about attitudes and methods, not systems or doctrines. What he valued above all in Bentham was neither his marvelous analytic power nor his hedonism, but his fertile inventiveness and his insight into the unity of art and science. "The process of thought," Wallas agreed, "has always been in human life part of the process of action." [47] The very structure of Wallas' books reflects his unceasing insistence on the unity of science and art, thought and action. His works generally have two parts, an opening description and analysis of psychological processes, followed by his application of them to social action.[48]

For all this, Wallas himself was only vaguely an inventor. He made a few suggestions: the staffs of foreign embassies should include cultural and scientific as well as diplomatic attachés; successful civil service appointees should sharpen and prove their capacities by a piece of original social research; [49] desk-bound administrators in the civil service should make occasional tours-of-duty in the field, so they could learn to harmonize their thinking with doing. At bottom, however, Wallas was an old-

[44] *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 96.

[45] *Jeremy Bentham's Works*, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), X, 216.

[46] *Ibid.*, VIII, 27. Quoted approvingly in Wallas' essay, "Physical and Social Science," *Men and Ideas*, p. 206.

[47] *Men and Ideas*, p. 192.

[48] See, for example, *Human Nature in Politics*, *The Great Society*, *Social Judgment*.

[49] Here Wallas used himself as an example. He believed that his years of intensive research in the Francis Place mss. were an invaluable intellectual training for all his later work.

fashioned moralist, a kind of secular social preacher more concerned to exhort and inspire than to invent.

Nor was Wallas' intended fusion of art and science, thought and emotion, much more satisfactory. Even as inspiration, his discussion was left hanging in the air. He confessed, in the last paragraph of *The Great Society*:

> But here we reach the point where our examination of the conditions of Happiness, and, indeed, the whole method of psychological analysis, ceases to be a sufficient guide to life. It is rather through Philosophy than Psychology, rather through a general interpretation of the universe than through a detailed study of so small a part of it as our own minds, that the call of the Extreme [a term which Wallas borrowed from Aristotle's *Ethics* to describe the union of thought and passion] makes itself most clearly heard.[50]

This was philosophical limbo. Wallas later pulled himself out of it. The science of psychology was at last beginning to free itself from the mechanical metaphors which had so long hampered it, and he welcomed all the latest developments from Freud to Gestalt psychology. So far as psychologists were no longer bound by dual worlds of thought and emotion, Wallas reassigned the analysis of creative social invention to them. Modern thought depends on knowledge accumulated and arranged by "scientific" methods. "But behind the use by thinkers of rules and materials drawn from the sciences there has always been . . . an unformulated 'mystery' of thought. . . . That 'something' lies in the field now claimed by the science of psychology."[51] Though Wallas relocated the "mystery" with the psychologists, he did not pretend that they had unraveled it. In *The Art of Thought* he tried to do it himself by making an analysis of the processes of thought, but he merely succeeded in giving the "mystery" a name — Intimation or Illumination, the feeling that a thought is coming. This was about as helpful to the student or civil servant whom Wallas was exhorting to heroic efforts of *social* invention as an explanation of sleep by a "soporific potency." Intimation of what? Illumination of what? Wallas was treating a question of values as a matter of psychological description and it did not work.

He might better have done as Bentham did: make a frank normative commitment to a general principle, either the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number or some other more persuasive and inspirational.

There was one doctrine of Bentham's that Wallas took over intact: the doctrine of individual responsibility. As Bentham would have every man his own laywer and his own priest, so Wallas would have every man his own moralist, psychologist, inventor. He concluded: "In the end, I should come to the individual trying to regulate his own impulses by his own painfully acquired knowledge of facts, and responsible to his future

[50] P. 369.

[51] *The Art of Thought*, p. 27.

self for using that knowledge without fear or favor." [82] Bentham spoke to an audience of legislators; Wallas, to students and civil servants. Yet they were individualists of the same kind. Their pleas were prescriptive. Both called on men to help remake outworn social patterns. Both focused on the problem of men in power. How could they be made and kept responsible? Bentham evolved the Principle of Single-Seated Responsibility and Wallas seconded him. "Someone must always, at each crisis, be ready to propose a policy for all the effects of which he is willing to be responsible." [83]

But Wallas was an individualist with a difference. The later Utilitarians, though not Bentham himself, tried to build a laissez-faire society on a leveling psychology in which all men are alike motivated by pleasures and pains. Wallas called for a collective society which consciously hunted for and developed individual differences.

Wallas Among His Contemporaries

Slowly, patiently, genially, single-mindedly, Wallas sought a *Weltanschauung*. He was a thinker in slow motion. He wrote and rewrote his books with painstaking care, anxious that no one misunderstand him. He had been a teacher long before he became a writer and a schoolmaster's tone lingers in his works. They are often bland, didactic, and repetitive. He was always concerned with the same overriding question: how can effective creative thought be organized in modern industrial mass society? The same themes run through his books: the need for international co-operation, the importance and danger of the vocabulary of politics, the fundamental need for good schools and civil service, the facts of psychological diversity and the evils of reductionist explanations.

All his books attempt to dispel dualisms and to harmonize thought and emotion. Sooner or later, the same attempt was taken up elsewhere, in England, France, Spain, the United States, by philosophers, economists, and novelists. Wallas was not unique. His ideas are throughout representative of Western thought in the first half of the twentieth century, and this is one measure of his quality.

Among the earliest of Wallas' colleagues in quest of intellectual and spiritual harmony was H. G. Wells. Though Wells caricatured Wallas rather cruelly as Willersly in *The New Machiavelli*, he shared many of his ideas. Wells' hero tried to develop Wallas' "social judgment."

> You see, I began in my teens by wanting to plan and build cities . . . I ended in the middle thirties by desiring only to serve and increase a general process of thought . . . . With that I felt there must go an emotion. I hit upon a phrase . . . to convey the spirit that I felt was at the very heart of real human progress — love and fine thinking.[84]

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[82] *Our Social Heritage*, p. 202.
[83] *Social Judgment*, p. 30.
[84] H. G. Wells, *The New Machiavelli* (New York: Duffield, 1911), p. 308.

The New Machiavelli was published in 1911. Fifteen years later Wells and Wallas were both still wrestling with the same problem. The political world of *The World of William Clissold* was a spiritually empty place, where the men of energy and imagination were driven vicariously into business and money-making because they could find no moving creed elsewhere. Wells, too, asked how public service could be made spiritually significant. Like Wallas, he had long deplored the emotional bankruptcy of Socialism. Wallas' disenchantment with the Fabian Society was a lingering process. Wells charged in and out again like an enraged bull, but he agreed that the Fabians "were neglecting human life altogether in social organization." [55]

Wells conceded how much he and Wallas owed to Ostrogorski. Wallas, he said,

> . . . had been greatly impressed by the book of Professor Ostrogorski on Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties (1902). It was an early break towards realism in political science. It swept aside legist conceptions of government by a frank treatment of parliamentary actuality.
>
> Under this stimulus he produced Human Nature in Politics (1908). W. Lippmann, under [Wallas'] inspiration produced a Preface to Politics and [I] my own Modern Utopia.[56]

Lord Keynes was actually such an inventor as Wallas called for. He, too, was struck by the enormous opportunities for social reorganization opened up by World War I and began to see the problem in terms of individual responsibilty. He said: "The next step forward must come, not from political agitation or premature experiments, but from thought. In the field of action, reformers will not be successful until they can steadily pursue a clear and definite object with their intellects and their feelings in tune."[57]

Even Laski, as he jogged along the road from pluralism to Marxism, paused to tell Justice Holmes:

> I felt . . . how much more political questions are moral questions, I mean of character, of *esprit*, and how little questions of machinery and formulae. . . . I have been writing about responsibility and as I have written it has become incredibly more urgent to me to find the secret of the moral tradition which builds responsibility than of the political machinery which secures it. . . .[58]

How can morals and politics, spiritual values and economic and social facts be joined? This was a widely recognized problem, pondered as well among French intellectual mandarins in some of their less ostrich-like moods. It is a recurrent question in Gide's *Journals*, and he agreed with Valery and Wallas that reform must begin in the schools. It was a prob-

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[55] *Ibid.*, p. 307.

[56] H. G. Wells, *Experiment in Autobiography* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), p. 511.

[57] J. M. Keynes, "The End of Laissez Faire," *Essays in Persuasion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932), p. 321.

[58] *Holmes-Laski Letters*, ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), I, 531. Laski spoke to Holmes of *The Art of Thought* as "elegant trifling" (II, 840).

lem which stirred Ortega y Gasset, and F. S. C. Northrop's *Meeting of East and West* is Wallas' harmony of thought and feeling.

But for the most part, their awareness of the problem was incidental and they dealt with it in fleeting and wistful asides. For Wallas, however, the harmony of thought and emotion was central, the unifying theme of all his writings. It was a matter of fact in his descriptive psychology; it was the armory for his attacks on dualisms and reductionism; its conscious cultivation was a normative aim of his call for educational reform and social invention.

Only for John Dewey did this psychological insight play a role as crucial as with Wallas. Dewey and Wallas drew the same implications from it for their social philosophies. Though Wallas' style was always clear and simple and Dewey's sometimes turgid and involved, they often thought alike. Year in and year out Dewey exploded dualisms as Wallas did: theory-practice, value-science, learning-doing, sensation-thought. They repeatedly warned against false simplifications in psychology and political theory, and criticized Hobbes for basing political organization on fear; the Utilitarians, on pleasures and pains; and the Marxists, on economic determinism. This is Dewey, but Wallas might have written it.

> There are an indefinite number of original or instinctive activities. . . . To increase the creative phase and the humane quality of these activities is an affair of modifying the social conditions which stimulate, select, etc. native activities. The first step in dealing with it is to increase our detailed scientific knowledge. . . . Having the knowledge we may set hopefully at work upon a course of social invention and experimental engineering.[80]

Here in one brief passage are three characteristic Wallas doctrines: the indefinite variety of human instincts, the need for conformable social organizations, and consequently the urgent call for social invention.

Dewey and Wallas believed that the divorce of facts and values so rife through Western history ended in critical spiritual malaise and that "the problem of restoring integration and co-operation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of modern life." [60] They thought that modern scientific method could be restorative, that the testimony of experimental scientists about an emotional-rational integration during their moments of discovery should be taken to heart by social scientists. Because of "the fact that in its experimental procedure science has surrended the separation between knowing and doing," they hoped it would be possible to extend "the needed integration in the wider field of collective human experience." [81]

One problem was still left dangling. What content was to be given to the values? Dewey tried to tie it down naturalistically, but Wallas left

[80] John Dewey, *Human Nature in Conduct* (New York: Modern Library, 1930), p. 148.
[60] John Dewey, "The Construction of Good," *Readings in Ethical Theory*, ed. Hospers and Sellars (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1952), p. 273.
[81] *Ibid.*

it suspended and unanswered. He was more concerned with persuading people to give up dualisms than he was with ethical analyses, with pointing to examples of successful intellectual-emotional harmony than with verbal definitions. In the end, in *Social Judgment*, he had to admit that there was as yet no "art of feeling." He ran up against the same "mystery" as he had in *The Art of Thought*. Yet somewhat vague and tender-minded as Wallas' speculations may have been, they were not quixotic. He early recognized a moral problem which many others after him agreed was genuine and urgent.

But even had he succeeded in giving a concrete meaning to the phrase "social judgment" (that is, the fusion of thought and emotion in social conduct), he would soon have been beset by a barrage of more strictly political questions. The best social invention, the most profound exercise of social judgment, is useless outside a political context. It must first be approved by superiors, translated into commands, passed down the hierarchy of subordinate authorities, and enforced within the framework of existing institutions. Inevitably questions of the organization and distribution of political power, of the structure and function of social institutions, crop up, but Wallas avoided them all. Nor did he face the specific economic causes lying behind the social evils he sought to banish.

Of course Wallas was not an economist. He was a descriptive psychologist, a social reformer, and a moralist. In his writings he switched easily from one role to another. What kind of performance did he give? His integrity and sincerity were perfect, but there were possible interpretations he never made and questions he never asked. The descriptive psychologist might have inquired, if the human psyche is a complex tangle of impulses, how is it possible to measure those which are specifically political? The political reformer might have wondered if his assumption that institutions should adapt themselves to the enormous variety of human impulses was a good one? Is it possible to organize society in such complex and changing patterns? The moralist might have hesitated before this: if all impulses were allowed free rein there would be no society. All would be chaos and anarchy. Who shall decide and how shall he choose which impulses should be encouraged; which, diminished; how much and when? Wallas celebrated inequality and change, but habit and the search for security may be the strongest human motives. He knew this but made little of it.

Though many of Wallas' themes did not change, he did. He played all three parts until he died in 1932, but gradually he became a moralist above all. That he shrank his interest to moral issues was fair enough, but he did it at the risk of turning his audience of students and civil servants into an army of Don Quixotes. If they were converted by Wallas to ride off on a crusade of social invention, he gave them a rousing inspirational send-off, but neither a map of the way nor a plan of strategy.

THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN INDONESIAN NATIONALISM AND POLITICS

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AS THE ANALYSIS of the nationalist upheavals in Southeast Asia in our time begins to deepen, it is becoming apparent that behind the demand for political freedom, complex cultural and socioeconomic processes are at work, many of which are older than modern nationalism itself, and which, once independence from colonial control had been achieved, have continued to shape the structure and policies of the new nation-states of the area. Illustrations of this are the cultural changes wrought by the great world religions on the Southeast Asian scene, and their relationship to the growth of political consciousness and of modern ideas of national advancement. Frequently, such a religion provided important impulses of development in the social process and in economic life, offering an ideological rationale to those who were restive under alien colonial domination; and thus it acted as a catalyst on other revolutionary elements in the crucible of change. With national liberty at last a reality, the religions remained as amplifiers of nationalist doctrines, making their presence felt in the national political arena as so many rallying points of public opinion and action.

In the following pages the function of one such religion, Islam, in a representative country of the Southeast Asian area, Indonesia, will be examined. First, it seems necessary to describe briefly the historic evolution of Indonesian Islam and its place in society and culture; secondly, the reasons for and the manner of its contribution to Indonesian nationalism need to be analyzed, in order to arrive, thirdly, at an understanding of its various roles in political life today.

I

The question has long been moot as to whether Indonesia should be considered an Islamic country. While nearly 90 per cent of its more than eighty million inhabitants profess themselves to be Muslims, from an orthodox legal point of view Indonesia is not an Islamic state, since implicit in its constitutional foundations is the doctrine of equality of religions and the absence of any provision conferring preferred status on the Islamic faith.[1]

[1] *Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia* (Djakarta: Pertjetakan Negara, 1953), p. 8 (Article 18). Public legal limitation of Islamic law is also provided for under Article 7 of the provisional constitution with its stipulations of equality of treatment under law, positing the supremacy of public law over special religious law. G. E. von Grünebaum, *Islam. Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*, American Anthropological Association, Memoir 81 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 127, 135, has pointed out that in the classical Islamic

While President Sukarno, as head of the state, is an avowed Muslim, he has on many occasions publicly expressed his opposition to the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, thereby focusing attention on an important rift in public opinion as to the foundations of the free Indonesian Republic.[2] To some modern Muslim theorists in Indonesia, however, freedom of expression for other religions is not incompatible with the principles of an actual Islamic state.[3] A more compelling reason to question the status of Indonesia as a Muslim country is the evidence of an extensive syncretism in the country, the unique blend of autochthonous animistic-pantheistic beliefs of the folk religions with Hindu–Indian religious and cultural traits and with the teachings of Mohammed. The host of cultures and folk societies in Indonesia, each considered at its own level

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tradition the primary purpose of the state is to make possible the service of God and its moral purpose is evidenced in its acceptance of Muslim Canon Law; the theocratic notion implicit in these doctrines precludes the principle of public organization recognizing no preferred status of a religious establishment. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, *Mens en Vrijheid in Indonesië* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1949), pp. 55–56, has cogently argued that in the Islamic community in Indonesia, freedom of religion means freedom for the Muslim to realize the all-Islamic society and state. It does not mean, as in the Western historic liberal sense, freedom of expression of different religions. Moreover, van Nieuwenhuijze points out that the non-Muslim has no positive organic function in the Muslim community, and that there is only one way to solve the question of religious minorities in Muslim dogmatics, and that is the absorption, one way or the other, of the nonbeliever into the body of the faithful. From an orthodox legal point of view Indonesia in the colonial period could not be considered a Muslim state, since its sovereign and source of public authority had no official connection whatever with the faith and its leadership, a situation which, in view of the secular structure of the Indonesian Republic and its constitution, essentially still prevails. See, e.g., W. J. A. Kernkamp, "De Invloed van den Islam," in C. W. Wormser (ed.), *Wat Indië Ontving En Schonk* (Amsterdam: N. V. Wereldbibliotheek, 1946), p. 77. To contemporary Muslim theorists in Indonesia freedom of religion in a Muslim state is, however, possible, but there is by no means unanimity in the Muslim community on this point. It is noteworthy that Indonesia's present Constituent Assembly, now in session, and charged with the drafting of Indonesia's constitution, has reached a seemingly hopeless deadlock over the issue of whether the Indonesian state is to have an Islamic philosophy, or whether it is to be essentially secular in nature. Cf. *Antara Daily News Bulletin* (New York), January 24, 1958, p. 4.

[2] See Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World* (Bandung: Indonesia, N. V. Masa Baru, 1954–56), II, 211–25, 241.

[3] See, e.g., Al-Hadj Wiranatakusumah, *Islamietische Democratie in Theorie en Practijk* (Bandung, Penerbit Pusaka, 1948), *passim*, esp. pp. 18 and 23; Mohammad Natsir, "Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs," Data Paper No. 16 (mimeo.), Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University (Ithaca, 1954), esp. p. 1 (Mohammed "has not come to abolish all other religions based on holy or sacred books, but very definitely to establish the freedom of religion"); Hadji Mohammad Saleh Suaidy in *Merdeka* (Djakarta), July 3 and 24, 1953. Such pronouncements have not tended to diminish apprehension among followers of minority religions (e.g., Hinduism on Bali, Christianity) that a formal Islamic state in Indonesia would impose harmful restrictions on the practice of other faiths. Evidence of this supposition is to be found in the reluctance of the Ministry of Religion to accord official recognition to Balinese Hinduism, refusal to allow the propagation of the Baha'i faith in the country, or disinclination to pay much heed to Roman Catholic complaints that the government hampers the sending of priests to Indonesia. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXII (1953), 121–25, and "Indonesia's Foreign Policy Dilemma," *Eastern World* (London), VIII (1954), No. 11, p. 18.

of development, present a picture of incredible religious eclecticism, a pattern of beliefs and practices drawn from many different sources, in which Islam is but one, and often not even the most important, element.[4] Some students, like the renowned Islamic scholar, Snouck Hurgronje, have argued that just because of this religious eclecticism, there is no reason to deny Islam paramount importance in Indonesian life, any more than there would be cause to denigrate status and respect of religious faiths in other countries on the grounds of imperfections in the practices of their followers.[5] It might be countered, however, that largely because of this eclecticism severe political and cultural disturbances have occurred in Indonesian societies whenever reform-minded Muslim teachers attempted to purify folk beliefs or tried to propagate orthodox Islamic concepts of marriage, family, and inheritance laws — efforts that brought them into conflict with hallowed Indonesian folk custom (usually called *adat*) and its traditional preservers.[6] Such conflicts point up the weaknesses of the claim that Indonesia should be considered an Islamic nation. Indeed, whatever conclusion one may ultimately reach, it is impossible to overlook the fact that wide differences exist between the regions of the Indonesian archipelago as to the depth of penetration of Islamic beliefs in indigenous society: as a result of this, significant social distance and cultural distinctions prevail between those Indonesians who take Islam seriously and in as undiluted form as possible (referred to as *santri*) and those whose Muslim beliefs are inextricably mixed with autochthonous religious notions and with their *adat* (called *abangan*).[7] As will be shown, this division is of cardinal importance to the understanding of Islam's contribution to Indonesian nationalism and to its role in Indonesian political life today. At the same time,

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[4] See generally J. de Jong, *Het Geestesleven der Volken van Indonesië* (Groningen: Batavia, J. B. Wolters, 1948). Compare C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "Geloven–en doen, over de Islam in Indonesië," in G. H. van der Kolff (ed.), *Sticusa Jaarboek 1951* (Amsterdam: Sticusa, 1951), p. 85. "Alive are all sorts of spiritual and religious concepts which originated in periods before the coming of Islam. Normal every day life of every Indonesian, and especially his feastdays, is impregnated by them. The average Indonesian Muslim is hardly aware of this . . . in good faith he ascribes things to Islam which are completely alien to it."

[5] C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam* (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1911). A restatement of these views of Snouck, one of the foremost Islamic scholars of his day and an advisor to the colonial Dutch government on Native Affairs around the turn of the nineteenth century, may be found in his *Verspreide Geschriften* (Bonn, Leipzig, Leyden: K. Schroeder and E. J. Brill, 1924–26), IV/2, pp. 225–306.

[6] Cf. H. Bouman, *Enige, Beschouwingen over de Ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust* (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1949), pp. 64–66; J. Prins, *Adat en Islamietische Plichtenleer in Indonesië* (2d. ed.; The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1950), pp. 10–16; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Disorganization and Social Change in Rural Indonesia," *Rural Sociology*, XIX (1954), 161–73.

[7] A telling example of a primitive Indonesian society, part of which has experienced Islamic influences, and the other part not, and which yet preserves a large measure of its original cohesion on the basis of traditional ritual, is that of the Badujs in the Southern part of West Java. See N. J. C. Geise, *Badujs en Moslims in Lebak Parahiang Zuid Banten* (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1952), esp. pp. 164–66.

there is no denying that the Islamization of Indonesia is an ongoing process,[8] and that increasingly in the present century it has provided a common cultural pendant to political aspirations, an ideology and philosophical rationale that heightens the sense of unity.[9] Even for the *abangan* in Indonesia Islam has become part of his newfound concept of nationality.

Islam began to penetrate into the Indonesian archipelago by the eleventh century A.D. along the trade routes connecting Southwest India and the Middle East, but not until the thirteenth century did sizable colonies of Muslim foreigners and local converts begin to spring up in the harbor principalities that dotted the coast line of Indonesia's many islands.[10] As the Islamization of the Malay Peninsula intensified in subsequent centuries, so did the Islamic character of Indonesian coastal cultures become more pronounced. Indonesian centers of Islamic scholarship began to emerge (e.g., Achin in North Sumatra, Demak in Central Java) and the village societies in the interior of the great islands also gradually became more familiar with the teaching of Muslim *ulama* and *kiajih* (scholars of the writ). Yet traditional eclecticism engulfed from the start much of this new Islamic influence in the Indonesian folk societies, an eclecticism discernible in the "Indonesianization" of mosque architecture no less than in the folk modification of Muslim dogmas and celebration of feast days.[11] Moreover, the Islamization of the Indonesian courts appears to have been dictated in many instances by mere political considerations: the emperor of the great Javanese realm of Mataram turned to formal acceptance of Islam in the seventeenth century because of fear of, and resentment over, the encroachments of the Dutch who had meanwhile established themselves in the archipelago.[12] And there is little reason to doubt that the subsequent Islamization of the village society proceeded on the basis of this official sanction given to the faith by the court, along the lines of the contemporary European principle of *cujus regio ejus religio*.[13] All this tended to give Islam in Indonesia a peculiar character, of import-

[8] G. W. J. Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism," in G. E. von Grünebaum (ed.), *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 286.

[9] See also Hasan Shadily, *Sosiologi untuk Masjarakat Indonesia* (Djakarta: P. T. Pembangunan, 1954).

[10] W. F. Stutterheim, *De Islam en zijn Komst in de Archipel. Cultuurgeschiedenis van Indonesië* (2d. ed.; Groningen, Djakarta: J. B. Wolters, 1952), pp. 33–37; R. A. Kern, *De Islam in Indonesië* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1947), pp. 5–15; H. J. de Graaf, *Geschiedenis van Indonesië* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1949), pp. 80–90.

[11] R. L. Mellema, *De Islam in Indonesië in het bijzonder op Java* (Amsterdam: Indisch Instituut, 1947), pp. 7–11; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Folklore and Tradition in Javanese Society," *Journal of American Folklore*, LXVII (1954), 25–33.

[12] C. C. Berg, "Geschiedenis en Geschiedschrijving van Mataram," *Indonesië*, VIII (1955), 236.

[13] W. J. Kernkamp, "Regeering en Islam," in W. H. van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk (eds.), *Daar Werd Wat Groots Verricht. Nederlandsch-Indië in de XXste Eeuw* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1941), pp. 192–93.

ance in the analysis of its place today. For almost inevitably conflicts between *santri* reformers and the *abangan* populace occurred. As early as the seventeenth century Javanese rulers persecuted orthodox Muslims because of their agitation against the prevailing heterodoxy and eclecticism (embodying autochthonous Indonesian, Hindu–Javanese and Muslim ingredients) in the courts and their culture.[14] Even at a later date resistance among the Central Javanese nobility to Islamic orthodoxy was in evidence, not the least because of the enduring strength of their pre-Muslim Hindu–Javanese traditions.[15] Such conflicts between orthodoxy and heterodoxy have also been common in many parts of Sumatra, including Achin and the Minangkabau area. Indeed, in Achin the conflict between orthodox Muslim schoolmen and traditional tribal chiefs, who personified pre-Islamic concepts and culture traits, led to bloody violence during and after the Japanese occupation of Indonesia in World War II.[16]

Given the strength of pre-Islamic tradition in Indonesia, it was inevitable that over the centuries Islam in Indonesia developed its own approach in winning converts. Not only by allowing eclectic tendencies to penetrate into Muslim precept was Islam able to gain acceptance, but also by stressing the mystical traditions that had come to be associated with it in the course of its development and spread in Africa and the Middle East. This mystical orientation proved most congenial to the animistic-pantheistic cosmogony of the Indonesian folk societies; because of it Islam could be rendered understandable in traditional, nativistic terms, and hence, as one authority has remarked, in Indonesia "every Muslim teacher of any note tries to give instruction in mysticism, because only by so doing can he get any real hold on the people." [17] As a result, Islam in Indonesia has been made to sanction a number of mystical-apocalyptic beliefs common to the traditional religious outlook, beliefs which revolve around the expectation that the present era will end in a series of cataclysmic upheavals and a new "Golden Age" of unbounded prosperity and happiness will arise.[18] Ancient prophecies, folk sayings, and mystical symbols are believed to foretell the coming of the new age, and with these the Muslim concept of the Mahdi (Savior), originating in Near Eastern Muslim speculations, has come to be

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[14] *Indonesian Sociological Studies. Selected Writings of B. Schrieke. Part One* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955), p. 77.

[15] W. F. Wertheim, "Effects of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society" (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), p. 56 (mimeo.).

[16] A. J. Piekaar, *Atjeh en de Oorlog met Japan* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1949), *passim*.

[17] Raymond L. Archer, *Muhammadan Mysticism in Sumatra* (Hartford, 1935), p. 91. Reprinted in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*, XV (1937), Pt. 2, pp. 112 ff.

[18] Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Messiah in Indonesia and Melanesia," *Scientific Monthly*, LXXV (1952), 161–65; F. H. van Naerssen, *Cultuurcontacten en Sociale Conflicten in Indonesië* (Amsterdam: J. M. Meulenhoff, 1946), pp. 14–15.

closely associated.[19] Since Messianic notions were already prevalent in the original Indonesian and Hindu–Javanese religious patterns, the popularity of the Mahdi concept, and its skillful blending with similar Indonesian expectations by Indonesian schoolmen and teachers of religion, tended to strengthen the whole tenor of apocalyptic tendencies — in Javanese culture in particular, with the result that later modern Indonesian nationalism also found much of its program interpreted in the popular terms of a forthcoming Golden Age. To speed the coming of the apocalypse, would-be Mahdis whipped the populace to xenophobic frenzy, utilizing a stricter interpretation of Islam as their weapon against both the institutions of Dutch colonial control and traditional heterodoxy and eclecticism. An example of this was the rebellion against the Dutch of Diponegoro, a Javanese prince, between 1825 and 1830. Diponegoro, today revered by Indonesian nationalists as a precursor of their movement, wished to cleanse the Javanese courts and the nobility of all manner of impurities that had followed in the wake of secular Dutch control by insisting on a return to Islamic "orthodoxy"; although his rebellion failed, he remains as a symbol of the early union of nationalistic aspirations and a presumably orthodox Muslim legalism.[20]

But it is well to see this Islamic orthodoxy and puritanism in its proper perspective. While it railed against Javanistic eclecticism and insisted on a stricter application of Muslim beliefs, it was itself still heavily encumbered by the tenets and practices of Indonesian folk Islam. An illustration is again Diponegoro, who though unfurling the banner of Islamic purism and proclaiming himself a ruler in Muslim Messianic terms, also accepted the Hindu–Javanese title of *Eruçakra* (Savior Prince), and proved faithful to the commands of pre-Muslim Javanese deities and spirits.[21] Prior to the spread of reform Islam in Indonesia in the latter part of the nineteenth century we should look on this earlier call for a greater strictness and purity in Muslim life as part of the total range of cultural reactions to the ever advancing penetration into and encroachment on Indonesian life by the Dutch colonial power.[22]

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[19] B. J. O. Schrieke, "De Javaansche Messias voor en tijdens den Islam," in *Oostersch Instituut Leiden. Jaarboek 1941* (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1942), pp. 77–79; G. W. J. Drewes, *Drie Javaansche Goeroe's* (Leyden: A. Vros, 1925), pp. 7, 9.

[20] Justus M. van der Kroef, "Prince Diponegoro; Progenitor of Indonesian Nationalism," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, VIII (1949), 424–50, and Muhammad Yamin, *Dipanegara* (Djakarta: Pembangunan, 1951).

[21] B. W. J. Drewes, "Over werkelijke en vermeende Geschiedschrijving in de Nieuw Javaansche Literatuur," *Djawa*, XIX (1939), 247–48. See also the communication of A. B. Cohen Stuart in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsche-Indië uitgegeven door het Koninklijk Instituut voor de Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde Van Nederlandsch-Indië* (hereafter cited as *BKI*), VII (1873), 285–89 and P. H. van der Kemp, "Dipanegara, een geschiedkundige Hamlettype," *BKI*, XXXVI (1896), 306 ff.

[22] Though Diponegoro's rebellion and the eruption of such reform movements in the Islamic Middle East and in India known as Wahabi both fall within the first decades

Islam had spread through the channels of trade in Indonesia, and it was through these channels again that the Islamic revival and reform movements of the late nineteenth century became manifest. Emanating to a large extent from the evangelistic purism of the new Wahabi movement of the Egyptian reformer Shaykh Muhammad Abduh and from the Al-Manar circle in Cairo,[23] Islamic reform in Indonesia appears to have appealed particularly to the Islamized Indonesian merchant groups which, traditionally more orthodox in their profession of the faith, were apprehensive over the loss of prestige of Islam among the younger generation of Westernized Indonesians.[24] The new concept of Islam stressed an evangelical return to the Koran as the prime source of the Muslim faith; opposed the hoary accretions of folk Islam and traditional eclecticism; announced its desire to bring Islam in line with modern scientific advances and empiricism, and its willingness to examine the great social, political, and economic upheavals of the modern world in the light of revealed Islamic truth; and above all urged a dynamic application of individual energy in the furtherance of one's social and economic status in life. The last-named factor in particular made reform Islam an activator of indigenous business develop-

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of the nineteenth century, there is no evidence that Diponegoro was directly influenced by the purism of Wahabi thought. Still, there is a remarkable similarity between the two movements, for like Diponegoro's rebellion the Wahabi upheaval in India began as an attack on the corruption in religious life, opposition to nativisitic encumbrances on the true faith and from there turned to resistance to foreign oppression also by peasants, who, as in Central Java, were caught in an economic squeeze by foreign landowners and creditors. Compare Wilfred Cantwel Smith, *Modern Islam in India. A Social Analysis* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1946), pp. 10–11.

[23] On the Islamic Reform see H. A. R. Gibb (ed.), *Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Moslem Movements in the Moslem World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), and H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947).

[24] W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition. A Study of Social Change* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1956), p. 207. Wertheim's contention that modern Westernized Indonesians had a negative attitude toward Islam, however, requires some qualification. To support his view Wertheim cites the opinions of a number of Indonesians on the indolence and low level of development of Indonesians around the turn of the last century, as presented to a committee charged with an investigation of Java's diminishing welfare. ("Inlandsche stemmen over de laksheid van den Inlander," *Onderzoek naar de mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche bevolking op Java en Madoera* [Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1905–14], Vol. IXe). In considering these Indonesian opinions one is struck by the fact that they do not attribute the Indonesian's backwardness to Islam as such, but rather to certain semireligious beliefs of non-Islamic origin which were fused, often through misunderstanding, with Islamic doctrine. For example, a number of these opinions are critical of the Indonesian's attitude toward fate (e.g., pp. 44, 56, 69, and 76 of the above named report), which encourages passivity and indifference to worldy goods. This fatalistic attitude is designated by Islamic or Islamized Indonesian terms (e.g., *takdir*, *qodrat*, *iradat*), but it is clear that we have to do here with pre-Islamic Indonesian attitudes which became the basis of a particular "Islamic" view of fate. Pre-Islamic animistic superstition, such as various notions about days of good and evil fortune, contributed as much to this fatalistic bent. Polygamy, sanctioned by Islam, is viewed as another deterrent to development in these Indonesian opinions, but they overlook the fact that polygamy as such is the exception rather than the rule in Indonesian society (See also Vol. Xb, part 2, pp. 79–80 of the above cited report).

ment, and thus by giving great impetus to the growth of the budding Indonesian middle classes, it has come to invite comparison with the role of Lutheranism and Calvanism in West-European economic development.[25] It was not long before this call to action led to the formation of Muslim business associations, welfare groups, and political parties. All this also heightened Indonesian Muslim interest in the work of modern Islamic thinkers and theorists like Anwar Iqbal Quereshi, S. A. Siddiqi, Mirza Muhammad Husain, and others who attempted to define the unique contribution of Islam to modern political organization, public administration, and social welfare. By quickening interest in Islam as a faith and way of life in the modern world, Muslim reform in Indonesia also contributed greatly to an increased awareness of their political and social condition among younger Indonesians and thus assisted in the growth of nationalist consciousness.

The important new role of reform Islam would not have been possible without its social and economic referents in Indonesian life. The status of those who became supporters of reform Islam did much to lend power and prestige to the new currents of thought. As has been explained, the Islamization process emanated from colonies of traders in coastal towns, supported by the lukewarm approval of court and nobility. With the emergence of Dutch colonial power in the seventeenth century the spread of Islam was not retarded, although the Calvanistic Dutch at first did not fail to obstruct its expansion.[26] As much of the distributing and retail trade passed more and more into the hands of immigrant Chinese, the Islamized Indonesian trader saw the sphere of his operations greatly restricted, at least in Java.[27] On the Indonesian islands beyond Java, however, where in most instances decisive Dutch control was not established until the end of the nineteenth century, and where local potentates often proved to be quite hospitable to Islam, the Muslim merchant group soon obtained a new lease on life. In West and North Sumatra and in South Sulawesi for example, the Islamic trader element began to play a role of major importance in local Indonesian society. Here, as well as in Java, the economic significance of the growing group of Muslim clerics and of

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[25] Compare *Mededeelingen der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang 1920* (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1920), col. 14; D. M. G. Koch, *Verantwoording. Een Halve Eeuw in Indonesië* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1956), pp. 190–211. Elsewhere Koch has also called attention to the similarity between the demands of the budding Muslim Indonesian entrepreneurs and the middle class desires and suggestions of reform collected in the *Cahiers* of the various provinces in France and sent to the States-General in Paris on the eve of the French Revolution. (D. M. G. Koch, "Romein in Indonesië," *De Nieuwe Stem*, XI [March, 1956], 165). See also Justus M. van der Kroef, "Economic Origins of Indonesian Nationalism," in Phillips Talbot (ed.), *South Asia in the World Today* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 180.

[26] W. J. Kernkamp, "Regeering en Islam," p. 193, in van Helsingen and Hoogenberk, *op. cit.*

[27] On the changing status of the Indonesian entrepreneur and trader see Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World*, II, 1–62.

Islamic religious institutions should not be overlooked. The chief officials of the mosque, their assistants, the keepers of rural Muslim prayer huts, the scholars of the writ and their students — all these assumed a position of great prestige in the Indonesian community. Moreover, many of them came to control sizable amounts of property, derived from charitable contributions, bequests of the wealthy or highborn, or from trust funds established because of legal disputes over inheritances, the decision of which was entrusted to competent Muslim scholars. The bequests (called *wakap* in Indonesia, from the Arabic *waqf*), in particular, might involve real estate of considerable value: rice fields, houses, fish ponds, woods, even whole villages might be placed under Muslim clerical control, their income intended to contribute to the maintenance of graves, shrines, or other — not necessarily religious — purposes.[28] The propagation of Islam in the rural areas also initiated another process of economic development. In the village some self-proclaimed exponent of Muslim law, particularly if he had made the required pilgrimage to Mecca, and returned as a revered *hadji*, frequently became the nucleus of a small school and/or of an active group of Muslim followers, whose lands, buildings, and other property frequently assumed the character of a corporation, the shrewd exploitation of which amassed for the leader and his followers comparative wealth, so that in some areas " 'rich man' and '*hadji*' are nearly synonymous terms." [29] Between such rural Muslim wealth and the not insignificant pockets of urban commercial Muslim wealth there grew, largely because of the common religious bond, a close connection so that the Muslim urban trade not infrequently came to be financed by rural wealth.[30] Compared to the economic status of the debt-ridden Indonesian peasant, his lands fragmentized under inexorable population pressure, inadequately adjusted to the workings of the money economy that followed in the wake of Dutch

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[28] L. W. C. van der Berg, "De Mohammedaansche Geestelijkheid en de Geestelijke Goederen," *Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-Land-en Volkenkunde uitgegeven door het Bataviasche Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen*, XXVII (1882), 1–46. B. Ter Haar, *Adat Law in Indonesia* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), p. 144, emphasizes that land or other property can be made *wakap* not necessarily for religious purposes "but for any reason that does not conflict with sacred law." Under the *wakap*, property may be set aside in perpetuity to a certain individual or group, who derives exclusive benefit from it. It would seem well to stress that as a sort of "trust fund," recognized also in public law, the *wakap* has contributed substantially to the capital formation of the Indonesian Muslim Community. The same applies to those villages in Java, called *desa perdikan*, which were declared exempt from most or all taxes, because of the religiosity of the *desa* members. This exemption was conferred by Javanese rulers, substantially recognized by the colonial government, and has persisted until this day. See E. Gobee and C. Adriaanse (eds.), *Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1957), I, 723.

[29] Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: some preliminary considerations," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IV (1956), 145–46.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

colonial penetration, and wholly dependent on a chain of usurious middlemen-creditors, the Muslim peasant group undoubtedly represented an elite, whose position was strengthened by the mutual tie of their faith and by the aura of mystical religiosity that their "orthodoxy" conferred in the eyes of their more eclectic-minded fellow villagers. Since reform Islam tended to emphasize the importance of attaining higher social and economic status for the Muslim, it is not surprising that the new rationale of self-improvement and group advancement would ultimately coincide with similar demands from other restive elements in Indonesian society.[31] This, however, the Dutch colonial government did not see or did not want to see. It was on the whole sympathetic to the Islamic reform movement so long as it did not meddle in politics, but it failed to understand that for the Muslim, whether of reformist persuasion or not, a government by unbelievers would by its very nature be illegal in Islamic eyes, and that on this, if on no other basis, Muslim sympathy for and collaboration with Indonesian nationalism lay in the nature of things.[32]

The reform movement also could not fail to emphasize the importance of Islamic ritual and practice in the life of the average Indonesian. The role of Koran and *hadith* (tradition), of the Shafi'ite legal orientation which prevails in Indonesia,[33] of the major duties of the believer, from profession of faith to the daily prayer, the observance of fasting, the act of charity and the often long-looked-for pilgrimage — all were cast in bolder relief by the Muslim *réveil*, and none failed to touch in some measure the lives of most Indonesians.[34] While the obscurer points of doctrine were still lost to the

[31] The rise of Islamic reform movements, accompanied by the call for a greater dynamism in the social and economic pursuits of the Muslim, and reflected in the general restiveness of other segments of Indonesian society, must also be viewed in terms of a general reaction to the ever-advancing pattern of Western secularism and modern enterprise in Indonesia. This advance, as I have suggested elsewhere, had important social-psychological consequences for the Indonesian, perhaps the most important of which was the profound experience of a threat of annihilation, economically and culturally. In psychological terms the adoption of a "Calvinistic" rationale of thrift and industry by the Muslim Indonesian was the equivalent of a complete identification with the aggressor. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Colonial Deviation in Indonesian History," *East and West* (Institute per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, Rome), VII (1956), pp. 251–61.

[32] Compare G. H. Bousquet, *A French View of the Netherlands Indies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 18–19, and the same author's "Introduction à l'étude de l'Islam indonésien," *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, II–III (1938), 135–259.

[33] The Shafi'ite orientation is one of four now existing interpretations or schools (*mahdab*) of the Islamic doctrine of duties (*fikh*). Briefly, a *mahdab* comprises a body of more or less authoritative interpretations of Koran and tradition, and in that sense invites comparison with the denominations of the Christian Church. Of the four *mahdab* (Shafi'ite, Hanafite, Malikite, and Hanbalite), the Shafi'ite prevails in Indonesia. The Shafi'ite *mahdab* was founded by Imam Mohammad ibn Idris as Shafii (767–820), a renowned scholar, who taught in Bagdad and later in Egypt.

[34] Still a part of the reform effort is to popularize and bring to an ever-widening public the main tenets and requirements of the Islamic faith. With advancing literacy the volume of printed Indonesian instructional and devotional materials has increased enormously. One of the best of these recent instructional booklets, addressed to a

average believer, this only served to enhance the prestige of *ulama* and *kiajih* who could expound them; while it was often difficult to distinguish between what was part of the old pre-Islamic *adat* and what was truly Muslim, this did not detract from the authority of Muslim jurisprudence;[35] and while furious dissent often racked the Muslim scholarly world, this did not diminish the newly won sense of self-worth of the simple follower of the faith. Along with the slow emergence of national pride Islam conferred an identity on the Indonesian that enabled him to press on in the pursuit of novel, if dimly discernible, goals of his own and of his nation.

II

The entry of Indonesian Islam into the arena of nationalism occurred in 1912 when an association of reform-minded Muslim traders and entrepreneurs, many of them in the small-scale *batik* (textile) industry, constituted themselves as *Sarekat Islam* (Islam Association — S.I.).[36] Students do not ordinarily consider it to be the first organized expression of modern Indonesian nationalism — a self-betterment society of aristocrats called *Budi Utomo* (Noble Endeavor) and various regional groups in West Java and elsewhere preceded it — but it was undoubtedly the first nationalist organization with a mass appeal. Arising out of the dissatisfaction of Muslim Indonesian traders over sharp business practices of their Chinese competitors, S.I. soon won support also among Indonesian youths and intellectuals as well as in the countryside among the untutored peasantry and in the ranks of the rising labor movement. S.I.'s program seemed at first to reflect a reform Muslim and middle-class interest: the organization was to devote itself to the promotion of the "commercial spirit" among Indonesians and the weeding out of "incorrect concepts about Islam." But when during the period of World War I a vehement intensification of nationalist activity took place, accompanied by a growing militancy and radical tone in political demands, the S.I. found itself forced to make a

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"bewildered" young Indonesian, is the richly illustrated and lively written volume by Mohammad Natsir and A. S. Nasroen, *Hidup Bahagia* (Bandung: Vorkink–W. van Hoeve, 1954).

[35] The present Indonesian government has maintained with little or no alteration the function of religious (i.e., Islamic) courts, as originally provided by decree of the Dutch colonial government in 1882. See J. H. A. Logemann, *Het Staatsrecht van Indonesië. Het Formele Systeem* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1954), pp. 129, 144. Such courts have exclusive jurisdiction over matters involving Muslims pertaining to marriage and divorce and property transactions concerned, though indirectly their influence may well extend beyond this. See also W. L. G. Lemaire, *Het Recht in Indonesië. Hukum Indonesia* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1952), pp. 232–34. For a good description of the early application of Muslim law in colonial Indonesia see K. L. J. Enthoven, *Het Adatrecht der Inlanders in de Jurisprudentie 1849–1912* (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1927), pp. 58–79.

[36] J. T. Petrus Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië* (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1931), pp. 56–57; A. K. Pringgodigdo, *Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia* (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1950), pp. 16 ff.

decision in regard to the communistic and ultra-nationalistic elements that had crept into it.[37] At the Fourth Congress of the party in 1919 it came to a rupture and Communists and other radicals founded their own organizations, among them the Indonesian Communist party. By 1921 leading Communist members had formally resigned from S.I., taking some important branches with them.[38] The "middle class" tone of the S.I. had been preserved. As the S.I. chairman, Tjokroaminoto, had declared in 1920: "First of all we must fight for political freedom. . . . It is not necessary to adhere to certain sets of principles, but it is important to show force. Later on we shall see if we are Socialists."[39] Long afterwards, however, Communists continued to exert their influence covertly in local S.I. sections and to establish rival organizations, since they appeared to believe that the international religious orientation of S.I. might be used as a base for their own operations in making the Indonesian conscious of the global proletarian struggle. In their persistent agitation, culminating in a wave of strikes and open rebellion (1926–27), the Communists ran afoul of the colonial Dutch government, which cracked down severely and drove the Communist party underground.[40]

The radical course taken by the Communists and other extreme groups and the increasingly repressive policies of the Dutch authorities did not fail to leave their mark on the Muslim movement. For one thing, it convinced many Muslims of the danger and apparent futility of "showing force," and in consequence they began to concentrate their attention on the nonpolitical side of the Indonesian Muslim's emancipation movement by joining such associations as the *Muhammadiyah*, founded in 1912 by Hadji Ahmad Dahlan, an exponent of reform Islam. *Muhammadiyah*'s work covered and still covers a wide field, ranging from the propagation of education, the establishment of schools, boarding houses, and peasants' and traders' co-operatives, the maintenance of mosques, prayerhouses, orphanages, and clinics to the publication of a vast volume of printed material in the furtherance of the Islamic revival.[41] While not engaging in

[37] J. T. Petrus Blumberger, "Vakbeweging (Inlandsche)," *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1919–35), VII (Aanvullingen), 429–30.

[38] L. M. Sitorus, *Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia* (Djakarta: Pustaka Rakjat, 1947), p. 25.

[39] *Mededeelingen der Regeering Omtrent Enkele Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang 1922* (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1922), col. 5.

[40] See generally J. T. Petrus Blumberger, *De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië* (2d. ed., Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1935); S. J. Rutgers, *Indonesië. Het Koloniale Systeem in de periode tussen de Eerste en de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Pegasus, 1947), pp. 149–65.

[41] D. M. G. Koch, *Om de Vrijheid. De Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesië* (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan, 1950), pp. 96–97; *Cultureel Nieuws Indonesië*, 1953, no. 25, pp. 598–600 (*Indonesische Documentatie*, December 20, 1952); Leslie H. Palmier, "Modern Islam in Indonesia: The Muhammadiyah after Independence," *Pacific Affairs* (September, 1954), pp. 255–63.

politics itself, *Muhammadiyah* did leave its members free to do so. Secondly, ideological and political-tactical schisms made their appearance among politically conscious Muslims. An example of this was the founding in 1926 of the *Nahdatul Ulama* (Association of Muslim Scholars — N.U.) by two orthodox Muslim teachers, Kjai Hashim Ashari and Kjai Wahab Hazbullah. Arising originally as a reaction to modern Wahabism and to reform Islam, N.U. reflected first of all rural Muslim life in Indonesia, traditionally centered around the village teachers-peasants. In a sense the emergence of N.U. was the "rural" answer to a new Muslim dynamic that had largely been urban-oriented up to that time. The significant ideological difference between the S.I. and *Muhammadiyah* on the one hand and N.U. on the other should be stressed. N.U. was on the whole far more conservative, less hospitable to the idea of reconciling the scientific findings of the modern world and its social and economic consequences to a simple evangelical interpretation of Mohammed's doctrine based almost exclusively on the Koran. N.U.'s conservatism also veered in the direction of the mystical domains of Indonesian folk Islam and it rigidly kept the body of tradition, of the law of duty and of dogmatics with little inclination toward more modern interpretations. Internal differences about political tactics also cost the S. I. much of its former strength. In 1922 the S. I. had had more than two million members; barely six years later it had lost at least half of them. Some S.I. leaders favored a more "national" orientation and an abandonment of the traditional Pan-Islamic ideology that had characterized the group in its earlier years and which the Communists had attempted to exploit. In response the S.I. changed its name to *Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia* (United Indonesian Islam party — PSII) in 1929. Others favored the direction taken by the N.U. and urged closer collaboration with *ulama* in the villages and smaller towns, and a non-co-operative policy with respect to the colonial regime. The first group feared, however, that such conservatism would nullify much of the value of reformed Islamic thinking and that the non-co-operation approach ignored the possibility of obtaining at least some concessions from the Dutch. But above all the strength of the S.I. (PSII) was sapped by the rise of secular nationalist parties, whose programs, avily influenced by Marxism and political radicalism, aroused apprehension in the ranks of more conservative Muslims, while they drew away mass enthusiasm from the S.I. (PSII) because of the latter's purging of radical elements.[42]

The different currents of thought led to a splintering of the once more or less united front. The founding of the N.U. had indicated that the S.I.

[42] On these cross-currents in the PSII see George McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 94–95 and J. M. Pluvier, *Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationistische Beweging in Indonesië in de jaren 1930 tot 1942* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1953), pp. 70–77, 113–18.

(PSII) had failed to address itself adequately to the rural Indonesian Muslim. Quarrels among the PSII's top leaders led to the foundation of a new *Partai Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islam party — PARII) in May, 1933. In Sumatra, under the influence of local Communist pressures, rival Muslim groups emerged which were far more radical in tone than was the PSII. The conflict over the question of co-operation with the colonial authority led to a further rift and in 1936, dissident elements which favored a more dynamic program and which accused the PSII leadership of having caused the degeneration of the party into a group of mere "religious propaganda and Koran readings" formed a rival *Barisan Penjedar PSII* (Movement to Make the *Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia* Conscious). Further dissension about the question of co-operation and the degree of orthodox religious emphasis led to a continued weakening of the PSII, while the *Barisan* failed to arouse any consequential mass support and other nationalist parties as well as the colonial regime remained suspicious of it. In an effort to recapture some of the lost ground among its former mass following, the PSII announced in 1937 that it would collaborate more closely with other nationalist groups and would be more forceful on the political scene. To emphasize this new dynamic orientation in the Islamic movement yet another Muslim party, also called the *Partai Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Islam Party — PII) was founded by PSII members in 1938. Soon it obtained quite a following in Muslim-conscious areas beyond Java, where a dynamic class of traders-entrepreneurs were ripe for a political organization which translated their economic convictions in terms of an active and reformed Islamic outlook. It seems likely that the evident popularity of the political activism and co-operation sponsored by the PII, and the indications that the PSII might prove to be more hospitable to these in the future, provoked a severe reaction among old-guard affiliates of the PSII, whose extreme Islamic-theocratic doctrines and dogmatic rigidity were irreconcilable with a policy of co-operation with non-Muslim nationalist groups and with the colonial power. The result was the formation of a rival body within the PSII with Kartosuwirjo as its leader. The new opposition group styled itself *PSII–Kedua* (PSII No. 2) and urged non-co-operation, both as a religious principle and as a political tactic, on the rest of the party. Further developments were cut short by the outbreak of World War II and the subsequent occupation of most of Indonesia by the Japanese.[43]

In viewing Muslim activity within the broader context of the Indonesian nationalist movement in the period before World War II, one is struck by the gradual emergence of a severe doctrinal split between, on the one hand, a traditional Pan-Islamism, which viewed the S.I. and the PSII as

[43] Pluvier, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–18.

vehicles of an uncompromising orthodox legalism that raised a wall between the Muslim believer and the *kafir* (unbeliever) and could conceive neither of a political theory nor of political action that was not entirely based on "pure" Islamic precept; and, on the other hand, a nationally oriented Islamic movement, hospitable by virture of its reform ideologies to the demands for emancipation and modernization of the Indonesian voiced by other non-Muslim nationalist parties, and, for tactical reasons, willing to collaborate with them. The significance of this split became increasingly apparent in the years after the successful completion of the Indonesian Revolution when it produced armed rebellion that has continued until this day. The fact that periodically it dawned on all Muslim groups that the strength of their movement was dissipated for lack of unity and that, in consequence, rather innocuous federative bodies of parties such as the *Madjlisul Islamil A'laa Indonesia* (All Islamic Federation of Indonesia), founded in 1937, were established, could hardly be construed to mean that the divisiveness of the Islamic community was not far-reaching and fundamental.[44] Moreover, it also seems clear that the early success of the *Sarakat Islam* lay precisely in its all-inclusive nature, its tendency to absorb a great variety of political (including more or less non-Muslim) and economic currents. When, as a result of Communist infiltration, the S.I. sought to define its program more clearly and as a result its religious basis had to be given a parmount position, dissension broke out, not just with the Communists but with other groups and points of view in the Muslim community in Indonesia as well. The continuous breaking off of new splinter groups from the parent PSII body reflected not merely tactical differences but a more profound cleavage as to the interpretation of Islamic law and tradition and its application to a movement looking toward the establishment of a free Asiatic state. In the absence of agreement on such an interpretation, due not a little to inadequacies of definition in modern Islamic thought itself, the program of the Indonesian Islamic movement was bound to become often vague and devoid of topical actuality. This in turn adversely affected the social and economic action of the Muslim parties. The PSII agitated, for example, for economic self-sufficiency of the Indonesian; only autochthonous products of agriculture and handicraft should be purchased in order to incite the production potentialities of the indigenous community.[45] In the depths of the economic crisis which, because of the fiscal policies of the Dutch colonial government, hit the Indonesian

[44] The view, therefore, of Harry J. Benda, "Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942–1945," *Pacific Affairs* (December, 1955), p. 352, that "Although the Islamic camp remained divided for many years the divisions under colonial rule were *hardly ever of a doctrinal or very farreaching nature*" (my italics), seems a misreading of the facts.

[45] Pluvier, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–73.

mass unduly severely,[46] the PSII urged government assistance, the formation of peasants' co-operatives, and the absorption of the villagers in the estate export economy, not as wage-earners but as actual producers.[47] Such demands were, given the colonial economic actuality, little short of dilettantism — the *Muhammadiyah* with its programmatic consistency in the actual development of co-operatives and community welfare projects was far more effective in these fields.

Due to its policy of non-co-operation the connection between the Muslim movement and other political parties was generally a tenuous one. In the earlier years of its existence, when other nationalist parties were deploying themselves and the political consequences of World War I in Europe heightened expectations of greater autonomy among many, including Dutch, layers of the politically conscious population of Indonesia, the rapport between the S.I. and such earlier nationalist groups as *Budi Utomo*[48] and the *Indische Partij* (Indian party)[49] had been considerable, and the S.I. supported many of the aspirations of the so-called "Radical Concentration" in the *Volksraad* (People's Council), colonial Indonesia's semi-parliament. But the expulsion of radical Communist elements from its ranks forced the S.I. to reconsider the whole ideological basis of its program of action, and since Islam was retained as its chief *raison d'être* the party's program had to reflect a particular concept of modern Islam, attuned in the first place to the interests of the bourgeois mercantile and professional groups that made up its chief support. Here, as we have seen, lay the rub: the S.I. (PSII) became internally divided over the question of active participation and co-operation with other groups in the political arena, and this dissension minimized its contribution to the further development of the Indonesian nationalist movement. For in 1927 secular nationalistic sym-

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[46] On Dutch policies during the depression of the thirties see G. Gongrijp, *Schets Ener Economische Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië* (3rd ed.; Haarlem: De Erven F. Bohn, 1949), pp. 211–43; Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, *Het Volkscredietwezen in de Depressie* (2d ed.; Djakarta: Noordhoff-Kolff N. V., 1952), esp. pp. 19–24, and R. Saroso Wirodihardjo, *De Contingenteeringspolitiek en hare Invloed op de Indonesische Bevolking* (Djakarta: Uitgeverij Indira, 1951).

[47] Pluvier, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–73.

[48] Generally considered the oldest Indonesian Nationalist party, *Budi Utomo*, founded in 1908, represented initially the emancipation interests of Western educated Javanese of noble origin, as well as a younger and more democratically oriented group. Its influence among the Indonesian members of the civil service was always considerable but it lacked mass appeal because of its predominant conservatism. In 1935 the group joined in the still existing *Parindra* party. Valuable insights into the movement are given by P. H. Fromberg, *Verspreide Geschriften* (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1926), pp. 540 ff.

[49] Founded in 1912 by a greatly gifted Eurasian, E. F. E. Douwes Dekker, the *Indische Partij* hoped to bring about a union of Indonesians, Eurasians as well as Dutchmen in Indonesia who favored political independence. Dekker's savage propagandizing led the colonial government to declare his party illegal and in early 1913 it was dissolved. Its influence was considerable, however, and the "spirit" of Dekker lived on long afterwards. See Koch, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–43.

pathies found a forum at last with the forming by Sukarno and others of the influential *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (National Indonesian party—PNI) and nationalist agitation, after the Communist debacle of the year before, resumed on a different and equally broad front. The S.I. collaborated with the PNI, *Budi Utomo*, and some smaller local groups in the formation of the first large nationalist federation, the PPPKI founded in 1928, but hardly more than a year later it withdrew. The federation had posited the principle to carry on the nationalist fight while respecting every religious and political conviction of the Indonesians and this precisely proved to be the stumbling block for the S.I.[50] Muslim legalism and exclusiveness and the problem of whether or not to collaborate with non-Muslim groups ultimately prevented it from continuing to join others in a common political endeavor. From that time on until shortly before the outbreak of World War II the S.I. (PSII) and all its splinter groups, as well as the *Nahdatul Ulama*, had a small role to play in the tumultuous course of nationalist endeavor. Even after 1937, when the PSII had relented somewhat in its non-co-operation policy and attempted to effect a federative rapprochement with three other non-Muslim groups, its efforts bore no fruit. Further participation of the PSII in yet another federation (GAPI) was cut short by the outbreak of the war. While gradually in the Muslim camp there seemed to grow a realization of the need for unity with others in the nationalist action program, such sentiments were by no means unanimous and the old doctrinal rifts would continue to plague the Muslim movement in later years.

Curiously, it was the Japanese occupation of most of Indonesia during World War II which brought about a certain enforced unity among the divers Indonesian Muslim groups. Although the occupation also tended to increase the hostility of non-Muslim nationalists toward the Muslim parties, it did greatly enhance official prestige of the Islamic faith, since Japan attempted to enlist Indonesian Islam and its leaders in the Japanese war effort. In order to establish their complete monolithic control over the Muslim movement the Japanese banned the PSII and its offshoot, the *Partai Islam Indonesia*, effected an intricate network of controls and communication over the influential *ulama* in the countryside, and ultimately established a central body that brought orthodox as well as reform Muslims together in a new compact Islamic organization known as *Masjumi*.[51] Dur-

[50] Pluvier, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[51] On Japanese policy in Indonesia, also toward organized Islam, see Yoichi Itagaki, "Outlines of Japanese policy in Indonesia and Malaya during the War," *The Annals of the Hitotsubashi Academy* (Kunitachi, Tokyo), II (1952), 172–82; D. H. Meyer, *Japan Wint Den Oorlog. Documenten Over Java* (Maastricht: Leiter-Nijpels, 1946); A. A. Zorab, *De Japanse Bezetting van Indonesië* (Leyden: Universitaire Pers, 1954); M. A. Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1955), esp. pp. 200–207.

ing 1944 and 1945 the Japanese intensified their efforts to gain control over the Muslim mind, while at the same time they appear to have diverted attention from leading nationalist collaborators not affiliated with the Muslim movement. There can be little question that the *Masjumi* stood the Japanese in good stead and that through this organization it was possible to indoctrinate rural *ulama*, raise levies of manpower in the countryside for the benefit of the Japanese war machine, and fuse Islam to the general program of Indonesian national emancipation under the aegis of Japan's Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. At the same time the Indonesian Muslim movement benefited from Japan's official endorsement of *Masjumi* and through its approved organization was able to reach deeper than ever before into the folk agrarian levels of Indonesian society with its Islamic message. This more or less enforced participation of the Muslim movement in national affairs had the effect of de-emphasizing the importance of the non-co-operation question that had divided Muslim ranks so bitterly in previous years. By the end of the occupation only a relative minority of ultra-orthodox diehards clung to the "pure" Islamic notion that an all-Islamic state was the only basis for Muslim political action and that complete exclusiveness should be maintained. Yet Islamic dogma was not completely thrown overboard. It is clear, for example, that the very character of the Islamic faith set limits to Muslim acceptance of the theocratic ideology of Shinto as it had been made to serve Japanese imperialism; for example, the doctrine of the divinity of the Japanese Emperor was unacceptable to the Muslim.[52] But perhaps the gravest consequence of Japan's favoritism to the Indonesian Islamic movement was the hostile reaction it provoked among other nationalist leaders and their followers. In the closing months of the war, when the tide of battle had decisively turned against the Japanese, Indonesian nationalist figures not identified with the Muslim movement of necessity played an increasingly prominent role in occupation policies, and from their new positions they were not averse to seeking the abolition of *Masjumi*. The Japanese apparently agreed to the formation of a new organization with which *Masjumi* would be merged, but the announcement of Japan's unconditional surrender in August, 1945, interrupted this development, so that the Muslim world in Indonesia was able to enter the chaotic period of the revolution against the Dutch (1945–1949) with most of its organizational machinery, its network of control over public opinion, and above all its leadership, largely intact. Indeed, in the early months of the Revolution the *Masjumi* broadened the range of its membership and began to include members of the previously banned PSII

[52] J. L. Swellengrebel (ed.), "God en de Keizer. Een fatwa van Dr. Abdul-Karim Amrullah," *Indonesië* VI (1952), pp. 77–92.

and the *Partai Islam Indonesia*, in addition to the groups that had originally constituted its core of supporters, such as N.U. and *Muhammadiyah*.[53]

The hostility, covert or expressed, which the *Masjumi* had incurred among the leadership of the non-Muslim nationalist parties tended again to minimize its contribution to the direction of the revolutionary effort against the Dutch, and its relative strength in the early formative years of the Indonesian Republic seems, in retrospect, due in large measure to the virulent factionalism, dissension, and jealousies of the more secularly oriented nationalist groups. Early in 1946 the *Masjumi* joined with other parties, including the Communists, the PNI, the Socialists, and a number of military and social organizations in a "United Front" against the Dutch, and prominent *Masjumi* members played a leading role in the provisional parliament of the Revolutionary Indonesian Republic and its executive committee, as well as in the series of cabinets led by the outstanding Indonesian nationalist Sutan Sjahrir. Two prominent Muslim military units, the Hizbullah and the Sabillah, which had originated in the Japanese period, participated actively in the revolutionary struggle under *Masjumi* direction.[54] Even so, and despite vociferous *Masjumi* opposition to any compromise with the Dutch that did not insure Indonesia's complete independence, other nationalists remained suspicious, not least because it was believed that conservative elements among the *Masjumi* would never stand for a Socialistic free Indonesia and that *Masjumi* was in fact secretly carrying on separate negotiations with the Dutch.[55] While the latter accusation has never been substantiated, it is clear that in radical nationalistic and Communist circles there existed bitter enmity for organized Islam, stemming in part from their early unhappy marriage in the formative years of the S.I., in part from the conscious anti-*Masjumi* direction of radical leaders, and in part from a popular reaction to the sharp, exploitative practices of Muslim traders and large landowners who were often found in the *Masjumi*.[56] Moreover, the old ideological differences that had earlier divided the Muslim movement came to the fore once more. A group of

[53] For many data in the above paragraph I have relied on Harry J. Benda, "Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation," pp. 350–62.

[54] During the revolution Indonesian armed resistance against the Dutch was carried on next to regular army units by a host of special military organizations and guerilla bands, some of them under the direction of political parties or groups of opportunists. As a result maintenance of discipline was always a major problem and on more than one occasion the Indonesian government admitted that it had no control over its fighting arm. One later consequence of the ill-disciplined character of the Indonesian armed forces was their continued interference in the domestic politics of the Republic which on more than one occasion has produced a debilitating political crisis. See on the whole problem, Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Place of the Army in Indonesian Politics," *Eastern World* (January, 1957), pp. 13–18, and "Instability in Indonesia," *Far Eastern Survey* (April, 1957), pp. 49–62.

[55] G. W. Overdijkink, *Het Indonesiche Probleem, Nieuwe Feiten* (Amsterdam: N. V. Keizers-Kroon, 1948), p. 157.

[56] Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, pp. 305–306.

younger, socially conscious Muslims, for whom Islamic evangelism and moderate Marxism presented an ideal basis of action, collided with a more conservative bourgeois capitalistic core, for whom religious orthodoxy was the chief point of departure in their political program. In a sense this conflict was but a continuation of the struggle between the progressivist and pro-co-operation group and the legalist non-co-operation group that had rent the S. I. asunder in the thirties.

The divergence of interests again led to a split in the major Muslim party, just as it had in the thirties. In 1952 the *Nahdatul Ulama* seceded from *Masjumi* to go its own way again. N.U.'s differences with *Masjumi* covered a range of problems, among them the dislike of conservative rural *ulama* and their business ancillaries for the Socialistic and modernistic ideas of a younger, urban-centered group of *Masjumi* leaders for whom the future structure of the Indonesian economy was to be both collectivist and capitalist. The rise of the "Religious Socialists" in *Masjumi* occurred almost certainly in partial response to the evident preference for an "anti-capitalist" economy advanced by other, nonreligious parties and their leaders. The two "grand old men" of the free Indonesian state, Sukarno and Hatta, for example, though not members of Muslim political parties, both nevertheless declared that the principle of a collectivist economy naturally emanated from Islam.[57] There was undoubtedly legitimate concern among these younger leaders of the *Masjumi* over the party's failure to press forward with a social reform and anti-capitalistic economic reconstruction program, a failure which would reduce their party to the same ineffectual status that the S.I. had occupied during most of the late twenties and the thirties. To this group it seemed necessary not only to be "Islam conscious" but also to be "Indonesia conscious," i.e., to draft a program that appealed to immediate as well as long-range social and economic needs of the Indonesian masses. By the same token, however, such a program could not fail to antagonize conservative Muslims, and the secession of N.U. was under the circumstances predictable. Earlier, in 1947, the opportunism of some former PSII members and tactical differences also over the question of formulating a dynamic "urgency program" had led to the departure from the *Masjumi* of the old PSII. With the *Muhammadiyah*, whose program dovetailed with the socioeconomic reform of the *Masjumi*, a smaller Muslim party called *Perti* with followers mainly in Sumatra,[58] and

[57] Cf. Sukarno, *Sarinah. Kewadjiban Wanita Dalam Perdjoangan Republik Indonesia* (2d. ed., Djakarta: Jajasan Pembangunan, 1951), p. 325; Mohammad Hatta, *Verspreide Geschriften* (Amsterdam, Djakarta: C. P. van der Peet, 1952), pp. 8–9. One is reminded of the pronouncement of the outstanding Indonesian Muslim leader, the late Hadji Agus Salim, at the congress of the Sarekat Islam in 1921, that the Koran had advocated dialectic materialism centuries before the birth of Marx. Petrus Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 74.

[58] On the origins and program of *Perti* see *Kepartaian dan Parlementaria Indonesia* (Djakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, 1954), pp. 427–40.

relatively insignificant Muslim groups among Chinese and European minorities, *Masjumi*, PSII, and N.U. represented organized Islam in the postwar and postrevolutionary Indonesian scene. Most of these groups attempted to create a host of auxiliaries in the labor movement, among women, students, veterans, and scouts, and in many occupational associations from writers and artists to the peasantry.[59]

Between late 1949, when Indonesia formally received her freedom from the Dutch, and early 1956, when the first elected parliament began to function, the Muslim parties in Indonesia were able to deploy unusual political power. *Masjumi* leaders headed three of the six cabinets in this period and collaborated in two others. In every cabinet the PSII and the N.U. were represented; *Perti*, however, only in one.[60] In the provisional appointed parliament *Masjumi* nearly always had the largest or the second largest number of deputies, and all other Muslim groups held seats, which, in retrospect, appear to have been far greater in number than their actual following in the country warranted. Relations with other nonreligious nationalist parties such as the revitalized PNI, also indicated a growing tension between *Masjumi* on the one hand, and the PSII, N.U., and *Perti* on the other. The last three groups, aware of *Masjumi's* strength banded together in 1952 to form a "Muslim League," which showed a marked willingness to collaborate with the PNI, the Communists, and other nonreligious groups, while, particularly after 1954, relations between *Masjumi* and most other parties (with the exception of the small Socialist party) notably deteriorated.[61]

The future role of Islam in Indonesian politics and nationalism will depend not the least on its ability to continue to formulate a Muslim-based ideology that appeals to broad nonreligious interests of segments of the population. Thus N.U., which began as a legalistic reaction to Wahabism and Reform Islam,[62] has managed to ally itself with the non-Muslim nativistic traditions of the Indonesian people, especially on Java, bolstering the xenophobic aspect of Indonesian nationalism today. *Masjumi*, in contrast, has blended its reform Islam with modernistic, secular currents, nationalistic also, but more Western in their orientation. Critics of *Masjumi* point to a certain religious shallowness in the party as a result of

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[59] See generally Justus M. van der Kroef, "Muslim Movements in Indonesia," *Eastern World*, June, 1954, pp. 18–20.

[60] On the role of Muslim parties between 1949 and 1956 see G. McT. Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," pp. 135 ff., in W. H. Holland (ed.), *Asian Nationalism and the West* (New York: Macmillan, 1953); Justus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World*, II, 305–56; Justus M. van der Kroef, "A New Course in Indonesia?" *International Journal* (Toronto), XI (1956), 129–37.

[61] See in this connection also Herbert Feith, "Toward Elections in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* (September, 1954), pp. 236–54.

[62] Petrus Blumberger, *De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 89.

this blend.[83] On the other hand *Masjumi* can be regarded as the principal anticommunist party in Indonesia today, a fact which has endeared it to the restive outer provinces beyond Java. At the same time, by virtue of its more nativistic Islamic orientation and its more pronounced anti-Westernism, N.U. has been more inclined to collaborate with nationalist groups far to the left.[84] Whatever the future holds for Indonesia, such new religio-ideological combinations emphasize the continued dynamism of Islam in the new Indonesia.

[83] Cases in point are the publications of the present chairman of *Masjumi*, Mohammad Natsir. A survey of Natsir's work, e.g., his *Capita Selecta* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1955) indicates an anxiety to present Islam as an integrated ideology, applicable to modern political and economic life, but, to speak with one authority (C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze in *Indonesië*, IX [1956], 430), Natsir's "method of thought remains quiet and speculative, nowhere does one encounter the extremes of human anxiety over the experience of great questions which compel an answer, nowhere also does one find the [other] extreme of advancing original answers or theories."

[84] See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia's First National Election: A Sociological Analysis," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, XVI (1957), 237–49, 407–20.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN: A CASE STUDY

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"THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states. . . ." Such is the brief, perhaps almost casual, reference to the sensitive and intractable problem of representation set down in Article I, Section II, of the Constitution of the United States. While provision was made here for geographic representation by states and provision was made elsewhere for equal representation of those given the vote, the constitutional provisions for representation do not adequately comprehend the need for representation of collective and organized interests.

Many such gaps are found in the Constitution. Most of them have been filled through the development of traditional practices and institutional devices. The political campaign has become one of these traditional practices; and the values embodied in the institutional arrangements through which it is mounted and executed constitute an elaboration of the constitutional provisions concerning representation. Campaigns are electioneering devices, means of getting candidates elected. But campaigns also embody traditional practices which manifest some of our answers to the most thorny aspects of the problems of representation.

A congressman from Washington State knows that his constituents agree on the promotion of trade with Alaska; but which of the overwhelming combinations of powerful interest groups aligned on either side of the Hell's Canyon issue should he represent? It is during the development of the campaign that this aspect of the problem of representation is initially resolved. It is during the campaign — in its broader sense — that the determination is made as to which interests shall have primary access to the representative. And it is during the campaign that the candidate develops the identification with the objectives of interest groups and alliances with interest groups which enable them to make a claim on the policy preferences he represents.

The focus of this analysis of the congressional campaign in Washington's First District, in 1954, is on the broad functional impact and the basic political consequences of the campaign as the institutional device through which the principle of representation was not only elaborated but implemented.[1]

[1] While the case history was the central methodological device in this research, three complementary streams of campaign behavior were investigated almost concurrently through what amounted to three substudies. The first, the analysis of power centers

Pre–Primary Phase

The flamboyant propaganda operations of the campaign are preceded by the pre-primary maneuverings of various interests seeking access to the national legislature by sponsoring the election of a candidate sympathetic to their interests. Because these activities take place largely beyond the view of the public and because they occur largely outside formal partisan channels, the pre-primary phase of the campaign can best be studied in terms of the behavior surrounding the emergence of the major candidates.

Thomas Pelly, the incumbent congressman, was, at fifty-four, a tall, gaunt man so lacking in handsomeness that he had been described as a rough copy of Lincoln, the father of his party. Following graduation from college, several years in banking and later management, Pelly became president of Seattle's oldest and largest stationery supply house in 1939. His ample energies soon sought outlets in numerous forms of community activity culminating, ten years later, in the presidency of the Chamber of Commerce — a hub of influence in the affairs of Seattle, the state, and the Northwest. Pelly's moderate but courageous leadership of the Chamber during a period when many feared recession might turn into full-scale economic crisis established him as one of the leaders of the business community and as a symbol of industrial statesmanship to the citizenry. Three years later, in 1952, when the incumbent Democratic congressman, Hugh B. Mitchell, vacated the seat from Washington's First District, conservative leaders induced Pelly to undertake what became a successful bid for Congress. These associates considered him stable, tactful, and one possessing good judgment. Many voters considered him to be fair-minded, reliable, and astute.

Hugh B. Mitchell, forty-eight, the son of a former head of the United States Civil Service Commission, had been active in politics all of his adult life. In 1932, young Mitchell became legislative assistant to Congressman Mon C. Wallgren. In 1940, Wallgren moved to the Senate and Mitchell with him. When Wallgren was elected governor in 1944, he appointed Mitchell, by now a tested leader, to his seat in the Senate. Running for a full term in 1946, he was defeated by the very popular young mayor of Tacoma, Harry P. Cain, as the Republicans took control of Congress. But two years later the people of Washington's First District sent him to the House and they sent him back again in 1950.

In 1952 Mitchell gave up what most observers considered a safe seat

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— made jointly with Professor Delbert Miller of the Department of Sociology, University of Washington — utilized focused interviews and seventeen judges competent to rank power-holders and classify their interests. The second, the analysis of campaign organizations and parties, utilized nondirected interviews and nonparticipant observers. The third, the analysis of opinion formation, involved a pre-election and a post-election opinion survey (both of which predicted the results within 2 per cent).

from the First District — the seat Pelly took over for his first term that year — to make an assault on the incumbent Republican governor, Arthur B. Langlie. He ran a close race with this "Eisenhower candidate" in a Republican year until Langlie maneuvered him into a defensive position with the charge that he was "soft toward Communism," and won. Mitchell intended to sever his relationship with politics when he became vice-president of a well-established van and storage firm early in 1953.

But Mitchell took leave of absence from his firm in mid-1954 after considerable friendly begging and badgering from numerous labor leaders who felt he must run. He reflected not only the opinions but the ideological foundations of the views of labor as naturally as Pelly symbolized those of business. Labor's leaders shared some of the credit for their emergence as a basic political force in the Northwest with the reflective but energetic Mitchell who, during twenty-odd years of fighting for labor in Congress, was often a more forceful spokesman for the "Labor-point-of-view" than many of its own leaders.

By March, 1954, it was clear that these two men would emerge as major contenders in the primary in September. Though both men had considered with care their decision to make the race, their status as major candidates can hardly be explained as the result of this personal choice. Each was heavily influenced in his decision by the encouragement of community leaders — Pelly by those with a conservative orientation and Mitchell by those with liberal leanings. This encouragement was especially persuasive when it was backed up with offers of assistance or funds or access to important community organizations and associations. In fact, since two competing groups of community leaders had discussed the matter of candidates among themselves before they approached the candidates, their offers of assistance amounted to offers to sponsor a man they had agreed should represent them. As this sponsorship was made available to only one candidate it amounted to selection of that candidate, for all practical purposes, prior to the primary election.

This is not, of course, atypical of the manner in which Congressional candidates are designated. While it has become traditional to assume that the selection of candidates falls within the purview of the party, it has become customary for local interest groups to offer their sponsorship to candidates acceptable to them. In this District, the custom of interest group sponsorship has now so far transcended the tradition of party selection that the party is little more than a junior partner in selecting candidates. This deviation of practice from tradition can best be examined by identifying the groups involved in selecting candidates, their motives, and the channels of influence through which they operate.

A study of the distribution of power in the Seattle metropolitan area indicated the existence of two powerful and highly effective concentrations

of economic and political power.[2] The indigenous and in a formal sense the unsanctioned existence of these centers of power sets them apart from the traditional institutional devices through which power is mobilized and channeled in our society. Even participants sometimes maintained there was no web of relationships linking leaders together, but that what appeared to be action in concert was in reality a coincidental confluence of purposes.

These two centers of power have no formal structure — though status as a leader of one of Seattle's largest organizations (business firms, unions, governmental agencies, political parties) or associations (trade associations, civic societies, professional associations) is a prerequisite for membership in either of them. And though these power centers do not have the formal objectives around which organized activity is usually built, they are effective devices for accumulating particles of power into a concentration with fields of influence which extend into every corner of the First District. Apparently the existence, as well as the persistence, of these centers of power is explained by the fact that they are effective devices through which leaders can co-operatively pursue purposes beyond their individual capacities.

Though their objectives are only loosely defined — in the sense that a governmental agency has a mission, or a business has a product — the binding agent which cements various leaders together in one of these illusive structures of working relationships is a common ideological outlook. The power center sponsoring Mitchell was "liberally" inclined. Its leaders were in general agreement that government should protect minority rights and the interests of various economic minorities; that government should intervene in the economy to control its fluctuations; that it should maintain active surveillance if not active control over the utilization of natural resources; and many of them were not opposed to federal "supervision" of state government. On the other hand, leaders in the "conservative" power center sponsoring Pelly generally agreed that government should inject itself into the economy only to protect the free enterprise system; that it is more likely to menace civil rights than to protect minority rights; that natural resources can be developed most effectively by private enterprise; and the state governments must be protected from federal domination.

Data from this study of power-holders indicates that though these broad beliefs commanded general support, particularly as symbols of common aspirations, there was little agreement as to how they might apply to a specific situation. Thus while business leaders, the core of the conservative power center, were in conflict with labor leaders, the core of the liberal power center, along a broad front, leaders from both groups were entangled

[2] This representation of the distribution of power in Seattle differs significantly from the findings of Floyd Hunter presented in *Community Power Structure*, who found a single monolithic structure of power in Atlanta, dominated by a handful of business leaders, vastly more influential in community affairs than either of these groups.

in numerous internal struggles. Small companies fought for independence among industrial giants; wholesalers and retailers each sought a larger share of the consumer's dollar; young firms sought to increase their volume at the expense of established companies, etc. Labor was by no means united either, considering the strife between the AFL and the Teamsters, the affiliated unions and several strong independents, and the more fundamental struggle between those who define the role of labor in terms of partnership with business and those who maintain the tradition of militant and aggressive opposition toward business. Thus, the nature of these enterprises determines the limits of their effectiveness. The potential influence of these power centers can only be realized when the several dozen leaders involved in them agree upon a common candidate, policy or program.

The leadership core of the liberal power center included a regional head of the AFL, the president of a large independent union, both senators, the head of a large fish-packing firm, and an officer in the Teamsters International. Around these leaders were several clusters of lesser leaders (in that they represented smaller organizations or associations) composed of heads of local unions; professional men from law, education, and social welfare; small businessmen; and officials of state and local government. The boundaries of the liberal power center could not be marked off precisely but it probably included between fifty and sixty leaders.

Operating through the web of relationship radiating from the influential leaders who constituted the core of the liberal power center, its membership found that it was an effective device for accumulating political power because, (1) collectively, they could speak for fifty or more of the largest liberally oriented organizations and associations in the community and because (2) they could produce most of the funds and skills required to construct a successful Congressional or gubernatorial campaign.

Between them these leaders had direct control of such formally constituted groups as the Central Labor Council, the regional Political Action Committee (PAC), the regional Labor League for Political Education (LLPE), and nearly eighty local unions. They had working relationships with the Democratic party, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), veterans' organizations, churches, civic groups, service clubs, and many special interest groups, such as a sportsmen's club. Their power stemmed not from the fact that they could direct these groups to take a particular stand, but from their willingness and skill in making themselves the instrument through which such groups mobilized their influence and gave it a common and hence forceful expression in the form of support for a specific policy (repeal of Taft–Hartley) or a particular candidate (Mitchell). This was dramatically illustrated by their decision to "pull Mitchell out of retirement."

Stimson Bullitt, a young lawyer, had run against Pelly as an unknown in 1952, losing by less than 5 per cent of the total vote. Sponsored primarily by a faction in the Democratic party which rejected what they saw as the conservatism of the leaders of the liberal power center and chafed by the secondary position of the party in the power center, Bullitt made known his intention to oppose Pelly again, late in 1953. In 1952 he had incurred the resentment of several leaders of the liberal power center by declaring that he could not oppose every last provision of the Taft–Hartley Act. As Bullitt's candidacy was discussed in the liberal power center, early in 1954, some felt that he was not as likely to win as Mitchell; others felt that he was not an effective spokesman for labor; and many objected to his stand on the Taft–Hartley Act. Leaders of the liberal power structure became convinced that they had to pull Mitchell out of retirement if they were to secure the spontaneous support of the groups to which they had access. For several months, however, Mitchell refused them. Finally, he agreed to run in the late winter of 1954, but did not publicize his decision until every inducement, all unsuccessful, had been offered Bullitt to avoid a primary contest.

One other Democratic candidate, Alice Franklin Bryant, a former Japanese prisoner of war, who felt that the people should have the opportunity to vote for a candidate "who stood for peace," presented herself. The Democratic primary was to include, then, a power-center-sponsored candidate, a candidate sponsored by a faction of the party, and a self-sponsored candidate with no real organized support.

The conservative interests had evolved a more tightly organized, highly disciplined power center, though it was no less indigenous. Chief among its leaders was the president of one of the nation's great aircraft companies. Around this man were a group of other leaders, including the head of the state's largest logging firm, the head of its largest bank, and the heads of an insurance and investment firm, a major railroad, a steel fabrication plant and a home-owned newspaper. Altogether, there appeared to be sixteen leaders in the core of the conservative power center, with about fifty lesser leaders in clusters around them.

The conservative power center embodied a degree of specialization by what might be called policy area which did not appear among the liberal forces. Two or three of the sixteen leaders in the core of the conservative power center concerned themselves with business and investment; several others, with educational and cultural problems; still others, with social welfare; and three or four concerned themselves primarily with governmental policies. While others occasionally became involved in some governmental matter, the head of an investment firm, the governor, a lawyer, and a banker took initial responsibility for looking after the interests of their colleagues in federal and state, and to some extent local, govern-

ment. Working with this group was a cluster of secondary leaders including two heads of medium-sized businesses, an advertising executive, a university administrator, a congressman, a lawyer, the chairman of the Republican party's state central committee, and occasionally several other men from the professions. The leaders of the conservative power center could influence directly the Chamber of Commerce, upwards of two dozen trade associations, a taxpayers group, and the Republican party. They had access to both of the city's newspapers, several of its radio stations, its more important cultural groups (such as the symphony association), and most of the business firms and trade associations in the area.

It was in the "political clique" in this power center that Pelly was first identified as a potential candidate in 1952 and it was this group that encouraged him to run for a second term.

The result of some nine months of pre-primary maneuvering by these organized interests manifested itself in their candidates. Unable to mobilize the full resources of the groups they represented except by presenting a candidate who approximated a common denominator for all of their interests, leaders of each power center selected a man whose position approximated a center of gravity for the competing interests within each center of power. Because the balance of power between the two power centers was roughly equal and because the district included almost equal numbers of Republican and Democratic voters, each group had then to make good its choice in the primary election.

Primary Campaign Phase

May 31, 1954 — the last day to file — passed and the stage was set for a struggle between the Bullitt portion of the party and the Mitchell patrons among the power-holders for the support of hundreds of uncommitted unions, businesses, civic associations, and interest groups with liberal leanings.

Responsibility for the assault on these community groups, as well as on the general public, fell largely on the campaign manager. In each case, the campaign had to be tailored to make advantage out of whatever factors could further the election of the candidate and contribute to the defeat of his opponents. The Bryant forces concentrated on the development and presentation of a policy or program; Bullitt's supporters focused their efforts on securing interest-group support; Mitchell's camp sought to build a smooth-functioning campaign organization; and Pelly people used the primary to test and revise themes and issues which they planned to "pound home" during the general campaign. Actually, *each* of these campaigns involved some efforts in all of these directions, but each activity can be illustrated by associating it with a particular candidate.

Mrs. Bryant's campaign activities consisted primarily of expanding and refining her conception of a foreign policy which would insure world peace, hoping to convert the public at the grass-roots level by the urgency of her appeal.

Bullitt's supporters felt he had every chance of success with the individual voter if he could win the support of a sufficient number of organizational sponsors through whom he could gain access to the affiliated voter. Representatives began contacting potential supporting groups before his candidacy was formally announced, intensifying their efforts as winter wore on. But emissaries of the liberal power center, pledged to activating commitments to Mitchell, were so successful that Bullitt was all but deprived of organizational support. The full depth of Mitchell's position was dramatically demonstrated when his supporters secured an unprecedented endorsement of his *primary* candidacy from the state Labor League for Political Education.

Largely freed from the need to secure organized support by the activities of power-holders, Mitchell's campaign manager divided his efforts almost equally between reinforcing Mitchell's existing name familiarity and developing a smooth-functioning campaign organization. His primary campaign opened with a substantial show of force as measured by the number of billboards, newspaper advertisements, radio spot announcements, newspaper stories, and speeches by the candidate. Every usually reliable observer agreed that it induced a sympathetic and quite general response from the public. The campaign manager then turned his efforts to the development of a campaign strategy and organization for the showdown with Pelly.

In looking beyond the primary both Mitchell and Pelly were anticipating the need for a substantial campaign organization; one capable of presenting their point of view in every corner of the District from the platform, through organized groups, and through the mass media. Both campaign organizations reflected the need for these three forms of presentation. An itinerary-planner developed a calendar of platform appearances day-to-day and finally hour-by-hour, in both camps. Publicity committees included experienced campaign leaders, advertising experts, the candidate or campaign manager, and occasionally a representative of the press. They took initial responsibility for how much use, if any, should be made of radio and television, mass mailings, newspaper advertising, billboards, etc. The third productive work-team, the organization group, supervised campaign work among interest groups supporting the candidate.

The two highest status groups in either camp were not these working teams, but the policy and finance committees. Both policy committees included the candidate, the campaign manager, several experienced politicians, and several community leaders. The candidate, his campaign

manager, and two or three trusted associates on the policy committee constituted a kind of executive committee which actually developed strategy, selected campaign leaders, allocated funds, and administered the campaign. The person who dominated this small central leadership group dominated the campaign.

The other prestige group in the campaign — the finance committee — tended to be "the tail which wagged the dog." The most important members of the finance committee were secondary leaders from the power center who had access to and reflected the interests of its leadership. Neither candidate received substantially more than 5 per cent of his funds directly from the party. Probably neither of them received more than another 20 per cent in contributions of less than $100. Thus, the $100–$2,500 contributions of three or four dozen well-financed supporters accounted for some 70 per cent of all campaign funds. It was inevitable that members of the finance committee would not seek to keep these purses open by overseeing the interests of their owners. Once the campaign was launched this was the only overt contact between the campaign and the power center, but it was sufficient.

As the two campaign organizations began to emerge the strategies of the two candidates began to manifest themselves. Though Pelly was equipped with materials to launch an attack on Mitchell, his initial decision was to present his candidacy as positively and as intensively as his resources permitted. He was labeled the "can do" candidate and his record of accomplishments for the people of the district was carefully elaborated.

A second element in Pelly's strategy was to neutralize Kitsap County, an hour by ferry across Puget Sound, which usually produced a comfortable margin of Democratic votes. He had stumped this area the preceding summer, talking to over fifty groups about his efforts in behalf of their Naval Shipyard, securing support from the local press in the process. To the extent that this strategy hinged upon converting some five thousand normally Democratic voters it had an element of boldness to it.

After the splash following the launching of the Mitchell campaign his forces concentrated on securing opportunities for Mitchell to speak before various groups, both sympathetic and neutral toward his cause. While most of his efforts were confined to pointing up his previous experience in Congress the foundations were also laid for what was to be the main theme of his general campaign — a vigorous attack on what Pelly claimed for his activities in Congress.

The results of the primary election on September 12, 1954, supported the judgments of both major camps. With almost 88,000 votes cast, Pelly received 36,978; Mitchell, 31,090; Bullitt, 14,153; and Bryant, 5,761. Pelly

forces pointed to his nearly 7,000 plurality over Mitchell and Mitchell's camp pointed to the impressive superiority of the combined Democratic vote.[3]

General Campaign Phase

The public — that amorphous aggregate of all individual voters taken collectively — is frequently aware of its frustrations and dissatisfactions with one or another governmental program but seldom aware of its dependence on organized interests to translate its anxieties or purposes into changes in governmental activity. Power-holders, on the other hand, are acutely aware of their dependence on the support of the voter in securing favorable action from public officials. The interdependence of public and power center can be seen as confluence of purposes — not necessarily complementary purposes — which are compatible in that they can be co-operatively pursued for independent benefit. Much of the effective power-seeking behavior of the interest groups helps voters come to agreement on a common policy. At the same time, reservoirs of opinion favorable to its policies and its candidates implement the objectives of a power center. Both sides of this interdependency will be examined below.

Most voters vote not for a man they know as a person, but for a stereotype symbolizing values important to them. Studies by Campbell and his associates indicate that the elements of this stereotype reflecting the candidate's personality and his partisanship are as important as those representing his ideological orientation.[4] Voters come to support their stereotype of a candidate by developing an identification with it based on some combination of all three of these elements.

Partisanship, as a basis for identifying with a candidate, may not involve detailed acceptance of or even nominal understanding of the party platform. The partisanship which operates as a motive for identifying with a candidate seems to be an emotional and attitudinal attachment to a vague, many-sided symbol known by the same name to all voters, but defined in terms of his own experiences and orientations by each individual. And the unifying influence of the partisan label could hardly be overestimated. Even though it was largely divorced from the concrete statements of policy embodied in the party platform, the partisan label, when shared by the party, the candidate, the power center, and the voter, became one of the few symbols with enough universality to provide a basis for a limited accommodation of ideological differences.

Issues and ideology seemed to have increased importance in this off-year

[3] It is likely that these results reflect some cross-over voting because by the nature of the ballot in Washington's "open primary" where candidates are grouped by office instead of by party the voter is allowed to hopscotch down the ballot as he sees fit.

[4] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), pp. 83–181.

election, especially regional issues. Ideologically based identification is simpler and more direct than that based upon partisanship. Here the voter perceives the candidate as a rough projection or personification of some of his own values. Since both camps sought to develop those issues which would cast their candidate in an attractive position in comparison with the opposition, farm policy and foreign policy received only passing attention. Neither issue touched substantial differences between the candidates or the power centers. Public power, a perennial issue in the Northwest, evoked little response and was therefore used sparingly. The three issues which were most fully developed were: first, whether a Democratic or a Republican congressman could best represent the District and insure continuing prosperity for the Northwest should Congress change hands; second, the tax bill passed by the Republican-controlled Congress; and finally, and most important, whether one of the candidates had associated with persons of questionable loyalty. Most of the moves and countermoves during the first part of the campaign were designed to activate partisan and ideologically based motivations in terms of the first two issues. But as the campaign wore on the candidates became more and more involved in the loyalty issue and personality-based identifications.

Interviewees who tended to identify with the personality elements of a stereotype held their candidate was intelligent, honest, sincere, humble, fair-minded, hard-working, etc. Frequently, these voters felt they could not anticipate the problems the House would face or understand policy problems anyway (a perfectly realistic view in relation to atomic power, peace, farm subsidies, etc.). Pelly's "can do" statement was aimed directly at this kind of propensity. Mitchell's stressing his long experience was projected in this same direction. But perhaps the most effective stimuli were less direct character indicators such as Mitchell's thoughful, reflective demeanor and Pelly's quiet candor and sincerity.

The total response of the voter must be accounted for in terms of his selective responses to partisan, issue, and candidate-oriented appeals. The problem of campaign management is to present the candidate, or information about him, through as many channels as possible, in the hope that by virtually enveloping the voter in a spray of stimuli, enough will break through into perception to induce identification with its candidate. Direct presentation, where the candidate actually confronts his public, is by far the most effective means of activating identification because it produces so many stimuli at once. Both candidates made dozens of appearances before organized groups. In these meetings, and in hundreds of small "coffee sessions" in homes, potential supporters had an opportunity to appraise the character, ideology, and partisanship of the candidate for themselves. Though highly effective, only a small percentage of voters could be con-

fronted directly, and devices with a wider impact had to be used to reach most members of the public repeatedly.

One such means was to stimulate such an intense interest among the membership of a supporting organization that its members spontaneously "sold" the candidate to friends and associates. If a supporter became sufficiently enthusiastic and if his belief in the candidate were reinforced often enough, some of those he brought to acceptance of his candidate might in turn communicate their convictions to others and a ripple movement would be started which could potentially penetrate every family in the District.

Person-to-person contact took an additional form in the Pelly camp with a doorbell-ringing operation. Five teams of two or three dozen people were organized to ring doorbells, one night a week each, in precincts which were evenly divided party-wise or of Republican inclination. Each individual was trained and received a map, a packet of literature, a potholder reading "get hot with Pelly," and transportation. Nearly 40,000 homes were visited in this manner.

The third form of presentation, through the mass media, is the most impersonal, the least intensive, and the most frequently used of all because it alone allows repeated penetration of the life-area of nearly all the community's voters. Assuming that a majority of those who might vote were predisposed toward Mitchell, his campaign manager placed primary reliance on presentation through the mass media. His strategy was to reinforce this predisposition against the efforts of the Pelly camp to erode and dissipate it, and to raise the interest level of Mitchell supporters to the point where most of them would actually vote. Radio spot announcements, mass mailings, television appearances, news stories, newspaper advertisements, and 200,000 facsimiles of a tabloid newspaper were used to present "the case for Mitchell."

Pelly's strategy, involving more reliance on organizational presentation, was to develop a stereotype of a fair-minded, capable man willing and able to protect and further the interests of all of the people of his District. This theme was directed toward activating motivations based upon the personality and character of the candidate. Three weeks before election, Pelly strategists felt that Mitchell was leading and that they must develop an issue to neutralize his success in activating the issue-based motivations of those voters who had not yet committed themselves to a candidate.[8] They had an almost prefabricated issue available in the charge of "soft toward Communism" which Langlie had used so effectively two years previously. The manner in which the issue was raised was as important as the issue itself. The State Chairman of the Republican party opened the verbal

[8] Their concern appeared to be well founded for when seven of the most astute observers in each party were polled, thirteen of them estimated Mitchell to be leading by 5,000 or more votes at this time.

battle with charges against Mitchell's former associations, especially with a former congressman who had invoked the Fifth Amendment. Others, outside the campaign, helped develop the issue by adding further charges. The attack reached its climax in a televised speech by Congressman Donald Jackson, California, who asserted that Mitchell had not actively opposed the Communist party and that he was known to have been friendly with people later identified as sympathetic to the Communist cause.

This speech produced immediate consternation within the Mitchell camp. Mitchell's own reaction was that the charge was unfounded and could not be substantiated. He immediately consulted capable lawyers. Informed that he had the basis for court action, he filed a suit for $100,000 in damages and took to radio and television to defend himself.

Mitchell's reaction was received jubilantly in the Pelly camp. His aggressive counterattack committed him to publicly challenging not Pelly, but some of his supporters on an issue where they could not be successfully outmaneuvered in such a short time and on an issue which was sufficiently dramatic to activate the issue motivations of many uncommitted voters. The theme of the Pelly forces became "why take a chance." Mitchell forces worked frantically to dissipate the charges made against him.

Both sides brought up their heavy artillery. Richard Nixon delivered a televised address supporting Pelly three days before the election. Democratic Senators Magnuson and Jackson counterattacked in Mitchell's defense on television the next day. Finally, both sides undertook to make 100,000 telephone calls "to get out the vote" the day before election.

As the first precincts began reporting election evening Pelly took a small lead and maintained it during the first three hours after the polls closed. At eleven o'clock he began to widen his lead, but Kitsap County had not yet been heard from and Mitchell could easily come from behind with the 5,000 plurality from across Puget Sound. At this point, the effect of Pelly's careful work the previous summer was immediately evident as early returns showed him splitting with Mitchell in that part of the District. The final totals were Pelly, 101,913 and Mitchell, 91,721.[6]

Conclusions

Critics of the modern political campaign have maintained that the discussion of major issues has degenerated into a battle of propaganda symbols essentially unrelated to major policy issues; that such vast sums are being spent that votes are literally being bought at one or two dollars apiece; and that partisan responsibility has been diluted by compromises with the

[6] Mitchell continued his court action against several Republican officials — charging conspiracy to defame his character — throughout 1954 and 1955. In the spring of 1956 an out-of-court settlement of about $7,000 was arranged which many felt substantiated the charges that Michell had been "smeared" unjustly.

influential interest groups which are an anathema in our partisan processes. As a result, they imply, the campaign tends to produce impotent artificial majorities which reflect no common ideology.

The scope of this study allows some evaluation of these criticisms in terms of one Congressional campaign. Certainly each of these criticisms except the last may be fairly applied to the Pelly–Mitchell contest. Propaganda symbols, substantial (perhaps excessive) expenditures, and diluted party responsibility define its character. But the conclusion reached here is that it does not follow that this campaign did not contribute in an important way to the emergence of ideological consensus. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that this campaign did induce a tendency toward consensus on fundamental ideological values; not as a product, but rather as a by-product of its machinations.

Several characteristics of the community and the campaign favored, if they did not facilitate, the emergence of consensus. Many policy values were almost unanimously accepted. For example, both power centers, both parties, most public officials, community leaders, and citizens were committed to strengthening the economy of the Pacific Northwest — especially through increased expenditures of federal funds for Boeing aircraft and Bremerton-built ships. Similar support existed for the maintenance and expansion of the United States' position of world leadership, the development of Alaska, etc. Widespread acceptance of such values had the effect of limiting the scope of controversy where it had not been resolved. These areas of agreement operated as ideological firebreaks which made it difficult for intense controversies to break away into general conflagrations threatening the whole ideological structure of the community and thereby its capacity to act. Further, ideological conflicts were defined and discussed largely in terms of the great body of shared ideology upon which community life was based, which had the effect of further limiting the boundaries of any controversy. Put differently, each area of agreement seemed to represent an entanglement in a co-operative enterprise whose continued success was threatened if the co-operating groups became irreparably divided over some campaign issue.

Competition and conflict, the central dynamic forces within the campaign, are devices for generating and accumulating power. It is difficult to detect the emergence of consensus behind the pyrotechnics set off by the host of prominent — if circumscribed — conflicts around which the purposive behavior of campaign participants was organized. The competition between the campaign organizations was the most dramatic, and deliberately so, because it had to generate sufficient psychological fireworks to attract public attention and support. The purpose of the campaign organization was simple and direct — to elect its candidate by defeating his opponent.

A second level or area of conflict found the parties locked in conflict. Here some of the fruits of victory were obvious; some important patronage positions, the prestige that goes to any winner, and the demonstration of its "power with the people." Not quite so apparent was the fact that the successful election of a fair proportion of its candidates was frequently felt to be necessary to the survival of the party as a broker in power.

A third level of competition involved the power centers. While perhaps the least apparent of the three levels of competition and conflict (many voters were only vaguely aware of it), the highest stakes and the most important political purposes were involved here. First among the power centers' objectives was access to public officials by sponsoring their own candidate and thereby securing the capability of influencing policy. Power centers also shared the party's interest in obtaining the appearance of public acceptance of the ideological position they represented, especially its economic implications, i.e., lower taxes (including corporate taxes) or guaranteeing the rights of labor (especially against big business).

These three levels of competition gave the campaign a jumbled chaotic appearance much of the time. In fact, there was considerably unity within it because the instrument of competition — the device through which campaign organizations, parties, and power centers sought to achieve their purposes — was the same in each case, the candidate. In addition to placing his own political future "on the block," the candidate carries the hopes of his organization, his party, and his sponsors. This simple fact tends to force a multitude of factional pressures into one of the two camps, thereby inducing at least a superficial unity of purpose, and to some extent ideology, in each camp.

Equally important in fostering consensus was the strategic necessity of relying primarily upon broad, often ambiguous ideological symbols in activating candidate identification. Symbols like "liberal," "soft toward Communism," "labor oriented," "can do," etc., were consciously selected to avoid more-or-less intense ideological conflicts between small but vocal interests by appealing to them in terms ambiguous enough to accommodate both sides.

Certainly these symbols are heavily loaded with sheer emotional symbolism unrelated to major policy issues. Still there was some evidence — from opinion surveys and interviews with campaign leaders — that the meaning attached to these symbols by individuals who identified with a candidate reflected if not an informed understanding of the policy values, a distinguishable concern with the major value orientations of the candidate. Further, there appeared to be a consistency between the ideological orientation of the individual and the ideological implications of the symbols he accepted. Those, for example, who responded to the "soft toward Communism" charge showed a generally conservative pattern of attitudes

toward many policy questions (though ideology was unimportant if perceived self-interest was involved). Likewise, those who responded to any one of the symbols Mitchell used to identify himself with "progress" showed generally liberal leanings toward policy questions. Where ideology was perceived in terms of the candidates' orientation Mitchell was commonly seen to represent a judicious questioning of many existing programs and as freely accepting the support of groups committed to overturning or modifying particular programs. Pelly was perceived as being disposed toward a defense of the status quo, which his supporters freely translated as a defense of "free enterprise and the American way of life."

In terms of their broad outlines and central meanings there were real ideological differences between the power centers if not between the parties: the conservative power center representing a commitment to states rights, free enterprise, and limited government; the liberal power center representing a commitment to governmental intervention into economic affairs, further redistribution of the national income, and governmental development of natural resources. To this extent the campaign involved a testing and a re-evaluation of two alternative ideological orientations.

This testing can hardly be said to have happened by design, however. The purposes of parties, power centers, and campaign organizations were limited to those immediate ends for which they existed. But in spite of their preoccupation with their own internal purposes each of these groups appeared to contribute to the process through which consensus on a broad ideological orientation evolved. The power centers contributed two broadly competitive ideologies and two candidates who represented them. In addition to contributing the tactical and managerial skills through which these ideologies were presented, the party provided additional symbols used to translate these ideologies into a form which was meaningful and acceptable to the public. To the extent that the ideology of the power center was modified during this translation the party had a hand in its formulation. The contribution of the campaign organization was perhaps more limited, but it contributed the energy and the mechanisms of persuasion through which minorities were able to accommodate the center of gravity represented by the power center and in this way nurtured the emergence of a majority; a majority which appeared to have reached agreement on a common ideological orientation.

THE FRENCH RADICAL SOCIALIST PARTY AND THE REPUBLICAN FRONT OF 1956*

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TWO SIGNIFICANT FACTORS characterized the French parliamentary elections of January, 1956. The elections followed the first dissolution of a French Assembly since 1877. Equally important in terms of French political development was the fact that, for the first time in postwar France, the voter was able to choose between a future moderate right government and a reformist left coalition. This choice was made possible by the formation of an electoral alliance between the Socialist and Radical Socialist parties, which its principal architect, Pierre Mendès-France, named the Republican Front.

In an electoral system characterized by its complexity and lack of clear choice for the voter, the Republican Front represented a serious attempt to link the individual's vote to a specific future government combination. While opposition to the Communists and Poujadists was taken for granted, the major opponent of the Republican Front alliance was the outgoing government coalition led by Edgar Faure and Antoine Pinay. This coalition was pictured as symbolic of the center governments which had ruled France during the Fourth Republic, largely by inaction. As an alternative, the Radicals and Socialists offered the voter a future moderate left ministry. Such a ministry would at long last enact fundamental social and economic reforms, conduct a realistic foreign policy, and liquidate French liabilities in North Africa. Thus, the stalemate from which recent French politics has suffered would be broken within the existing parliamentary framework.

The key group in the formation of the Republican Front was the Radical Socialist party, if not from the point of view of electoral and parliamentary strength, at least for strategic purposes. The SFIO went into opposition in the National Assembly shortly after the elections of 1951. By themselves, however, the Socialists offered no realistic alternative to the center party governments which continued to rule France. On the other hand, the Radical Socialist party had been an integral part of the center party governing coalition. No government since 1947 has been without a Radical minister, and for more than a third of the time since 1945 a Radical has been premier. Therefore, the important fact of the 1956 elections was not that the SFIO had joined in an electoral alliance opposed to the exist-

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ing government, but that its partner in this alliance was the Radical Socialist party.[1]

As a political ally in a left-wing coalition the Radical Socialist party presented a number of liabilities, not the least of which was the eclectic nature of its composition. A party which has always been composed of divergent elements, in the Third Republic it was able to maintain a left-wing aura under the leadership of Edouard Herriot and Edouard Daladier.[2] In the Fourth Republic, however, the party, greatly reduced in strength, had become in part a repository for men whose doctrinal positions were subordinate to their ministerial ambitions. Such men were attracted to a political group, which, despite its small parliamentary representation, had a demonstrable ability to collect ministerial portfolios.

The eclectic nature of the party is clearly observable in the voting behavior of the Radical Socialist deputies in the 1951 legislature. An important index of a group's position in the French parliament is its stand on investiture votes. If we examine the Radical Socialist group in terms of such votes we find that the group was unanimous in its support for the investiture of most candidates for the premiership coming from its own ranks, i.e., René Mayer, André Marie, and Edgar Faure in his first attempt in 1952. It also supported both the Pinay and Laniel governments. However, in all the other investiture votes the group revealed a deep cleavage. Of the sixty-five Radical deputies who served throughout the four-and-a-half years of the legislature, thirteen gave their support to every government presented, from Reynaud and Petsche on the right to Mendès-France and Socialist Pineau on the left. Three Radicals of the extreme left supported only the left governments, and they were counterbalanced by two on the right who supported only the right-wing premiers. The remaining Radicals fell somewhere between, approximating the general complexion of the Chamber.[3]

We find a similar situation in the Radical Socialist group with respect to the two major policy issues which dominated the 1951 legislature —

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[1] The postwar Radical party is examined in Alain Gourdon, "Le Parti Radical," in *Partis politiques et classes sociales en France*, ed. M. Duverger (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955), pp. 219–39; and Georges E. Lavau, "Destin des Radicaux," in *Les Temps Modernes* (juillet, 1955), 1186–1905. Both articles treat the party in its pre-mendesist phase.

[2] The Radical Socialist party of the Third Republic is discussed in: G. Bourgin *et al.*, *Manuel des partis en France* (Paris: Editions Rieder, 1928); F. Goguel, *La politique des partis sous la IIIe République* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1946); A. Milhaud, *Histoire du Radicalisme* (Paris: Editions SEFI, 1951).

[3] The investiture votes of the 1951–56 Assembly for right-wing candidates for the premiership on which the Radicals divided were: Pleven, August 8, 1951; Petsche, August 2, 1951; Reynaud, May 28, 1953; Bidault, June 10, 1953; and Edgar Faure, February 24, 1955. The left-center groupings on which the Radicals divided were those of Mendès-France, June 4, 1953, and June 17, 1954, and that of Pineau, February 18, 1955. *Journal Officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires, Assemblée nationale.*

European Union and state aid to church schools. On the European question Radical votes were again scattered. On the final vote which killed the European Defense Community, twenty-four Radical Socialists voted with EDC supporters.[4] Only sixteen of these, however, were true "Europeans" in the sense of having voted for every measure which would extend the European union concept. In contrast, five Radical Socialists voted against every pro-European measure.[5] Most Radicals varied their position on European unity according to the specific bill, but seldom in unison.

The church school issue demonstrates even more dramatically the lack of unity within the group. Historically, the Radical party has been France's major anticlerical party. The party of Emile Combes, who prepared the way for the separation of church and state in 1905, the Radical Socialists were particularly noted for their defense of the lay public schools against clerical intrusion. Indeed, they were often criticized during the Third Republic for their preoccupation with the clerical question at the expense of more important social and economic issues. In 1951, however, when the MRP deputy, M. Barangé, introduced a bill which gave the state aid to church schools, of seventy Radical deputies, six actually voted for the bill and only forty-three voted against it.[6]

If the Radical Socialist party lacked unity on most major issues, the one doctrinal tenet on which the party seemed able to unite was in complete antithesis to an alliance such as the Republican Front. In postwar France the Radical Socialist party had come increasingly to consider its basic ideological premise the governing of France. To govern was the solemn obligation of all Radical Socialists; opposition was a luxury in which they could not allow themselves to indulge. Such a philosophy is not entirely new to the Radical Socialist party. Between the two world wars, because the Radical Socialists were the largest group in the Chamber and were part of most ministries, they enjoyed the reputation of being *the* party of government. However, after the party's losses in the election of 1928, a serious effort was made within the party to develop the concept of responsible parlimentary opposition.[7] In the Fourth Republic, however, under the leadership of such new Radicals as Edgar Faure, René Mayer, and Bourgès-Maunoury, the concept of the Radical party as one with a solemn mission to govern has been dominant.

Edgar Faure was perhaps the most notable practitioner of this phi-

[4] August 30, 1954.

[5] Other votes on the European question were those dealing with the principle of the European Army: February 19, 1951, and November 27, 1953; also the question of German entry into NATO which was voted on on December 27, 1954.

[6] September 10, 1951.

[7] Parti Republicain radical et radical socialiste, *25e–28e Congrès du Parti . . . 1928–1931*. It was as a result of the 1928 Radical congress that the three Radical ministers resigned from the Poincaré ministry of National Union, 1926–28.

losophy within the party. The two governments which Faure headed in the 1951 legislature were supported by contradictory party alliances. In 1952 the Faure government fell after one month because of the Premier's attempt to win Socialist support for his budget.[8] Faure then served successively as finance minister in the Laniel and Mendès-France governments. In February, 1955, after the fall of Mendès-France, Faure formed his second ministry with the MRP and Conservative support, the very groups responsible for the defeat of the Mendès-France government. Faure's voting record in the Chamber matched perfectly his ministerial career. From 1947 on, he voted for every candidate for the premiership. He voted against no government on a major vote of confidence.[9] At the Radical congress of November, 1955, he summed up the political philosophy of which he had been the leading exponent in the following words:

> We have had a choice to make; each one of us has faced, on various occasions, the problem of whether to take on the burden of power or to decline it, for we could have declined it. We could have justified our opposition on the grounds of reason and perspicacity. We could have set ourselves up as Cassandra and said, "We warned you, shift for yourselves." Here again, we have shown the worth of our party which is not an academic party, a party of doctrine, but a party of governing. We who had been right, were wise enough not to want afterwards to be too right. We were wise enough to agree to co-operate with other Frenchmen, who had been wrong but who were republicans and patriots, in order to govern the country.[10]

Thus the Radical Socialist party's civil service doctrine, as well as its heterogeneous make-up, made it an unlikely partner in the Republican Front. Two factors, however, made the alliance possible; the party's political traditions and the Mendès-France doctrinal and organizational revolution within the postwar party. In its long and continuous history as France's oldest organized party (the party was formally founded in 1901), the Radical Socialist party has had its greatest electoral successes in alliance with the Socialists. In 1906, 1914, 1924, and 1932, the Radical Socialists sought to identify themselves with the Socialists as the Republican reformist left, which had as its major opponent conservative clerical and large-scale interests. There is, as a matter of fact, a basis for comparison between the electoral situation of 1956 and the elections of 1924. In 1924 the Radical Socialist party, chastened by its electoral defeat in 1919, which it attributed to its wartime association with right-wing elements in the *Union sacrée*, joined with the SFIO in an electoral alliance. As in 1956, the electoral law of 1924 prescribed a departmental list system and the two parties engaged

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[8] Philip Williams, *Politics in Post-War France* (London: Longmans, Green, 1955), pp. 41–42.

[9] The votes considered here are all those tabulated as most significant since 1946 in Williams, Appendix IV, pp. 438–39. No other Radical had as consistent a record of support for all governments as Faure.

[10] Speech of Faure is reprinted in *L'Information Radical-Socialiste*, 26 novembre 1955.

in pre-election negotiations both at the local and national level.[11] In 1924, this alliance between the Radicals and the SFIO, or the *Cartel des Gauches*, was highly successful for the Radicals. The party's parliamentary representation increased from 86 to 139[12] and it was able to form the first Radical Socialist ministry of the postwar period.

Such historical analogies, however, might have remained purely academic for the party, if it were not for an amazing carry-over of the Third Republic Radicals to the Fourth Republic. Of these, the men who were most enthusiastic about reorienting the party toward the left were the two Edouards, Daladier and Herriot. Daladier's power in the Fourth Republic party has been open to question, but there is no doubt of the great influence wielded by Herriot, especially among the rank and file. The furor aroused by Herriot at the 1955 Radical congress was unequalled by any other Radical, including Pierre Mendès-France; and the symbol of the veneration with which the party regards him was his position as its president for life.[13] Herriot's attitude towards the Socialists in his long political career has varied considerably from one of comradeship to studied aloofness,[14] but his strong support of the Mendès-France bid for control of the party was an important step towards the Republican Front.

Similar support for Mendès-France came from other Third Republic Radicals. Twenty Radical deputies in the 1951 legislature had sat in the prewar Chamber. Of these, fifteen could be considered Mendès supporters, a much higher proportion than in the group at large.[15] It is interesting to note also that the Republican Front alliances concluded between the Radicals and Socialists in 1956 followed closely the geographical pattern of the *Cartel des Gauches* lists of 1924.[16] At the departmental level, too, the party's political tradition, often exemplified by prewar personnel, had an important influence on its role in the 1956 elections.

In the creation of the Republican Front the most vital factor was undoubtedly the Mendès-France-led revolution within the contemporary

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[11] For an explanation of the law under which the elections of 1924 were held see G. Lachapelle, *Elections Législatives du 11 Mai 1924* (Paris: G. Roustan, 1924). The electoral law of 1951, which also governed the 1956 election, is explained in Robert Neumann, "The Struggle for Electoral Reform in France," *American Political Science Review*, XLV (1951), 741–55.

[12] *Journal Officiel. Débats, Chambre des Deputes*, 30 janvier 1920, pp. 93-94; 9 juin 1924, pp. 235–36.

[13] Parti radical et radical socialiste, "Le Congrès de Marseille, 14–17 octobre 1954," *L'Information Radical Socialiste*, Numero spécial, novembre 1954, p. 29.

[14] Compare, for example, Herriot's offer to the SFIO for government participation in 1924 with that of 1932. Edouard Herriot, *Jadis* (Paris: Flammarion, 1948, 1952), II, 135–36; 298–302.

[15] The deputies' position with respect to the leadership of Mendès-France has been determined by their votes on a number of key issues. See below, footnote 31, for the votes and method used.

[16] G. Lachapelle, *Elections Législatives . . . 1924*; *Le Figaro*, 12, 14 décembre 1955 and *Le Monde*, 13 décembre 1955.

Radical Socialist party. Much of the strength and weakness of the alliance were linked to the extent of his success in capturing the party's organization and in reorienting its doctrine. In February, 1955, the Mendès-France government was overthrown. In the following months, Mendès-France sought to return to power with a similar ministry which would have a solid additional advantage — the support of a rejuvenated and unified Radical Socialist party. A Radical Socialist himself since the 1920's, Mendès-France hoped to make the party an effective instrument of reform. To become such an instrument he felt that the party needed two things: a clear-cut program to present to the voters in the 1956 elections, and an expanding and revitalized organization which could present such a program.

To speak of the Mendès-France doctrinal revolt within the Radical Socialist party is to refer especially to his de-emphasis of radicalism as a doctrine of government — any kind of government. For this nebulous concept, Mendès-France sought to substitute concrete proposals, especially for social and economic reform. The proposed reforms fell within the given framework of the French mixed economy. They were, however, directed at specific kinks in that economy — the problem of management-worker relations, of the small businessman in an expanding industrial society, of overprotection of specific agricultural groups, and of the housing crisis.[17]

By November, 1955, the influence of Mendès-France on the doctrine and program of the Radical Socialist party was clearly evident. Not only was he the principal author of the party program adopted by the 1955 party congress: the tribute to its acceptance by the party was the patience with which almost two thousand congressists listened to his detailed and professor-like exposition of specific and technical proposals for France's economic rejuvenation.[18] It is even more of a tribute, when one realizes that both the program and the philosophy from which it stemmed could be considered antithetical to the party's traditional clientele, the small peasant proprietor, the artisan, and the small businessman to whom special government favors have long been considered essential for existence. From the point of view of a future left-wing electoral alliance, the acceptance of the Mendès-France proposals by the Radical Socialist party meant that there now existed a doctrinal basis on which such an alliance could be negotiated.

However useful the new party program may have been for electoral propaganda, without control of the party organization Mendès-France could never have hoped to put it into operation. Among those French parties with a continuous formal existence, both within and without parliament, the Radical party is best described as a loose organization with diffuse foci

[17] See *L'Information*, 26 novembre 1955 for copy of electoral platform expounded by Mendès-France.

[18] Observations on the November, 1955, party congress held in Paris are based on the author's attendance at all of the sessions.

of power. Three organs, each representative of party action at a different level, exercise almost autonomous jurisdiction — the Executive Committee, the parliamentary group, and the departmental federation. To gain effective control of the party, Mendès-France had to operate at all three levels of organization.

Probably the most conspicuous but easiest battle which Mendès-France fought for the party's organization was for the central administrative organ, the Executive Committee. At the time of the Mendès-France government in 1954, the Executive Committee and its representative organs, the Bureau and the Administrative Presidency, were in the hands of anti-mendesists. The Administrative President, Leon Martinaud-Deplat, a deputy of the conservative wing of the party, opposed Mendès-France to the point of voting for the fall of his government in February, 1955. At the Radical congress in October, 1954, for whose arrangements the Bureau could be held largely responsible, only one deputy on the official program could be considered pro-mendesist. Six of the major speakers at the congress eventually were to vote for the defeat of the Mendès-France government.[19] This was true despite the fact that the congress came at the height of Mendès-France's prestige as premier. During the long crisis which followed the fall of this government, representatives of the Executive Committee and the parliamentary groups met in the party's traditional "Cadillac committee." Not only did they agree to support a ministry headed by Antoine Pinay, who had been a major Mendès-France opponent, but they decided also to allow Radicals to take part in such a ministry.[20]

Such strange political maneuvering by the central organs did not, however, go unnoticed by a large number of party members who had looked favorably on the Mendès-France government. Immediately after its fall, a number of departmental federations passed resolutions requesting the holding of a special congress to consider the political complexion of the party.[21] These requests gained the active support of Mendès-France. Naturally enough, the move was opposed by the central administration, the Executive Committee formally rejecting the proposal at its meeting in March, 1955.[22] Only under the strongest pressure from Edouard Herriot did the Executive Committee finally reverse itself and call for a special congress in May.[23]

[19] *L'Information*, Numéro Spécial, novembre 1954.

[20] The vote in the "Cadillac committee" was 81 to 67 in favor of participation in a Pinay government. *La Dépêche du Midi*, 9 février 1955.

[21] The first motion calling for a special congress was passed by the federation of the department of Doubs, February 7, 1955, the day after the fall of the Mendès-France government. *La Dépêche*, 7 février 1955.

[22] The vote of rejection for a special congress was 64 to 18. *La Dépêche*, 17 mars 1955.

[23] The Executive Committee's vote, at this time, was unanimous in favor of a special congress. *La Dépêche*, 14 avril 1955. The call for the meeting, however, left the congress with a limited order of the day: (1) tactics for the coming senatorial elec-

The special congress marked an important step for Mendès-France in his struggle to gain control of the party's central machinery. Held in Paris, a center of mendesist strength, the congress was largely favorable in sentiment to changes in the party's orientation and organization. Despite administrative opposition, a majority of nine placed organizational questions on the congress agenda which was arranged by the federation presidents.[24] By a voice vote the congress not only eliminated the Administrative Presidency, it also set up a seven-man committee under Mendès-France to revise the party's statutes and to work out a program which would be submitted to the regular congress in November.[25]

Despite charges of authoritarianism and highhandedness on the part of Martinaud-Deplat and his supporters, the Mendès-France efforts were highly successful at the central administrative level. The seven-man committee of action named by the May meeting prepared for and organized the November congress. The important sessions of the congress were chaired by such strong Mendès-France supporters as Jean Maroselli and Edouard Daladier, as well as by Mendès-France himself. Most of the delegates were pro-mendesist in sentiment. Not only did the congress adopt the Mendès-France program and the newly revised statutes of the party, which gave the Executive Committee emergency powers of exclusion; in a closed secret ballot, the congress elected Mendès-France to the newly created post of first vice-president of the party. Only at a sparsely attended Sunday morning session did Martinaud-Deplat and his supporters dare raise a voice of protest.[26]

The most important result of the Radical party congress of November, 1955, from the standpoint of the future Republican Front, was that it formalized the split between the central party organization and the Faure government. As long as the government was led by a Radical in good standing, the party could hardly be the rallying point of an organized opposition. The issue on which the central machinery of the Radical party broke with Edgar Faure was symbolically in its best prewar tradition. Among the questions on which the Radical congress took a firm position was that of electoral reform. Historically, the Radical Socialist party has most consistently favored election on the basis of a single-member district, or *scrutin d'arrondissement*. With legislative elections scheduled for 1956, the Radical Socialist congress decided firmly in favor of a return to *scrutin d'arrondissement*. The strong stand on electoral reform was accompanied

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tions, and (2) party doctrine and governmental coalitions. The Jacobin club of Paris, a center of mendesist strength, criticized the call for the congress because it failed to include administrative reform of the party. *La Dépêche*, 26 avril 1955.

[24] *La Dépêche*, 5 mai 1955.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *La Dépêche*, 7 novembre 1955.

by the passage of two other important resolutions, one which required all of the party's candidates to accept the congress platform and another allowing electoral alliances only with the candidates of other parties who likewise accepted the platform.[27] Viewed in the context of the Faure government's determination to hold elections as soon as possible under the existing electoral system, the significance of the congress's decisions was manifest. Although Mendès-France managed to restrain his more ardent supporters from having the congress require the immediate enactment of *scrutin d'arrondissement* or the resignation of the Faure government,[28] the practical results of the congress were the same. On December 2, shortly after Faure's dissolution of the National Assembly, five Radical ministers resigned.[29] The same day the newly elected Executive Committee, using the recently granted powers of emergency exclusion, excluded Edgar Faure from the party.[30] Thus the Radical party officially severed its ties with the government. The congress, the Executive Committee, and its Bureau were either in the hands of Mendès-France supporters or agreeable to his leadership. An opposition electoral alliance was now possible, at least in terms of the party's central administrative organization.

The Mendès-France revolution, ostensibly successful in terms of the party's central organs, was less effective at the parliamentary and departmental levels. Within political parties in a parliamentary system, the group of elected representatives is usually a powerful and often independent one, from the point of view of other party organs. This is especially true of the Radical party. It is not unusual that the greatest opposition to Mendès-France control of the party and the smooth running of the Republican Front came from the Radical Socialist deputies in the National Assembly.

Probably the simplest way to analyze the reception of the Radical deputies to the Mendès-France movement is to study their voting behavior during two important crisis periods for the party: (1) the period from December, 1954, through February, 1955, when the Mendès-France government fell and was replaced by the Faure ministry; and (2) the period of late October and November, 1955, when Edgar Faure proposed advancing the elections and ultimately dissolved the Assembly.[31] A close sup-

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *Le Monde*, 3 décembre 1955.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] The method used to rank the deputies on a pro- and anti-mendesist basis is an adaptation of scaling techniques suggested to the author by Professor George Belknap. The following positions on votes, in the order presented, are pro-mendesist in decreasing degree of intensity. A Radical deputy who took position number one generally took all the succeeding positions. An extreme anti-mendesist acted in the opposite manner in each case. The positions are: (1) Abstain in vote of investiture of Faure government, February 24, 1955; (2) Vote for priority on vote of Socialist resolution of non-confidence in Faure government, October 26, 1955; (3) Vote of

porter of Mendès-France would have voted confidence in his government in the two crises which threatened its existence. Following Mendès-France's lead, he would have abstained rather than voted the investiture of the Faure government and would have voted against it on each vote of confidence posed on the question of the election date. In addition to Mendès-France himself, there were four Radicals who voted in this manner. A total of thirty-one additional Radical deputies can be accounted as mendesist to a greater or less degree, since they supported his government, and, at some point in the struggle over the elections, withdrew support from Faure. The intensity of their pro-Mendès feeling is in direct measure with the speed with which they broke with Faure. Most of them, however, had voted against Faure by the time of the Radical party congress in November, 1955.

Of the Radical deputies clearly in opposition to Mendès-France, most may also be accounted as firm supporters of Edgar Faure. At the extreme are the fifteen who opposed the Mendès-France government in one or both of its crises and who supported Faure up to the dissolution. There were nine "government" Radicals, including Faure himself, who supported both governments completely. In the nature of the struggle as it developed, they could hardly be considered as mendesists. Finally, there was a small group of five who not only opposed the Mendès-France government, but also voted against Faure on the final vote which brought about the dissolution. They must, however, be included among the thirty Radical deputies in open opposition to Mendès-France. The Radical group was thus roughly divided in two, with respect to Mendès-France's control of the party.

This conclusion is supported by the direct intervention of a number of Radical deputies in the struggle for control of the Executive Committee and the central party machinery. Immediately after the special congress of May, 1955, twenty-four Radical deputies signed a statement to the effect that the decisions of the congress were illegal and that they would refuse to be bound by them.[32] Since the congress had taken no decisions which affected the party's deputies directly, the manifesto was primarily a symbol of the extent to which the parliamentary group opposed the Mendès-France move-

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non-confidence in Faure government on its general politics, October 28, 1955; (4) Vote of non-confidence in Faure government on question of anticipated elections, November 3, 1955; (5) Vote of non-confidence in Faure government on method of elections, November 12, 1955; (6) Vote of non-confidence in Faure government on question of continuing debate on elections, November 29, 1955; (7) Vote of confidence in Mendès-France government on its North African policy; (8) Vote of confidence in Mendès-France government on its handling of the affair of "leaks" in military secrets.

[32] *La Dépêche*, 7 mai 1954.

ment. Of those who signed the manifesto, all but one[33] were Mendès-France opponents also on the basis of their voting records.

During the struggle for party control, the Radical Socialist parliamentary group was thus equally divided for and against Mendès-France. The election crisis, however, enabled Mendès-France to bring about a realignment within the group and to take a majority of its members into opposition against the Faure government. On the first confidence vote with respect to the elections, of the sixty-seven Radicals representing metropolitan France, forty-seven voted for the Faure ministry. On the second vote, immediately before the November Radical congress, the number supporting the goverment dropped to thirty. On the third vote, after the congress, Faure's supporters numbered twenty-seven. By the final vote of confidence there were twenty-three Radical deputies still voting with the government. The act of dissolution itself provoked the resignation of the five Radical ministers, who must be considered the stronghold of Radical Faure support. Thus, while Mendès-France's position with respect to the Radical Socialist parliamentary group was not nearly as favorable as it was in relation to the central organs of the party, the group was not an obstacle to Radical Socialist membership in the Republican Front.

The extent of the Mendès-France revolution within the Radical Socialist party at the local level and its effect on Republican Front coalitions is best analyzed in terms of the electoral alliance itself. There can be no question that the electoral crisis and the dissolution of the Chamber provided the spark which finally welded the alliance between the SFIO, the Radical Socialists, the UDSR, and the Social Republicans.[34] Since the autumn of 1955, the determination of the Faure government to insure its existence by holding immediate elections had been the basis for union in opposition of the above groups. To this situation must be added the fact that the Socialists, plagued by steady electoral losses in the Fourth Republic, saw in a union with Mendès-France the opportunity for dynamic leadership which the party badly needed. The SFIO national council, which met in emergency session shortly after the dissolution, laid down two requirements for electoral alliances with deputies of other parties seeking reelection: (1) support of the Mendès-France government in February, 1955; and (2) support for *scrutin d'arrondissement* in the recent parliamentary

[33] This was M. Henri Queuille, the most successful premier of the Fourth Republic in terms of length of service. His voting record is mendesist, while at the same time he lends his support to every anti-mendesist move within the party.

[34] In addition to the two major partners, the Republican Front encompassed two minor groups, the Union démocratique et socialiste de la résistance (UDSR) and the Social Republicans. The former had been associated with the Radicals in the political holding company known as the Rassemblement des gauches républicaines (RGR), and had at its head François Mitterand, the Minister of the Interior under Mendès-France. The Social Republicans were those former Gaullists who had not gone over to the right-wing parties and were led by Chaban-Delmas, a former Radical deputy.

battle.[35] Both requirements show the increasing influence of Mendès-France on the Socialists. Thus, only one week after the dissolution of the National Assembly, the Republican Front was proclaimed.

Despite the handicap of time, the Republican Front was effectively co-ordinated at the level of the top leadership. The leaders of the four parties, Mendès-France, Guy Mollet, Chaban Delmas, and François Mitterand, issued joint policy statements. During the election campaign Guy Mollet wrote for the mendesist newspaper, *L'Express*, which came the closest to being the official organ of the alliance. Since there was no machinery for bestowing official Republican Front investitures on individual electoral lists, *L'Express* also served this function. While Mendès-France made it clear that *L'Express* endorsement did not represent an official Radical Socialist investiture, the paper's mark was the clearest indication of a Republican Front list.[36]

The formation of the Republican Front met with varying success at the departmental level. This was to be expected, given the short two weeks allowed by law for the creation of electoral alliances after the dissolution. In a total of one hundred and three metropolitan electoral districts, the Radical Socialists presented candidates in eighty-six. Alliances with the SFIO, under the provisions of the electoral law, were formed in thirty-seven districts, and in seven districts the two parties formed joint lists.[37]

Not infrequently, the success or failure of the Republican Front was dependent upon the politics of the incumbent Radical deputy and his control of the departmental federation. Only four right-wing Radical deputies contracted an alliance with the SFIO. On the other hand, seven, in clear violation of the party's national commitment to the Republican Front, made alliances with the MRP and Independents. A number ran on a straight Radical ticket, having paid lip service to the party's program and thus received the official investiture. It should be pointed out, however, that the Radicals showed themselves much more willing to ally with the Socialists in their own areas of strength than was the case in the reverse situation. In the forty-five districts where Radicals had polled less than 10 per cent of the vote or had no candidate at all in 1951,[38] they found it particularly difficult to conclude alliances with the SFIO. Of these, only sixteen districts had some form of Republican Front coalition.

While it is true that the Republican Front suffered especially from the

[35] *Le Monde*, 8 décembre 1955.

[36] *L'Express*, 19 to 30 décembre 1955. The newspaper gave its endorsement to 80 Socialist lists, 64 Radical Socialist lists, and 7 combined Radical–SFIO lists. The paper also endorsed some 49 lists of allied groups, the UDSR, Social Republicans, Jeune République, and a few lists which actually called themselves Republican Front.

[37] *Le Monde*, 13 décembre 1955; *Le Figaro*, 12 décembre 1955.

[38] The election coalitions and results for 1951 are taken from *Les Elections Législatives du 17 juin 1951*, (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1953).

haste with which it was organized and frequently from the divisive situation within the Radical Socialist party, the electoral outcome of the alliance was hardly unsatisfactory to the two major participants. Both parties increased their share of the total number of votes. According to the most careful estimate, Republican Front tickets received about 28 per cent of the total vote,[39] or an increase of 4 per cent over the combined Radical–SFIO strength in 1951. In relation to the Communists on the left and the groups to their right, the Republican Front parties improved their position distinctly. In the one hundred and three electoral districts of metropolitan France, in 1956, the Communists were outvoted by the Republican Front alliance in sixty-three districts. In 1951 the same parties had outrun the Communists in only fifty-five districts. As for the right-wing parties, the districts where they had held the majority dropped from forty-three to thirty-three between the two elections. On the whole, the left, from the Communists through the Radical Socialists, had a clear majority of about 54 per cent of the vote. The increased strength of the left-wing forces occurred entirely within the ranks of the Republican Front and the Radical party in particular.[40]

In terms of the Radical Socialist party alone, the electoral results of the Republican Front had far-reaching implications. They showed especially important shifts in the party's electoral base which were clear-cut evidence of the Mendès-France influence. In the 1956 elections the Radical Socialist party made its most conspicuous gains in the northern industrial areas of France, where the party has been traditionally weak. This was especially true in the Paris region. As against the five seats which the Radicals had held in 1951, they won nine in 1956. In every *arrondissement* of Paris, rich or poor, the Radicals enjoyed a gain of from 10 to 15 per cent of the total vote.[41] This was true even where incumbent conservative Radicals, excluded from the party, ran under another label in competition with Radical party-endorsed candidates. In some such areas, the incumbent increased his own vote, while the new Radicals were also able to gain from 13 to 17 per cent of the vote.[42] Since both the Communists and the Socialists maintained their strength in these areas, Radical gains undoubtedly came from heavy MRP and Gaullist losses.

At the same time that Radical strength increased in the north, the party suffered its most outstanding losses in its historical stronghold, the south. There is probably a close correlation between the Radical Socialist

[39] Based on tabulations of François Goguel, "Les Elections françaises du 2 janvier 1956," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, VI (janvier–mars 1956), 8.

[40] Election results of 1956 drawn from *Le Monde*, 4, 5 janvier 1956 and *Le Figaro*, 4, 5 janvier 1956.

[41] Paris vote is broken down by *arrondissement* in *Le Monde*, 6 janvier 1956.

[42] This was true of the second district in Paris, which includes both the wealthiest and poorest areas. *Ibid.*

vote-pattern and that the of Poujadists and Gaullists. Traditionally the Radical Socialist party had directed its appeal to the very groups which Pierre Poujade championed in 1956, the tax-burdened small shopkeeper and the struggling small peasant proprietor. In the 1956 election the Poujadists made their most outstanding advances in the south, outpolling their right-wing counterpart of 1951, the RPF, in thirty southern electoral districts.[43] In the Vaucluse, for example, an old Radical Socialist stronghold and the department of Edouard Daladier, the Poujadists received 16 per cent more of the total vote than the RPF did in 1951. In contrast, the Radical Socialist vote declined by 8 per cent. There is evidence here that Mendès-France has had some success in switching the party's appeal from the older anachronistic elements of French society to a new and more dynamic base.[44]

While the electoral results of the Republican Front, given the complicated electoral system, were often difficult to analyze in terms of popular support, the immediate success of the alliance at the parliamentary level was clear. Despite the fact that both parties, due to the vagaries of the electoral law, lost seats, their relative position in respect to the other parties of the Assembly made them the likely choice for a government combination. In February, 1956, the Republican Front achieved its major objective. In place of the Faure–Pinay ministry there was formed, under the first Socialist premier since 1947,[45] a Republican Front government. At the same time, both the Radical Socialist Executive Committee and the Radical Socialist parliamentary group gave their full support to that government.[46]

It is perhaps one of the most significant facts of postwar French politics that the image of the Mollet government as different from its predecessors was short-lived and that the disillusionment with that image came first within the Republican Front coalition itself. In the formation of the Mollet government Mendès-France had taken the conspicuous if ambiguous position of minister of state. In the weeks which immediately followed the investiture vote, it became increasingly clear that there were basic policy differences between the president of the council and his electoral ally, especially with respect to Algeria. By May Mendès-France felt these differences were serious enough so that he could no longer personally remain in the government. He did, nevertheless, hope that something could be salvaged from the electoral coalition. Therefore he asked his fellow Radicals to remain in the government and dissuaded his more extreme supporters

[43] A. Prost, "Géographie du Poujadisme," *Les Cahiers de la République* (No. 1, 1956), pp. 69–77.

[44] The shifting base of the Radical party is examined in Goguel, "Les Elections françaises du 2 janvier 1956," pp. 5–17.

[45] Williams, *op. cit.*, Appendix II, p. 436.

[46] *Le Monde*, 18 janvier 1956; *L'Express*, 31 janvier 1956.

from taking an actual opposition stand.[47] Relations, however, between Mendès-France and the Mollet ministry continued to deteriorate. By the end of June, 1956, Mendès-France was, himself, voting against the government.[48] And, on the confidence vote which ended the Republican Front government a year later, the Radical group decided formally to abstain.

The final dissolution of the Republican Front was marked also by the collapse of mendesist control of the Radical party. Shortly after Mendès-France's resignation from the cabinet a group of Radical deputies led by André Morice made a drive to oust the mendesists from control of the national organization. However, mendesist support in the Radical departmental federations was sufficient to offset this move at the party congress in Lyons in October of 1956.[49] The Morice faction, consisting of fourteen deputies, then proceeded to break formally with the regular party group in the Chamber and to establish a dissident Radical organization.[50] Despite the removal of his most die-hard opponents, Mendès-France's difficulties with the Chamber group did not lessen. The eight Radical members of the government became an increasing source of tension within the party. On the vote which ended the Mollet ministry, in addition to the Radical ministers, four Radical deputies violated the group decision to abstain and voted in favor of the government.[51] This vote brought to a head the conflict within the party. Mendès-France insisted that the four deputies be excluded on the basis of earlier party decisions. The party Bureau, however, refused. Feeling that his position was untenable, Mendès-France resigned as head of the party.[52] This act put an official end to his attempt to reform the Radical party organization. It was a fitting conclusion that the government which succeeded Guy Mollet's should be headed by Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, a Radical in the Faure tradition.

[47] *Le Monde*, 24, 25, 26 mai 1956.
[48] *Journal Officiel . . .*, 21 juin 1956.
[49] *Le Monde*, 14, 15, 16 octobre 1956.
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] *Journal Officiel . . .*, 23 mai 1957.
[52] *L'Information*, mai 1957.

THE EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS: FIRST SESSION

FLOYD M. RIDDICK*

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, in an unprecedented action, addressed a joint session of Congress on the Middle East Situation[1] on Saturday, January 5, 1957, which was five days before he appeared again to deliver his State of the Union[2] message.

The Congress had not intended to reconvene until January 7, and had passed a joint resolution to that effect;[3] but on the day following the *sine die* adjournment of the Eighty-fourth Congress, second session, it was discovered that a law passed earlier in that session had set January 7 at 1:00 P.M. as the hour to count the electoral vote instead of the usual date, January 6, which fell on Sunday in 1957.[4] Since one hour prior to the joint session was inadequate for organizational purposes, the President was requested by the leaders of the two houses to veto the bill and allow the Congress to reconvene on January 3, the date stipulated in the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution.

The above and following messages of the President, set forth below with their dates of submission, provided the major program of the Administration from which Congress formulated its legislation for the session: Budget, January 16;[5] Economic Report, January 23;[6] Status of American Education, January 28;[7] Immigration Matters, January 31;[8] Emergency Conditions Brought About by Prolonged Drought and Other Severe Natural Disasters, March 5;[9] Report on Operation of Trade Agreements Program, February 11;[10] Amendment to the Anglo-American Financial Agreement of 1945, March 6;[11] Reorganization Plan of 1949, as amended, April 1;[12] United States Membership in the Organization for Trade Co-operation, April 3;[13] Holding Federal Costs and Activities to a Minimum, April 18;[14] An Interim Report of the Special Assistant for Aviation Facilities Planning, April 11;[15] Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1957 (RFC liquidation), April 29;[16] and Mutual Security Programs, March 21.[17] In his State of the Union address he reminded Congress: "You meet in a session of stress that is testing the fitness of political systems and the validity of political philosophies. Each stress stems in part from causes peculiar to itself. But every stress is a reflection of a universal phenomenon."

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* Washington, D.C.

[1] H. Doc. 46.
[2] H. Doc. 1.
[3] S. J. Res. 203.
[4] H. J. Res. 517 — Pub. L. No. 436.
[5] H. Doc. 16.
[6] H. Doc. 29.
[7] H. Doc. 79.
[8] H. Doc. 85.
[9] H. Doc. 110.
[10] H. Doc. 93.
[11] H. Doc. 111.
[12] H. Doc. 145.
[13] H. Doc. 146.
[14] H. Doc. 155.
[15] H. Doc. 150.
[16] H. Doc. 161.
[17] H. Doc. 182.

ORGANIZATION

The Eighty-fifth Congress convened with the Democrats in control of both houses, and with a Republican Administration, as was the case in the previous Congress. The party division in the Senate was 49 Democrats and 47 Republicans, as compared to 48 Democrats, 47 Republicans, and 1 Independent in the Eighty-fourth Congress. In the House, the division was 233 Democrats, 200 Republicans, and two vacancies, as compared with the previous Congress' 232 Democrats and 203 Republicans. The major officials and their assignments are set forth in Table I.

TABLE I

OFFICE	DEMOCRAT		REPUBLICAN	
	Senate	*House*	*Senate*	*House*
President pro tempore and Speaker	Hayden (Ariz.)	Rayburn (Tex.)		
Floor Leaders	Johnson (Tex.)	McCormack (Mass.)	Knowland (Calif.)	Martin (Mass.)
Ass't Leaders and Whips	Mansfield (Mont.)	Albert (Okla.)	Dirksen (Ill.)	Arends (Ill.)
Chairmen of Rules Committees	Hennings* (Mo.)	Smith (Va.)		
Chairmen of Caucuses or Conferences	Johnson (Tex.)	Price (Ill.)	Saltonstall (Mass.)	Hoeven (Iowa)
Chairmen of Steering or Policy Committees	Johnson (Tex.)		Bridges (N. H.)	Martin (Mass.)
Chairmen of Committees on Committees†	Johnson (Tex.)	Cooper (Tenn.)	Bricker (Ohio)	Martin (Mass.)

* The position held by the chairman of the Rules Committee of the Senate is not comparable to that of the chairman of the Rules Committee of the House in the determination of the legislative program. The Senate Rules Committee has no part in program determination.

† The Democratic Steering Committee of the Senate serves as its Committee on Committees.

The "official objectors" designated to serve their respective parties in their respective houses during the calls of calendars to pass noncontroversial proposed legislation[18] include: in the Senate, Senators Talmadge of Georgia and Clark of Pennsylvania for the Democrats, and Purtell of Connecticut, Barrett of Wyoming, and Hruska of Nebraska, for the Republicans. In the House, the Democrats selected Representatives Aspinall of Colorado, Boland of Massachusetts, and McFall of California for the Consent Calendar, and Roberts of Alabama, Boland of Massachusetts, and Hemphill of South Carolina for the Private Calendar; and the Republicans had Cunningham of Iowa, Byrnes of Wisconsin, Ford of Michigan, and Weaver of Nebraska

[18] See Floyd M. Riddick, "The Eighty-fourth Congress: First Session" *Western Political Quarterly*, VIII (1955), 614–15, for further details on this subject.

for the Consent Calendar, and Sheehan of Illinois, Van Pelt of Wisconsin, and Avery of Kansas for the Private Calendar.[19]

On the opening day the Senate was in session for nearly three-and-a-half hours and the House, for nearly two. The Senate elected its President pro tempore, thirty-four Senators were sworn in, several procedural resolutions were adopted, and then Senator Anderson of New Mexico moved that the Senate consider the adoption of its rules for the Eighty-fifth Congress. The argument was renewed that the Senate was not a continuing body and should not be bound by the rules of a previous Senate until approved. The Majority Leader, as was done in a like situation at the beginning of the Eighty-third Congress, moved to table the Anderson motion, having previously obtained unanimous consent to submit a unanimous consent agreement to allow debate of the motion to table until 6:00 P.M. on January 4. The agreement was adopted. On January 4, the motion to table carried by 55 to 38, but in the meantime, in accordance with a tacit understanding, the Vice-President was called upon to render an opinion on the situation by the use of a parliamentary inquiry,[20] which is not binding on the Senate since the Senate itself cannot take an appeal from an opinion expressed by the Chair under such circumstances. An appeal by the Senate is in order only if the Chair has occasion to make a ruling on specific proceedings deemed to be contrary to the rules in which he might take the initiative or make a ruling pursuant to a point of order being made by some Senator.

The House, after electing its Speaker, swore in its members, elected its officers, agreed to routine resolutions, and adopted its rules for the Eighty-fifth Congress.

The size of standing committees remained unchanged in the Senate. On January 9, a resolution[21] was adopted, without opposition, to continue for another Congress the increase in the size of two committees,[22] as well as certain changes in the number of majority and minority members who could hold third committee assignments. In the House, the size of twelve of the nineteen standing committees, which had been enlarged since the Eighty-third Congress, was continued: but three of them were still further increased.[23]

The membership of the standing committees together with their chair-

[19] See 85 *Cong. Rec.* 1339 (1957). For a brief explanation of certain policies and rules governing committee and House action on private bills and immigration and claims bills, see *ibid.*, pp. 1990–92, by Representative Roberts.

[20] *Ibid*, pp. 102–77, 139.

[21] S. Res. 27.

[22] The Committees on Post Office and Civil Services, and on Public Works.

[23] See Riddick, *op. cit.*, p. 614. Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and the Merchant Marine and Fisheries were increased by two each. See H. Res. 11 and H. Res. 89.

men were approved by the Senate on January 9.[24] The Senate elected two new committee chairmen: Senator Green of Rhode Island was made chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and Senator Hennings of Missouri became head of the Committee on Rules and Administration. Thirty-one changes were made in the total committee personnel in the initial assignments — approximately two-thirds going to freshman senators. Of course, other changes were made during the year resulting from the death of Senator McCarthy and the election of Senator Proxmire, and the resignation of Senator Daniels and the election of Senator Yarborough. By January 16, the majority and minority members of all standing committees, including the chairmen, had been selected by the Committees on Committees and approved by the House.[25]

The House, like the Senate, elected two new chairmen: Representative Gordon of Illinois to head the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Harris of Arkansas to chair the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. There were over one hundred initial changes in the total committee personnel with others being made from time to time during the year. There was not a single change in the membership of the important Ways and Means Committee.

Procedure and Business Transacted

The session was a long one,[26] having convened on January 3, 1957, and adjourned *sine die* on August 30. Both houses were out of session from April 18 to April 29 for an Easter recess, but the Senate was actually sitting 133 days and the House, 141, compared with 119 and 118 respectively for the previous session. The following table summarizes the work load of the session compared to the previous session.[27]

The most controversial issues of the session included the civil rights proposal, mutual security, and the middle east economic and military cooperative program.

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[24] Order presented and agreed to at pp. 375–76.

[25] See proceedings on House Resolutions 7, 8, 81, 82, 90, and 103.

[26] The longest since 1950; in 1954, the Senate did not adjourn *sine die* until December 2, but the House adjourned *sine die* that year on August 20, and the Senate transacted no more legislative business after that date. The Senate resumed its sittings on November 18 of that year but only for the so-called McCarthy trial, at which time he was censured by a vote of the Senate, but nothing else was done.

[27] Of the 1,210 measures passed by the Senate, there were 612 Senate bills, 346 House bills, 22 Senate joint resolutions, 54 House joint resolutions, 24 Senate concurrent resolutions, 28 House concurrent resolutions, and 124 Senate resolutions; of the 3,297 bills and resolutions introduced, 2,911 were Senate bills, 132 were Senate joint resolutions, 51 were Senate concurrent resolutions, and 203 were Senate resolutions.

Of the 1,198 measures passed by the House, there were 276 Senate bills, 610 House bills, 9 Senate joint resolutions, 63 House joint resolutions, 22 Senate concurrent resolutions, 31 House concurrent resolutions, and 187 House resolutions; of the 10,716 measures introduced in the House, 9,609 were House bills, 461 were House joint resolutions, 230 were concurrent resolutions, and 416 were House resolutions.

TABLE II

	Eighty-fifth Congress First Session: 1957			Eighty-fourth Congress Second Session: 1956		
	Senate	*House*	*Total*	*Senate*	*House*	*Total*
Public bills enacted into law	101	215	316	211	427	638
Private bills enacted into law	172	169	341	156	247	403
Congressional Record						
Pages of proceedings	9,423	5,869	15,292	8,489	5,471	13,960
Pages of Appendix			7,235			6,783
Measures passed*	1,210	1,198		1,555	1,236	
Measures reported*	1,319	1,179		1,629	1,170	
Measures left on calendar*	30	59		33	87	
Bills and resolutions introduced*	3,297	10,716	14,013	1,865	5,260	7,125

* Measures include H.R., H. J. Res., H. Con. Res., H. Res., S., S. J. Res., S. Con. Res., and S. Res.

As is usual in the first session of a Congress, the statistical accomplishments of both houses mounted slowly for several months. By the end of January, only three public and no private bills had been enacted;[28] by the end of February, only three more public laws had been passed,[29] and as late as April 1, their number totaled only twelve.[30] A month later the *Record* showed only 28 of the 316 public bills enacted during the session and 12 of the 341 private ones.[31]

Of the 5,869 pages of the *Congressional Record* devoted to House proceedings, only 2,785 were used to print the debate on measures requiring space of three or more pages each. The other 3,084 were utilized for proceedings on measures discussed for shorter periods; or for speeches on matters other than actual pending legislation, the reproduction of texts of bills and amendments, roll-call votes, and the printing of various materials and data incorporated under "leave to print" procedure.

Likewise, only 3,048 of the 9,423 pages of Senate proceedings were used for legislation requiring three or more printed pages. The other 6,375 pages were utilized for other purposes as enumerated in the above paragraph for the House, as well as for proceedings in connection with treaties and nominations.

In these calculations, all proceedings — be they reproduction of bills and amendments, revision of remarks, or matters included under "leave to

[28] 85 *Cong. Rec.* (1957), *Daily Digest*, p. D 64.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. D 153.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. D 272.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. D 362, D 853; as late as July, only 74 public and 47 private bills had been enacted; p. D 604.

TABLE III

Pages of Debate in Cong. Rec.*	81st Congress: Bills Debated 1950 Second Session		82nd Congress: Bills Debated 1951 First Session		1952 Second Session		83rd Congress: Bills Debated 1953 First Session		1954 Second Session		84th Congress: Bills Debated 1955 First Session		1956 Second Session		85th Congress: Bills Debated 1957 First Session	
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate
3– 5	17	12	7	7	8	3	8	10	14	11	18	13	18	11	11	5
5– 10	37	16	24	14	18	11	25	19	22	15	25	20	33	18	24	15
10– 15	22	6	20	13	8	4	12	9	15	12	14	10	18	18	16	7
15– 20	24	4	8	3	5	4	8	6	9	9	14	6	9	11	6	7
20– 25	6	2	4	6	2	2	9	4	4	6	8	6	4	6	5	1
25– 30	8	1	6	3	2	3	7	2	7	3	3	2	6	3	7	3
30– 35	4	5	4	2	7	3	3	3	9	2	4	2	2	4	3	5
35– 40	6	2	1	4	1	4	1	3	4	4	1	3	1	1	3	1
40– 45	1	3	1	1	2	3	6	1	0	3	1	0	2	2	2	1
45– 50	2	2	1	1	0	2	2	1	0	2	3	1	5	0	2	0
50– 60	2	6	6	5	2	1	1	4	5	2	4	1	2	2	5	5
60– 70	3	1	1	2	2	0	2	0	2	2	3	2	2	4	3	1
70– 80	3	1	2	1	2	2	3	1	1	3	1	1	2	1	1	3
80– 90	1	2	1	1	1	1	2	0	2	0	2	1	0	2	0	1
90–100	1	1	3	0	0	1	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	1
100–125	1	3	2	5	3	2	2	5	3	2	3	2	1	1	2	1
125–150	0	2	3	4	3	1	0	0	2	3	2	2	3	0	0	0
150–175	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	3	1	0
175–200	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
200–300	1	3	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	2	1
300–400	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
400–500	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
500–600	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
600–700	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1000 and over	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1†	0	0	0	1‡	0	1
Totals	142	79	96	77	67	51	94	69	101	86	106	73	109	89	95	60

* Debates occupying fewer than 3 pages have not been included.

† This bill was actually debated 930 pages.

‡ Only a total of 713 pages.

print" — were tabulated as debate, provided that the actual colloquy or speeches involved three or more pages. The comparative breakdown for various Congresses is set forth in Table III.

The Senate sat for 860 hours and the House for 585, as compared with 801 and 465 hours respectively in the previous session.

The so-called civil rights bill (H.R. 6127) was debated at greatest length, occupying the Senate some or all of twenty-eight days and the House some or all of ten, involving over 1,356 pages of the *Record* to print the proceedings.[32] The President's "Middle East Doctrine" (S. J. Res. 19–H. J. Res. 117) took second place with the proceedings involving 386 pages of the *Record*,[33] and the Mutual Security Act (S. 2130) placed third.[34]

During the year, the Senate completed 139 quorum calls and the House, 120; the Senate took 107 roll-call votes[35] and the House, 100. The *Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report*,[36] found the percentage of members participating in 207 roll-call votes of the two houses in 1957 was as follows: Democrats, 88 per cent, Republicans, 87 per cent, or an average of 88 per cent for both parties in both houses. In the Senate four members — plus Senator Proxmire who was elected at the very end of the session and participated only three times in roll-call votes — voted in every roll-call vote; while in the House, forty-nine scored 100 per cent voting participation.[37]

Senate Procedure

The Senate passed 1,210 bills and resolutions, of which 826 were approved under the call of the calendar procedure; 524 of the latter number were private. The calendar was actually called on twelve days as contrasted to thirteen in the previous session when 995 bills and resolutions were approved. In addition to the number passed without objection during the call of the calendar, as indicated above, many were called up and passed under unanimous consent procedure or on motion after very brief debate; to illustrate, a total of 89 bills and resolutions were passed in one of five days by such procedure.[38]

The Senate was in session fifty-nine more hours than in the previous year but passed 345 fewer bills. The real debate (requiring three or more

[32] The Senate debate on the bill occupied 1,067 pages and the House, 289 pages.

[33] The Senate debate took 288 pages during twelve days and the House 98, during five days.

[34] Senate discussed the bill over a period of four days, covering 190 pages; the House, six days and 169 pages — a total of 359 pages in both houses.

[35] The *Daily Digest* of *Congressional Record* for September 19, p. D 853, tabulated 111 roll-call votes, but counted two votes taken on August 8, on six treaties which were approved *en bloc* by unanimous consent agreement, as six votes instead of two.

[36] Vol. XV (September 20, 1957), pp. 1105–09.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] See proceedings for June 5, June 12, July 3, August 8, and August 23.

pages of the *Record*) was devoted to 60 bills and resolutions, compared to 89 in the previous year. See Table III.

The consideration of the so-called civil rights bill (H.R. 6127) will no doubt go down as one of the great debates in the Senate. While the measure met strong opposition from the time of its introduction until the President signed it, and while it was almost unanimously fought by the Southern senators, it was disposed of in the absence of any concerted action to stage a filibuster. The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate never reported its version of the measure, although hearings were held and many hours were spent in executive session working on redrafting its language and contents. The first test in the Senate came on June 19, when the version of the legislation passed by the House was laid before the Senate. The bill was read the first time; on objection to its second reading, under the rule, its further disposition went over one legislative day. On June 20, after the second reading, an objection was made to its further consideration, with a view to having the measure placed on the calendar without reference to committee, under Rule XIV, clause 4. Senator Russell made a point of order against the procedure with a view to having the bill referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Chair expressed an opinion on the situation,[39] but submitted the point of order to the Senate for its decision. By a vote of 39 yeas to 45 nays the point of order was not sustained and the bill was placed on the calendar.[40] There it reposed until July 8, 1957, when it was brought up on motion, and was kept continuously before the Senate until final passage.

As in the last several sessions, a number of unanimous consent agreements limiting debate or setting the time to vote on amendments or motions were utilized, in order to reach a vote on final disposition of the then pending measure. Some were objected to outright, some modified and agreed to, and others were adopted as submitted. More than a score of such agreements were used; in fact, five were adopted for the disposition of the civil rights bill alone — one limiting debate on the motion to take it up for consideration, and the others on amendments and on the bill before final passage.

There were no tie votes during the session; hence, the Vice-President did not get an opportunity to exercise his right to vote "when the Senate is equally divided." The Senate defeated the bill (S. 1771) to provide for a 1957 corn base acreage of 51,000,000 acres, by 35 yeas to 45 nays.[41] On June 5, the District of Columbia Policemen and Firemen's Retirement and Disability Act Amendments of 1957 was recommitted,[42] but a similar

[39] See 85 *Cong. Rec.* 8855 (1957) for the opinion.
[40] See *ibid.* and *Daily Digest*, p. D 553.
[41] 85 *Cong. Rec.* 4840–67 (1957).
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 7335–48, 7467.

House-passed bill (H.R. 6517) was reported in the Senate on July 23; on the same day,[43] after two motions to recommit it had been defeated, it was passed and became law.

After considerable debate, a resolution to authorize Senator Eastland to testify in the United State District Court for the District of Columbia in connection with a contempt case (Seymour Peck) concerned with internal security was indefinitely postponed.[44]

The Senate adopted six resolutions citing persons for contempt of the Senate, for failing to answer questions while testifying before certain committees of the Senate;[45] and because of the time devoted to the matter, it should be pointed out that there was considerable discussion at different times on the report of the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Committee on Rules and Administration relating to campaign expenditures and contributions in the 1956 general election.[46]

The problem of attendance continued to vex the leadership, one of the reasons being the frequency of committee meetings. Hence, on February 21, the Majority Leader announced that he was directing a study of attendance in the Senate, and the transaction of business therein, with a view to having sessions three or four times a week, and not giving permission, "except in unusual cases, for committees to meet during that period; and then to have two or three days a week in which the committees can meet all day."[47] No announcement of any conclusions was ever made and the Senate schedule was not altered in that respect during the session, but Senate Resolution 102 was introduced on February 22, with a view to improving the attendance.[48]

Because of sparse attendance at the daily sittings of the Senate on a number of occasions, and for the first time in over a decade, the leadership insisted that Senators, in order to be recorded as present, must be present before the Chair makes his announcement that a quorum is present. For example, on February 28, during the consideration of the so-called Middle East Doctrine (S. J. Res. 19), the Majority Leader announced that effective on March 1, during the further consideration of that bill, the names of Senators would not be recorded on quorum calls unless they had answered to their names before the Chair had announced the presence of a quorum,

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 13044, 13050.

[44] See proceedings on S. Res. 116 and S. Res. 117 on March 21 and 22.

[45] See procedure on Senate Resolutions 89, 90, 91, 92, 103, 104, and 124.

[46] See Senate proceedings particularly for March 29 and April 12.

[47] 85 *Cong. Rec.* 2085–86 (1957).

[48] "RESOLVED, That it is the sense of the Senate that the leadership of the Senate experiment with schedules for meetings of the Senate so as to determine whether the business of the Senate will be more efficiently transacted by providing for alternate days for chamber sessions and committee meetings, or by providing for three full days for committee meetings and three full days for sessions in the chamber, or by providing some other schedule."

and that the Chair would be requested to announce the number of Senators responding to their names so as to fix the number making up the quorum.[49]

By unanimous consent, the Senate referred the message and bill (S. J. Res. 19) on the President's Middle East Proposal to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations and authorized the committees to sit jointly and act as a single committee for the handling of that matter, but stipulated that this was not to be considered as a precedent for the future.[50]

Senator Thurmond set a new record for making the longest speech ever heard in the Senate when he spoke on the civil rights proposal for twenty-four hours and eighteen minutes. And lastly, because of particular developments during the session, the Senate abandoned its previously often-used practice of permitting Senators to introduce individuals or groups of individuals seated in the gallery. On August 26, it adopted an amendment to Rule XIX, which reads as follows: "No Senator shall introduce to or bring to the attention of the Senate during its sessions any occupant in the galleries of the Senate. No motion to suspend this rule shall be in order, nor may the Presiding Officer entertain any request to suspend it by unanimous consent." [51]

House Procedure

Measures passed by the House during the year totaled 1,198, compared with 1,236 in the previous session. More than nine-tenths of the measures were acted on after very brief consideration — most of them being disposed of under expeditious procedures, as follows: The Private Calendar was called on thirteen different days, when 497 bills were passed without objection. The Consent Calendar was the order of business on thirteen days, accounting for the passage of 223 public, noncontroversial measures. Thirty-five measures were passed under the suspension of the rules procedure, the Speaker having recognized members on twelve different days to offer such motions.[52] On seven days the House devoted its attention to business of the District of Columbia, passing 34 measures and the District of Columbia Appropriation bill.[53]

Calendar Wednesday procedure was not utilized, having been dispensed with at each allotted time. Many bills and resolutions were called up

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[49] 85 *Cong. Rec.* (1957), *Daily Digest*, p. D 143. See 85 *Cong. Rec.* 2200, 2284, 2460 (1957).

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 812.

[51] S. Res. 183.

[52] Two others were called up under this procedure but defeated — H.R. 5497, watershed protection and flood prevention, facilities for fish and wildlife development, and H.R. 4770, extension of social security coverage to policemen and firemen. The former was defeated on August 19 and the latter on August 5. Both measures were left on the Union Calendar at adjournment.

[53] Measures were passed under this procedure on March 25, April 8, May 13, June 24, July 22, and August 7 and 26.

out of order by unanimous consent and passed without objections, with or without brief comment.[54] The important legislative debate of the session was directed to 95 bills and resolutions, as shown in Table III.

Six motions to discharge committees from further consideration of bills were filed but only one, for consideration of H.R. 2474, postal pay bill, received a sufficient number of signatures (218)[55] for entry on the Calendar of Motions to Discharge Committees.[56] The motion was entered on the Calendar on July 11; the Committee on Rules was discharged and the House passed the resolution (H. Res. 249–special rule) on July 22; the bill passed on July 23, but after passing both houses it was vetoed.[57]

During the session, the Committee on Rules reported seventy-two special rules, and the committee was discharged from one other,[58] which the House adopted. Of the total number reported, sixty-six were adopted, to provide for the consideration of sixty-three pieces of legislation.[59] Four were left on the calendar at adjournment,[60] one was laid on the table when the bill was passed under another procedure,[61] and one was defeated [62] — the bill never having been called up.

Of the sixty-three pieces of legislation brought up under special rules, two were vetoed,[63] two were recommitted,[64] and two were defeated by the House.[65] One resolution was adopted by the House for a report from the President on reduction in budget estimates,[66] one passed the House and was reported in the Senate,[67] two passed both houses but were not finally enacted,[68] twelve passed the House only,[69] and forty-one became public

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[54] For example, on March 28, June 1, and August 16, 26 measures were called up under unanimous consent procedure and passed after very brief discussion.

[55] 85 *Cong. Rec.* 10306-07 (1957).

[56] That was directed to H. Res. 249, to provide for consideration of H.R. 2474, Postal Employees Pay bill, which was pending before the Committee on Rules.

[57] It was a pocket veto, on September 7.

[58] H. Res. 249 for consideration of H.R. 2474, Postal Pay.

[59] Three resolutions adopted were concerned with bills already brought up before the House under special rules. H. Res. 188, to take bill (H. J. Res. 117, Middle East Doctrine) with Senate amendments from Speaker's table and agree to them — the bill had been called up under H. Res. 123 and passed. H. Res. 410, to take bill (H.R. 6127, Civil Rights bill), with Senate amendments from the Speaker's table and agree to them with amendment — the bill had been brought up by H. Res. 259 and passed. H. Res. 274, to waive points of order against H.R. 6974 (Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act); the bill had been brought up under H. Res. 264.

[60] The four include H. Res. 314, 322, 376 and 382.

[61] H. Res. 271, to consider H.R. 7168, Federal Construction Contract Procedures Act.

[62] H. Res. 362, to consider H.R. 7244, Agriculture, Meat promotion.

[63] H. R. 4602, Veterans Housing, and H.R. 2462, Federal Employees Pay Act.

[64] H.R. 72, Veterans, gratuities for guardians, and H.R. 6763, D. C. Bridge bill.

[65] H.R. 4901, Corn Acreage, H.R. 1, School Construction.

[66] H. Res. 190.

[67] H.R. 5822.

[68] H.R. 5538 and H.R. 3753.

[69] H.R. 2, 469, 985, 1056, 2528, 4135, 5836, 6814, 6974, 7125, 7390, 7963.

law. As usual, these data show that the Rules Committee gave the green light for the consideration of various bills which neither the Administration nor the majority of either house ever approved.

An analysis of the sixty-six rules adopted by the House[70] shows that sixty-three provided for the immediate consideration of the same number of measures.[71] Fifty of them were open rules primarily setting the stage for preferential consideration of certain proposed legislation[72] not otherwise privileged for House action. Only four could be classed as absolutely closed rules, but thirteen waived points of order against provisions of the reported bills. Not a single one of them provided for the consideration of an appropriation bill, which is unusual. Actually, very few of the resolutions were controversial; the debate on thirty-four of them occupied less than a page each of the *Record* — in eight cases it took less than three pages to record the debate for action on both the resolution and bill. Sixty-three of the resolutions stipulated that the debate be confined to the bills under consideration; fifty-nine provided that the bills, or substitute amendments, be read for amendments under the five-minute rule; four provided that the bills be considered as having been read for amendments; and sixty-three specified that at the conclusion of consideration, the Committee of the Whole should rise and report the bills, or substitutes therefor, back to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, "and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion, except one motion to recommit." Each of the sixty-three resolutions classified above prescribed a maximum time for general debate of each of the sixty-three legislative proposals.[73]

The casualties in the House legislative arena were higher than usual. Two bills were recommitted,[74] two were defeated under suspension of the rules procedure,[75] and two were voted down after having been called up for consideration under special rules.[76] One resolution for an investigation

[70] These do not include H. Res. 249, discharged from the Rules Committee, or H. Res. 362, rejected by the House.

[71] The other three resolutions (H. Res. 188, H. Res. 274, and H. Res. 410) were concerned with the disposition of measures already brought up for consideration under other special rules.

[72] Three of these provided that the committees reporting the bill would be authorized to offer an amendment as a substitute, or a substitute would be in order, for the bill without being subject to a point of order and that the substitute be read for amendments.

[73] Of these, 30 called for one hour of general debate, 25 for two hours, 2 for three hours, 2 for four hours, 1 for six hours, 1 for seven hours, 1 for one day, and one for four days.

[74] H.R. 72, Veterans, gratuities for guardians, H.R. 6763, D. C. Bridge bill.

[75] H.R. 5497, facilities for fish and wildlife development, H.R. 4770, social security coverage to policemen and firemen.

[76] H.R. 1, School Construction by vote of 208 to 203, and H.R. 4901, Corn Acreage.

of the national monetary and credit policies and the financial structure was defeated,[77] and one special rule providing for the consideration of a bill amending the Stockyards and Packers Act, for a meat promotion program, was voted down.[78] The Senate passed the bill for the construction, operation, and maintenance of Hell's Canyon Dam on the Snake River (S. 555) on June 21 by a vote of 45 to 38, but the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, in July, by a vote of 15 to 12, killed a companion bill (H.R. 5).

The House took unprecedented action when it adopted a resolution requesting information from the President as to a "substantial reduction" in the budget and where "a reduction of that magnitude could best be made."[79] The President responded to the House's request on April 18: his reply was published as a House document entitled: "Holding Federal Costs and Activities to a Minimum."[80]

On August 23, three resolutions citing three persons for contempt of the House for failure to answer questions while testifying before the Committee on Un-American Activities were adopted.[81]

While the Speaker may vote whenever he desires, on one occasion during the session it fell to his lot to break a tie, when a vote stood at 176 to 176 on a bill to change the requirements for obtaining a freight forwarder permit.[82] He voted "yea." The Speaker, while his comments were very brief, indulged eighteen times from the floor as a Representative from Texas in eulogizing late members of the House, former members of Congress, and late international figures. He participated in debate — though very brief except on two or three occasions — on pending legislative matters eleven times, including the legislative appropriation bill, investigations by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, the budget, federal reserve and monetary policy, the Middle East Doctrine, mutual security, and rural electrification.

Appropriations

The budget for 1958 was received by the House on January 16, and by the Senate on January 17, with estimates in the amount of $71.8 billion, the highest of all peacetime budgets, and $2.9 billion in excess of the previous year.[83] As already pointed out, the House adopted a resolution on March 12, asking the President how reductions could best be made. The President had previously expressed a willingness to consider ways in

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[77] H. Res. 85; rejected by 174 to 225.
[78] H. Res. 362; by vote of 175 to 216.
[79] H. Res. 190; H. Doc. 155.
[80] H. Doc. 155; 85 *Cong. Rec.* 5395 (1957).
[81] H. Res. 407, H. Res. 408, H. Res. 409.
[82] S. 1383; See 85 *Cong. Rec.* 13471 (1957).
[83] H. Doc. 16.

which cuts could be made without cutting essential services. On April 18, the Speaker received a letter in response to the House resolution, but this did not appear to satisfy the House.[84]

Nineteen regular, supplemental, and deficiency appropriation bills and resolutions were enacted during the session,[85] the same number used in the previous session to provide funds for the operation of the federal government. As enacted, the bills appropriatd $59,589,731,631 based on $64,638,110,610 budget estimates, submitted to Congress in the annual budget message[86] and subsequent supplemental and special messages — a reduction of $5,048,378,979 from the original estimate. The bills were approved by the two houses with a minimum of conflict; several were passed by one or other of the houses without amendment, and after very little debate. The bill making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare (H.R. 6287) caused considerable conflict in the House. It was debated part or all of eight days, involving 202 pages of the *Record* to print the debate. Some of the bills were enacted later in the year than usual, primarily because they were late getting out of committee. The last one enacted, Mutual Security (H.R. 9302), was signed by the President on September 3. The House passed its last supply bill on August 21, and the Senate, on August 27. The previous year, the President signed the last bill on July 31.

Committees, Including Investigating Committees

The committees as usual carried a terrific work load. In a special study, the *Congressional Quarterly*[87] reported that during the year through July 7 the committees held 2,517 meetings, of which 854 were closed.

Some of the matters given most attention by the committees included: civil rights; labor rackets investigations;[88] television inquiry; Senate cloture rule; price discrimination; mid-east doctrine; various defense problems as reserve program, current state of readiness of the armed services, defense programs, and state of national security; foreign aid program; federal aid highway program; internal security and un-American activities; various

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[84] H. Doc. 155.

[85] Two joint resolutions (H. J. Res. 391 and 426) were enacted to make funds available after June 30, the end of the fiscal year, until the regular supply bills could be enacted, but without increasing any final appropriations. Two urgent deficiency bills (H.R. 4249 and H. J. Res. 310) passed both houses but because of the inability of the two houses to agree over certain items added by the Senate, particularly sums for stockpiling, the bills died without enactment, and the sums embodied therein upon which the two houses could agree were enacted in other bills (see H. J. Res. 312).

[86] H. Doc. 16.

[87] *Weekly Report*, XV (July 12, 1957). 835–36. The *Congressional Quarterly* set certain ground rules for its tabulation.

[88] Hearings held by Select Committee on Investigation of Improper Activities in Labor Management Relations; this Senate Committee was appointed pursuant to S. Res. 74 adopted on January 30.

aspects of small business; operations of various governmental agencies; and atomic energy.

Actually, the Senate adopted over forty-five resolutions authorizing investigations, or funds therefor, increasing the limit of expenditures by its committees, extending time for investigations, or authorizing additional staff for particular committees. The House adopted over fifty such resolutions. The *Congressional Quarterly*, in its survey of funds[49] available to committees of both houses in the Eighty-fifth Congress, first session, found that $6,127,791 was authorized, and through June 30, $2,178,241 had been spent. The Senate committees fared a little better than those of the House: $3,233,291 was authorized for the former and $2,894,500 for the latter. Senate Committees, up to June 30, spent $1,398,332 while House committees spent $779,909. Five joint committees were allotted $480,860 for use in fiscal 1958. These sums do not include salaries of permanent staffs of standing committees and unspent balances from the previous Congress.

The *Quarterly* further pointed out:

> The Senate Appropriations Committee reported spending $24,186.32. The House Appropriations Committee spent $158,775.42.
>
> The Senate Judiciary Committee, Congress' leading spender, reported spending $1,629,396.48 throughout the 84th Congress and $439,540.53 in the first six months of the 85th. The second-ranking House Government Operations Committee reported spending $895,902.67 and $246,963.80 for the two periods. The House Un-American Activities Committee, which ranked third in the 84th Congress with reported spending of $476,610.95, fell to fifth place in 1957. It reported spending $145,258.98, compared to $162,198.58 reported by the Senate Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Programs and $152,942.37 reported by the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Fields.

The Senate special and select committees during the session include: Small Business, Labor Management, and Foreign Aid Programs. The House had Small Business.

The Senate as a Council

Nominations totaling 45,114 for posts in all branches of the government were sent to the Senate during the year for confirmation; of these 44,620 were confirmed, 33 were withdrawn, and 461 were left unconfirmed. Less than half-a-dozen of the nominations considered by the Senate caused any conflict. The most controversial ones, which were acted on by roll-call votes, included: Scott McLeod, to be Ambassador to Ireland, approved after considerable discussion by a vote of 60 yeas to 20 nays; Jerome K. Kuykendall, to be a member of the Federal Power Commission, approved by 50 yeas to 25 nays; and Don Paarlberg, to be Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, confirmed by 42 yeas to 32 nays. These last two nominations occupied the Senate during nearly all of its sitting for August 15. On March 19, for the first time since March 15, 1836, the Senate confirmed the

[49] *Weekly Report*, XV (Oct. 11, 1957), 1172–76.

nominations of two Supreme Court justices in one day, by voice vote and after brief consideration — William J. Brennan of New Jersey and Charles E. Whittaker of Missouri.

Fourteen treaties were submitted to the Senate during the year for approval, while fifteen others submitted during previous years were awaiting action. Twelve of the former and one of the latter were approved. Two current ones and thirteen from previous sessions were left without action.[90]

All of the treaties were acted on after a minimum of controversy; in fact, the procedure was mostly routine. As in the last few years, however, all were approved by roll-call votes, but while there were thirteen cleared for ratification, only nine roll-call votes were necessary since several treaties were voted on *en bloc*. For example: Executives E, M, and J, and A, B, and K — all of the Eighty-fifth Congress, first session — were approved by two roll-call votes each of 86 to 0, under unanimous consent agreements that each vote would be applicable to each of the three treaties in that group. By unanimous consent, one treaty was returned to the President, pursuant to his request.[91]

The Atomic Energy Treaty (Exec. I of Eighty-fifth Congress, first session) was given the closest scrutiny, no doubt; it was debated on two different days but was finally approved by 67 yeas to 19 nays.[92]

The President and Congress

The President and Congress began to experience less harmonious legislative relationships. Criticism of the President himself was heard more often, and it was more outspoken. Senator Kerr, perhaps pushing charges to the furthest extremes, during a discussion of the monetary policy of the Administration states: "No man can help Eisenhower study the fiscal policies of this Government, because one cannot do that without fiscal brains, and he does not have them." [93]

The Administration was criticized on several occasions on such things as interest rates on bonds, fiscal policies, the withholding of information from the public, ambassadorial appointments, and foreign policy, including OTC and GATT.

The President, on the other hand, told a news conference on August 21 that he was disappointed that Congress had failed to enact so much of his

[90] Exec. H of 84th, 1st, was returned to the President at his request, and executives J, K, and L of the 82nd Congress, first session, conventions No. 91, 92, and 93, which were adopted by the International Conference held at Geneva, June 8–July 2, 1949, are counted as one treaty.

[91] The treaty was Exec. H of 84th, 1st, on friendship, commerce, and navigation between the U.S. and Republic of Haiti. The request was made on July 24, and ordered returned on August 8.

[92] See Senate proceedings for June 17 and 18.

[93] 85 *Cong. Rec.* 10537 (1957). It was pointed out in the next day's proceedings that Senator Kerr in editing the transcript had inserted the word "fiscal." See p. 10654.

program, "and in so many cases (had) not even held hearings." He was quoted as saying, "Everybody who voted against what I thought was the right thing to do, why, they have to share the blame."

The President signed 316 measures into public law and 341 into private law; he vetoed twelve proposals of which nine were of the pocket variety; no bill became law over his veto. In fact, all but four of the vetoes were private bills. The four consisted of increases in rates of pay to postal (H.R. 2474) and to federal (H.R. 2462) employees, veterans' housing (H.R. 4602) and a bill relative to a secondary highway in the state of Washington (H.R. 2224).

The President's program was submitted to Congress in a series of messages, listed in the opening section of this article. And according to a study by the *Congressional Quarterly*,[94] the President made two hundred and six specific legislative requests, with the following results: seventy-six or 36.9 per cent were enacted; twenty-three or 11.2 per cent were either rejected in committee or on the floor of the House or Senate; eleven or 5.3 per cent were passed by either the House or Senate, but not both; ten or 4.9 per cent were reported by committee but never came up in either house for a vote; twenty-four or 11.6 per cent were given hearings before committees but never were reported by them; and sixty-two or 30.1 per cent never received any action at all. This record shows the President's "legislative batting average" to have dropped "to a new low."

Legislative action on some of the more publicized recommendations includes the following: the President's mid-east doctrine was enacted, but after some modification.[95] The House passed the measure substantially in the form requested by the President, but it was reported in the Senate with the recommendation that all the language after the enacting clause be stricken out and that a substitute be inserted therefor. The Senate amended the bill over the committee's proposal and the House then agreed to the Senate version.[96] In the case of the civil rights bill (H.R. 6127) the House passed the measure as recommended by the Department of Justice. The Senate made major changes, practically rewriting it — sixteen amendments were made, including the elimination of Part III of the bill. The House accepted all but two of the Senate amendments, completely eliminating Part III, and took those two with amendment, in which the Senate concurred.

The President in his Mutual Security Message made a total "request for new funds for fiscal year 1958" in the amount of $3.865 billion, "a sum $535 million less than estimated in my budget message last January."[97]

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[94] *Weekly Report*, XV (Sept. 6, 1957), 1069–74.
[95] H. J. Res. 117 (S. J. Res. 19) — P.L. 85–7.
[96] See House proceedings for March 7.
[97] H. Doc. 182.

As passed, the law called for $3.36 billion, having passed the House at $3.1 billion. The time for an economic development loan fund, to be built up over a three-year period as requested by the President, was cut back to two: as the House had originally passed the bill, it provided for one year.[98] When it came to the appropriations for this program, the estimates called for $3,386,860,000, but Congress gave only $2,768,760,000.[99]

On June 17, the President sent letters to Vice-President Nixon and Speaker Rayburn urging action on five bills[100] to carry out recommendations submitted by the Administration for reorganization of the executive branch as proposed by the Hoover Commission. Only one of these became law;[101] two passed the Senate only (S. 434 and S. 385), one was reported (H.R. 5338), and no action was taken on the other (H.R. 29). The President requested $1.3 billion for school construction over a period of four years (H.R. 1) but the bill was killed in the House on July 25. The recommendations for postal rates increase (H.R. 5836) passed the House, and hearings were held on the measure in the Senate, but no legislation was forthcoming. An immigration bill (S. 2792 — Pub. L. 85–316) for hardship cases was enacted but it did not contain any of the "basic immigration changes" requested by the Administration. No statehood bill for Hawaii or Alaska was enacted although such bills were reported in the Senate.[102]

The President blocked the enactment of several proposals opposed by the Administration. He pocket-vetoed the bills proposing pay increases for postal and federal employees (H.R. 2474 and H.R. 2462). Finally an attempt to repeal the effect of the Status of Forces treaty, opposed by the Administration, did not materialize. Such an amendment offered in the House to the Mutual Security bill was defeated and such a bill (H. J. Res. 16) reported in the House was never called up for action.

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[98] See S. 2130 — P.L. 85–141.
[99] See H.R. 9302 — P.L. 85–279.
[100] S. 1791, S. 434, S. 385, H.R. 29, and H.R. 5883.
[101] S. 1791 — P.L. 85-766.
[102] S. 49 and S. 50.

POLITICAL FUND RAISING AND THE SMALL CONTRIBUTOR: A CASE STUDY

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IN RECENT YEARS the increasing costs of American political campaigns consequent upon the growth of the mass media of communication have focused attention on the financial aspects of party activity. A University of North Carolina study[1] estimated that the cost of nominating and electing all public officials in 1952 was approximately $140,000,000. It seems likely that the comparable figure for 1956 will approach $200,000,000. We now know with fair accuracy how this money is spent and we also know that much of it is raised in contributions or $100 or more. For instance, the same study estimated that in 1952 the Democrats raised 81 per cent of their funds in this way while such contributions accounted for 88 per cent of the Republican total.[2] The phenomenon of sums of such magnitude being expended on so important a part of the political process is obviously deserving of the closest study. To date, however, students of government have almost completely ignored the 12 to 19 per cent of the parties' war chests which comes from small contributions.

Concern over the size of party treasuries together with perhaps excessive anxiety over the dangers inherent in very large contributions, has led to two recommendations for reform of this traditional reliance on large contributions. One proposal is substantially some kind of governmental subsidy to the parties. Other people have urged the parties to undertake a really serious effort to broaden the base of their financial support. It is, of course, possible to combine these two proposals through the medium of permitting tax deductions or credits for political contributions. It is ironic, however, that the suggestion that the parties appeal for smaller contributions from greater numbers of people is put forward before we have discovered whether significant numbers of them will in fact heed such appeals.

That political leaders have historically relied on large contributors for party funds is well known. What is not know, however, is whether this reliance is born of the knowledge that small contributions will not in general aggregate significant sums, or whether it is merely a product of an era in which expenses were not so large as to compel other sources to be explored. There is simply nothing in the literature of political science that gives any indication of the response to be expected from a really serious

[1] Alexander Heard, *Money and Politics* (New York: Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 242, 1956), p. 2.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 13. See also the Report of the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections submitted to the Committee on Rules and Administration pursuant to S. Res. 176, 84th Congress, *1956 General Election Campaigns* (1957).

effort at mass financial solicitation by political parties. It seems generally admitted that Beardsley Ruml's widely advertised plan to finance the 1952 Democratic campaign with $5.00 contributions was a failure, but no precise figures on this attempt have ever been made public. It appears that the sum total of our knowledge on this matter is limited to an oft-quoted Gallup poll finding that most American families have never been asked for a political contribution, that in 1954 only one family out of eighteen made any political contribution at all, but that 31 per cent of them would give at least $5.00 if asked.

This paper is an effort to provide a moderately detailed case study of an attempt by a political party in one county to solicit its registered membership for political contributions. No pretense is made that the results of this effort are typical of what may be expected elsewhere, but since the precise method of solicitation was somewhat novel it would appear to be an experiment worthy of the attention of political scientists. This study, then, is presented in the hope that it will stimulate other and similar studies that will throw light on such questions as: Will registered party members give to their party? How much will they give? What proportion of a local party's expenses can be underwritten by small contributions? The answers to these questions have assumed increased importance since the announcement by the Democrats of their intention to institute a sustaining membership plan complete with party dues.

Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, the site of this study,[2] is located in the southeastern corner of the state. It has a population of 234,717 according to the 1950 census and is 45.1 per cent urban. The county seat is the city of Lancaster with 63,774 residents, and there are four boroughs and three townships with populations greater than 5,000. The population is divided roughly in halves between those in agricultural and nonagricultural pursuits. Consistently Republican since its native son, James Buchanan, left the presidency, the 1956 party registration figures were: Republican, 80,882; Democratic, 29,657.

Early in 1956 a proposal was made to the Democratic party leaders for a selected solicitation of the party's membership for contributions for the 1956 campaign. After a period of discussion among the leadership it was decided to go ahead with the plan and appeal for funds to a select list of 3,000 party members. These 3,000 names represented party members who had, in connection with the 1955 local election, contributed $1.00 each in a fund-raising scheme in which their gift created the possibility that fate might endow them with a new automobile. There was no way of knowing

[2] For access to the information on which this study is based the author is indebted to Mr. David R. Eaby and Mr. Thomas J. Monaghan, chairmen, respectively, of the Lancaster county and city Democratic committees, and to his colleague, Dr. Sidney Wise, who conceived and directed the fund-raising plan itself.

whether these names represented Democrats dedicated to the party's welfare or merely people who were prepared to regard a contribution of $1.00 as a hostage to the generosity of fortune. At worst, however, they were people who had demonstrated no hostility toward Democratic affluence and were, therefore, the best group available for the experiment.

A committee was accordingly established under the name of "Dues for Democracy" and the chairman of the Democratic County Committee assumed the chairmanship of the new committee. This decision was made deliberately, it being determined on the part of the proponents of the scheme that the whole effort should be toward *party* support and to emphasize that the Dues for Democracy Committee was a *party* committee. The title for the Committee, which served also as the title of the fund-raising plan, was chosen as being mellifluous and alliterative, as an accurate capsule description of the plan, and also, in reaction to the then-current Republican line, as an effort to capture for the Democratic party and the plan the adjectival connotation of "democratic."

The plan itself was outlined in a letter over the signature of the Committee chairman and mailed to each of the 3,000 voters on the list. Dated June 25, 1956, the letter opened with the heading "OIL AND POLITICS DON'T HAVE TO MIX. . . ." After reciting some of the costs of reaching the [illegible] by mail, newspaper, and television the letter estimated the cost of "a frugal county campaign" at $30,000. The letter than described the problem posed by these figures in these words: "How does a political party bring its message to the electorate without mortgaging its integrity?" After urging that the voters must assume a responsibility for increasing campaign costs the plan itself was described: "Enclosed with this letter are five postage-free envelopes. Please file these envelopes carefully in your desk, and at the first of each month beginning with July 1, 1956, enclose a single dollar bill in one of these envelopes and mail it out when you pay your other bills." The letter then pointed out that if these directions were followed a contribution of $5.00 could be made without hardship and concluded: "Democracy and political parties are inseparable. Is not the Democratic party worth 3¢ a day to you between July 1 and Election Day?"

The installment-plan character of the scheme was decided upon both because it was feared that a flat $5.00 contribution would be beyond the means of some party members and also because the enclosure of the five self-addressed, postage-free envelopes would constitute a kind of "gimmick" that would serve to attract attention and stimulate interest. The monthly-payment habit is by now deeply ingrained in our society and it was hoped that this might increase the number of participants by setting for them a kind of goal which could be reached by small and regular payments.

The letters were placed in the mail so as to be delivered in the last week of June. Simultaneously, an extensive program of publicity was out-

lined and news releases were prepared on the novel features of the drive. Since it was essential to maintain interest in the plan throughout the five months in which it was to be in operation, letters describing it were sent to Democrats prominent on both the state and national scene. Such personages as Governor Stevenson, Senator Kefauver, former President Truman, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, National Chairman Butler, and many others were invited to comment on the "Dues for Democracy" idea in terms suitable for publication[4] in a press release. The Committee filed these responses so as to permit releases at the beginning of each of the ensuing months.

At this point a development took place which transformed the whole experiment and greatly extended its scope. One of those who had been informed of the plan and asked to comment on it was Mr. Matthew McCloskey, a Philadelphian, and treasurer of the National Committee and chairman of the Finance Committee of the Pennsylvania Democratic party. Upon learning of the mechanics of the plan Mr. McCloskey telephoned the chairman of the Committee and urged that every registered Democrat in the county be solicited and, since the financial resources of the local party were hardly adequate for such a gamble with scarce funds, a sum of $1,500 was made available from the state party treasury by Mr. McCloskey to underwrite the experiment.

This decision to solicit on a county-wide basis was not made, therefore, until the very last days of June. It was essential, in view of the mechanics of the plan, to get the letter in the hands of the party's enrolled membership during the first week of July. Accordingly, it was decided that an additional 20,000 solicitation letters be printed, it being hoped that by skillful handling no more than one letter would be sent to each address and that in this way the entire registered membership of the party (29,657) could be reached with 20,000 letters. This hope proved to be illusory because sufficient care was not taken at the addressing stage to avoid such duplication and also because with many rural route addresses it was impossible to know whether they were the same residence. As a result the supply of envelopes and literature was exhausted before the voters' lists had been completely covered. In some voting districts no voters at all were circularized.

Moreover, the need for speed prevented processing the second mailing so as to eliminate those who had received the letter in the initial mailing. All that could be done was to append a postcript in the second printing of the letters urging the addressee to pass the letter on to a friend if he had already received such a letter. Because of this duplication and because of the duplication in addressing the second mailing, either unavoidably or

[4] It may be noted in passing that some of the prominent party leaders failed to measure up to expectations as sources of publicity. The Committee received more than one letter of the "I like your plan very much. I wish you every success. Yours very truly" variety. This is not the stuff of which press releases are made!

through carelessness, not all Democratic registrants were reached. For the purpose of this study it will be assumed that 20,000 registered voters were solicited, but in many cases this involved both a husband and a wife. It was anticipated by the Committee that in most cases husband and wife would, if they contributed, accept only a single responsibility. This assumption proved to be mainly correct in the returns, but there were instances of both husband and wife making contributions. Some 9,000 of the registered Democrats were thus not reached directly, and it seems probable that in this way several thousand family units were omitted from the canvass.

A second decision was made at this time which was also prompted by the necessity for haste and which had a direct bearing on the profit shown by the contribution campaign. The volume of work involved in collating 20,000 letters with 100,000 contribution envelopes and stuffing, sealing and addressing the second mailing was deemed too great to be done in the time required by volunteer party help. This work was therefore contracted to the printing company and paid for by the Committee. This expense could normally be avoided by utilizing volunteer help, but time did not permit it in this instance. All of the second mailing was handled professionally and placed in the mail on July 7, 1956.

Response to the plan in the press was very favorable. One of the two large-circulation daily newspapers in the county printed an editorial praising the plan and also reprinted a commendatory editorial from the Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*. Governor Leader of Pennsylvania praised the idea warmly and posed for a publicity picture with a member of the Committee accepting a dollar from him. Although interested almost exclusively in local publicity for the plan, the Committee did secure outside recognition which it was able to convert into local news items. Drew Pearson mentioned the plan in his daily column.[5] Congressman Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota also lauded the plan in an extension of remarks in the *Congressional Record*.[6] For the most part, however, the Committee relied for periodical publicity on press releases based on the progress of the plan, the reaction of individual contributors, and endorsements of the plan communicated directly to the Committee.

Both in August and September follow-up postcards were addressed to delinquent contributors. These cards were sent only to those who had contributed to the drive but who had not made the contribution for that month. The cards expressed gratitude for the contribution received and reminded the contributor that another installment was now past due. During the first week of August the Committee also placed brief newspaper advertisements urging Democrats not to forget "Dues for Democracy."

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[5] Column of July 9, 1956.

[6] 102 *Cong. Rec.* A5894 (July 28, 1956).

After the middle of September, however, no further reminders were addressed directly to contributors. By that time the political campaign was reaching its peak and it was felt that this activity would make the voters "politics conscious." Moreover, a great deal of publicity was being given to the financial plight of the Democrats on the national scene and the Committee hoped to profit locally from these appeals.

It is impossible to state whether the financial results achieved by the plan measured up to the expectations of local party leaders because they really did not know what to expect. The gross receipts of the scheme, received from 1,511 contributors, were $6,324 and these receipts were divided into the categories indicated in Table I. Assuming that 20,000 prospective contributors were reached, then a contribution of at least $1.00 was received from 7.6 per cent of those solicited. This percentage is lower than the Gallup poll result would lead us to expect, but that poll was designed to measure family contributions; and since this mailing often reached more than one member of a family unit it is impossible to correct this figure for a valid comparison.

It can be seen from Table I that 23.4 per cent of the receipts of the plan came from persons whose total contribution was greater than $5.00. These contributions ranged from $6.00 to $50.00; their arithmetical average being $10.50 and the median contribution, $7.00. Many of the larger contributions, as the letters occasionally accompanying them indicated, were from people who had rarely if ever been asked for a political contribution, thoroughly approved of the plan, and sought to indicate their enthusiasm with a contribution larger than was requested.

TABLE I

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS BY CONTRIBUTORS

Amount Contributed	*Number of Contributors*	*Percentage of Contributors*	*Amount of Receipts*	*Percentage of Receipts*
$1.00	253	16.7%	$ 253	4.0%
$2.00	174	11.5	$ 348	5.5
$3.00	154	10.2	$ 462	7.3
$4.00	164	10.9	$ 656	10.4
$5.00	625	41.4	$3,125	49.4
Over $5.00	141	9.3	$1,480	23.4
Total number of contributors 1,511		Total amount of receipts $6,324		

It is also noteworthy that approximately 60 per cent of those contributing a total of $5.00 or more did so by means of a single contribution rather than using the installment method. This suggests than an appeal for a flat $5.00 contribution would not have been regarded by many contributors as excessive, but considerable revenue would have been lost, and perhaps more important, the number of voters participating in the plan would have been sharply reduced.

The expenses of administering the plan are indicated in Table II, below. It may be observed from this statement that the cost of duplicating the first mailing of 3,000 together with the cost of contracting the handling of the second mailing rather than doing this by volunteer party help reduced the net receipts of the drive by a substantial amount. The $257.37 spent on the original mailing plus the $936.98 spent for labor on the second mailing thus represents a sum of $1,194.35 which could be added to the net receipts of a future drive if adequate foresight were exercised.

TABLE II

STATEMENT OF EXPENSES

For original 3,000 mailing			
3,000 stamped envelopes (business size)	$109.62		
15,000 envelopes (return)	103.75		
3,000 letterheads	26.00		
Printing	18.00		
		$ 257.37	
For second 20,000 mailing			
20,000 stamped envelopes (business size)	$730.80		
100,000 envelopes (return)	500.00		
20,000 letterheads	122.60		
Printing	58.15		
Addressing, collating, stuffing, etc.	936.98		
		$2,348.53	
Newspaper advertising		$ 33.26	
Postage (on returned envelopes)		111.84	
Postcards (reminder notices)		32.00	
Total Expenses			$2,783.00

Thus the plan produced a realized total of net receipts amounting to $3,541, this being the difference between gross receipts of $6,324 and total expenses of $2,783. When consideration is given to the nearly $1,200 spent through haste and duplication necessitated by inadequate planning it may be seen that the potential of such a program is considerable. It seems that of the voters reached in this particular drive the average contribution per voter solicited was approximately $0.32. The cost of contacting each voter may be estimated at approximately $0.08. When several thousands of registered party members are solicited the sum raised through this method can be of substantial help to a local party.

CONCLUSION

It should be remembered that the Lancaster "Dues for Democracy" plan was carried out in a presidential year. Thus the mass solicitation was conducted at a time when popular interest in politics is at its highest. Moreover, the Democratic National Committee was probably of assistance be-

cause of its nationwide appeals for small contributions. It is likely, however, that the national drive for funds by door-to-door solicitation carried out on "Dollars for Democrats" day, October 16, may have reduced the receipts of the local plan in that month. Registered Democrats who were participating in the local program and who were also solicited at their door may have omitted their mailed contribution that month. It is impossible to estimate the net effect of these two considerations so far as the receipts of the local plan were concerned.

More important, perhaps, than the sum realized for the 1956 campaign by the "Dues" plan is the acquisition of a mailing list of some 1,500 local party members who are proven contributors. It is the intention of the Committee to solicit only these known contributors for the local elections of 1957 and perhaps for one or two years thereafter. The receipts to be anticipated annually from solicitation of this list may prove to be of substantial assistance to the party because the large overhead associated with a mass mailing will be greatly reduced. Because of changes of address and population movement any mailing list can be used for only a few years. It seems probable that another mass mailing of all registered party members will again be necessary not later than 1960. For the local and state campaigns in the next three years reliance will be placed on the list of proven contributors.

There are advantages other than financial that accrue to a local party which employs such a mass solicitation. The letter requesting contributions can be a campaign document itself and a county-wide mailing to all registered party members thus serves a political purpose even for those voters who do not make a contribution. Moreover, all of the publicity associated with the "Dues for Democracy" plan redounded to the benefit of the party. One of the best electoral assets of the Democratic party is the widely held conviction that it is the party of the "little man." A campaign for small contributions helps to buttress this belief and thereby to strengthen the party's appeal.

Party leaders are also convinced that people who can be persuaded to contribute to the party can be relied upon to turn out and vote for the party on election day. This stems from the fact, amply attested to by the letters accompanying contributions, that such mass appeals help to create a sense of "belonging" among supporters who had not previously been asked for assistance in the party cause. Many voters seem to have been stimulated to a kind of proprietary interest in a party to which their affiliation had always been loose. Voting for the party on election day becomes for them an act in the nature of looking after their investment. It is impossible to measure the extent to which this feeling was aroused by the "Dues" campaign, but all members of the Committee agree that this is a feature of the plan which deserves emphasis. This result of mass solicita-

tion was probably heightened by the installment character of this particular scheme which protracted the party member's obligation over a period of five months.

Even if the actual monetary return in this particular experiment was not as large as could be anticipated from the Gallup poll mentioned earlier, there can be no doubt that a very large proportion of the receipts represented money that the party would not otherwise have gotten. The majority of contributions came from contributors who were unknown to party leaders and regular financial supporters were urged not to use the "Dues" plan. It is the hope of the Committee that with repeated solicitations some of the contributors will become active party workers and future party leaders. This can be encouraged by using the contributor mailing list for notices and announcements of party activities such as rallies and dinners.

Sentiment among local party leaders is unanimous that this experiment in mass solicitation was an undoubted success. In an area where the Democratic party is seriously outnumbered and in a year when Mr. Eisenhower's presence on the ticket eroded the partisan zeal of many registered Democrats, the party nonetheless realized a substantial sum of money, enjoyed some highly favorable publicity, and also stimulated partisan enthusiasm in its followers. Receipts were certainly not sufficient to encourage the hope, without much further citizen education, that such mass solicitation can substitute for the more traditional methods of party finance. Indeed, income from the "Dues" plan represented only about 10 per cent of the local party's budget for the year. Nonetheless this experiment took place at a time when the governorship of Pennsylvania was in Democratic hands and the party had access to funds much greater than it could hope for while in opposition. Such a mass solicitation program would have a truly significant importance in the lean years of being "out." Will Rogers once observed that politics "has got so expensive that it takes a lot of money even to get beat with." The Democratic party of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, seems at least to have demonstrated that from 10 to 15 per cent of the money necessary "to get beat with" can be obtained in small contributions from a party's enrolled membership.

THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF OLDER PERSONS: A DISCUSSION OF SOME FRONTIERS IN RESEARCH

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IT HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED in a number of recent popular articles that one of the basic facts of political life in mid-twentieth-century America is the increasing number of older people in our total population. For many years social scientists have investigated carefully the problem of juvenile adjustment to modern society, and the efforts of Negroes to achieve a political, economic, and social status commensurate with the principles which are considered basic to American democracy. Older people now comprise a larger proportion of our population than do either juveniles or Negroes.[1] Yet as members of a special group, older persons have not received so profound an intellectual analysis as Myrdal's *An American Dilemma*, nor so profound a series of treatments as the books and articles on youthful delinquency.

Contemporary articles on older people frequently repeat popular conceptions without any serious attempt at systematic factual investigation of their validity. These articles often fall into two categories, tending either to stress the potentialities of the aged as a tremendous pressure group or to deal glowingly in panaceas. The following excerpt from an article entitled "Old Age Turns Explosive"[2] provides an interesting illustration of the sort of sweeping generalization which purports to inform the public about the possible consequences of an aging population:

> . . . consider the rapidity with which the aging of the population is creating a problem for the politicians. They have known that this change in our age level was loaded with political dynamite ever since Dr. Francis E. Townsend flashed over the national horizon. In such states as California, Florida and Arizona the "retired" vote may soon come as close to holding a balance of political power as has the Jewish vote in New York. . . . The effect on national as well as state politics may, in a couple of decades, turn out to be spectacular. And since these "elder citizens" tend to think in patterns laid down in these formative years, they constitute a ticklish factor for the politician — conservatism on large questions of national policy coupled with desires for radical gains in their own social benefits.

The questions which can be raised about the unqualified assumptions made in this article are many. Can it be taken for granted that conservatism is a concomitant of old age? Is participation in radical welfare movements such as that led by Townsend typical of the aged? Do older people vote as a bloc or as members of a social or economic class? Are costly old-age programs adopted in states like California simply because of the numbers and cohesiveness of older people or because large numbers of people from

[1] Otto Pollak, *Social Adjustment in Old Age* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1948), p. 17.

[2] From the *Christian Century* (March 18, 1953), p. 309.

other age categories are willing to support them? How rapidly is the proportion of older people in the American population growing?

During the past decade a number of studies have been completed in the fields of social psychology, economics, and political science which present either challenging hypotheses or tentative answers to these questions. An assessment of these studies, with particular emphasis upon the researches in political behavior, may throw light on the validity of a number of current assumptions about older people, and, perhaps of greater importance, indicate clearly some of the frontiers of social scientific research in problems of the aged which remain unexplored.

Sociologists have long recognized that age differences and the cultural definitions given such variations by the congeries of human societies may be ranked among the most important factors to be considered in the study of individual and group behavior.[3] An outstanding example of the systematic and challenging sort of work being undertaken in the field of economics is Corson and McConnell's *Economic Needs of Older People*.[4] Within the fields of social psychology and journalism, attention has focused upon the aged as members of interest or pressure groups.[5] Specialists in personnel administration have given consideration to the age qualifications and retirement programs of public employees.[6] In recent years, the Council of State Governments has given attention to the state legislative actions taken affecting the aged.[7] Finally, the modern development of survey research sampling methods has opened up hitherto unavailable research sources. The two major contributors to the modern study of political behavior, the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research and the University of Michigan Survey Research Center, have both given serious attention to age differences among the factors influencing political behavior.

The Problem of Definition

Criteria for defining the precise age at which individuals are termed "old" or "aged" vary. Age 65 is perhaps most frequently used because it represents a terminal year in many private retirement and annuity programs and because it has been accepted as the age of eligibility for social security

[3] See, for example, Samuel N. Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation: Age Groups and Social Structure* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), pp. 21–55.

[4] New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1956.

[5] See, for example, Richard L. Neuberger and Kelley Loe, *Army of the Aged* (Caldwell: Caxton, 1936); and Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements* (New York: Wiley, 1941).

[6] See, for example, Thurza J. Brannon, *Outline of Federal Retirement Systems* (Washington: Social Security Administration, 1948); or Lewis Meriam, *Principles Governing the Retirement of Public Employees* (New York: Brookings, 1918).

[7] See, for example, *Report of the Governors' Conference, The States and Their Older Citizens* (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1955).

benefits. There is, however, evidence of a downward trend in retirement programs. When social attitudes toward older persons are taken into consideration, age 60 or younger has been suggested as more appropriate.[8] In this account a person whose age is 55 or over will be classified as old for the practical reason that the political behavior studies utilized for much of what follows generally accept this classification. When material from investigations employing different standards for distinguishing older persons from members of other age groups is utilized, the variation in standards will be noted in parentheses in the text.

The Importance of the Aged

Although virtually every contemporary account of the political impact of the aged stresses the growing importance of older people, the emphasis is usually upon population statistics rather than the political behavior of the aged. The population information is, of course, impressive in itself. Yet analysis of past election studies suggests that the correlation of population, political behavior, and demographic investigations would provide greater insight in terms of the dimensions of the political importance of older persons.

On the basis of the 1950 census, persons 65 and over totaled 8.2 per cent of the American population. When age 55 and over was used, the percentage was more than doubled. Under the latter definition, older persons comprised nearly 17 per cent (16.9) of the total population. The percentage of those over 55 years of age has been steadily increasing from 9.4 per cent in 1900, 11 per cent in 1920 and 15 percent in 1940.[9] Estimates of future population proportions differ, but all agree upon the probability of even greater increases in the proportion of older persons in coming years. Evidence in several of the major voting behavior studies shows that the political influence of the aged may be much greater than the population statistics would indicate. For a greater proportion of the aged actually vote in presidential elections than do adults in two of the other three age groupings which were classified. Persons 55 and over voted more heavily than those in either age group 21 to 34 or 35 to 44. Only the middle-aged group, 45–54, surpassed them.[10]

The geographic distribution of the aged has a bearing on estimates of the political importance of older people. Although it is generally assumed

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[8] Pollak, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–16.

[9] Corson and McConnell, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

[10] Angus Campbell and Robert L. Kahn, *The People Elect a President* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1952), p. 34; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 70; the Woodward and Roper study also supports this, although the age categories utilized are not precisely the same; see "Research on Political Parties and Leadership," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV (1950), 877.

that states like California and Florida have the highest proportions of aged because of the migration of retired persons, the greatest percentages are actually found in certain of the New England and Mid-western states, notably, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska.[11]

The location of the aged within each of the states having the heaviest concentrations may be significant for certain levels of state politics. The situation in Iowa is illustrative. This state ranks second in the nation in the percentage of aged (defined by the Census Bureau as 65 and over) in the total state population.[12] The twelve Iowa counties having the highest concentrations of older persons (percentagewise) are rural and located in the southern portion of the state which has the poorest soil. The high concentration of older people is largely the result of steady population losses. The young adults migrate to nearby or out-of-state urban centers; the elders remain, tending to settle in small towns in these rural counties.[13] The political significance of the twelve Iowa counties which contain a heavy proportion of older people rests on the fact that they make up a large portion of the region in Iowa (the southern tiers of counties) which is heavily overrepresented in the Iowa General Assembly. Over 50 per cent of Iowa's state legislators now represent slightly less than one-third of the people of the state. Because they constitute so great a proportion of the population of the overrepresented rural areas, the aged have the strategic political advantage of being concentrated where their numbers are most

[11] Corson and McConnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31.

[12] *Report of the Governors' Conference*, *op. cit.*, p. x.

[13] Mabel I. Edwards, unpublished manuscript on the Ecological Distribution of the Aged in Iowa, Institute of Gerontology, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa; the data on the concentration of aged in these countries is given in the following chart:

County	*Percentage of aged (65 and over) based on 1956 estimate**	*Approximate percentage of persons 55 and over†*
Van Buren	16.0	32.0
Wayne	15.5	31.0
Taylor	15.2	30.4
Lucas	15.1	30.2
Keokuk	14.9	29.8
Appanoose	14.6	29.2
Henry	14.6	29.2
Union	14.0	28.0
Monroe	13.9	27.8
Page	13.7	27.4
Decatur	13.7	27.4
Ringgold	13.6	27.2

* These figures are from the Edwards study and are based upon a detailed examination of birth, death, and migration factors.

† This is simply a rough calculation based upon the assumption that the ratio of persons 55–64 in these counties follows the national pattern, i.e., is approximately equal in numbers to those 65 and over. This assumption could obviously be false if persons 55–64 were seriously caught up in the migration pattern in these counties, but this does not appear to be the case.

effective in state legislative elections. Since demographic evidence indicates that there is a long-range national trend toward the settlement of older people in rural non-farm areas,[14] it is probable that the aged enjoy similar strategic advantages in other states that have failed to reapportion state legislative seats in accordance with population.

What is the political significance of the fact that (a) the aged in rural non-farm areas enjoy greater longevity than their fellows in urban areas and (b) that among the aged in rural non-farm areas, men out-number women (even though aged women outnumber aged men nationally, especially in urban areas)? [15] Since men, in general, vote more heavily than do women,[16] these facts would suggest that, percentagewise, older persons in rural non-farm areas vote more heavily than their counterparts in the cities. These possibilities could be explored in future elections. The possible influences of such strategic concentration of aged voting power upon state political organizations could afford new avenues for research and perhaps a fresh approach to the interpretation of the plentiful, but frequently untapped, primary source material on state politics. For example, how does the concentration of aged in the rural counties which presently are overrepresented in the Iowa General Assembly affect the attempts of some elements in the Republican party of Iowa to adopt new approaches to major social and political problems? Or conversely, what proportion of the leadership of Iowa's minority party is aged? Do minority party organizations in one-party states generally lapse into leadership patterns in which old and relatively inactive relics of past election battles are dominant? To attempt conclusive answers to questions of this sort, the accumulation of more data on the social bases of political diversity in the forty-eight state political systems is necessary.

Other approaches to the problem of assessment of the importance and possible influences of the aged in politics could involve consideration of such factors as health and mobility. The health factor might work to the political disadvantage of the aged, while the relative stability of the aged and the higher mobility of younger adults could serve to place the latter at a disadvantage in terms of fulfilling residence requirements for voting.

Questions, Answers, and Some Unknowns

Why do older persons demonstrate greater voting interest than do the members of other age groups? Despite the fact that voting studies have consistently shown that older persons participate in voting more than any group except the 45 to 54 age category, persons 55 years old or over rank

[14] *Man and His Years, An Account of the First National Conference on Aging* (Raleigh: Health Publications Institute, 1951), p. 20.

[15] Pollak, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24.

[16] Woodward and Roper, *op. cit.*, p. 877; and Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

lowest in sense of political efficacy (defined as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process").[17] Generally, this low sense of political efficacy was matched by a low index of political participation, but in the case of older people this correlation was not consistently established. This suggests that older people have a more pessimistic view of their possibilities for political effectiveness, but are determined, nevertheless, to participate politically.

Since persons 55 and over had tended to vote more heavily Republican than Democratic in the elections studied prior to that of 1952 (the election in which the test of political efficacy was first made), the pessimism of older people could in part reflect past electoral disappointments during the long period of Democratic presidential victories, 1932 through 1948. In addition, differences in participation records appear among adults in general which may partially explain this behavior of the aged — men participate more frequently than women, Republicans more frequently than Democrats.[18]

A special aspect of the political behavior of older persons analyzed in the Michigan study of the 1952 election provides an additional explanation of the low sense of political efficacy but high political participation ratio of the aged. A measurement of the sense of citizen duty (defined as "the feeling that oneself and others ought to participate in the political process, regardless of whether such political activity is seen as worthwhile or efficacious") indicated that older persons ranked both first in the category of high sense of citizen duty, and at the opposite extreme — first in low sense of citizen duty. This tendency toward extremes suggests that oldsters having a sense of citizen duty are frequently highly motivated, perhaps more highly motivated than those in other age groups, while oldsters who have a low sense of citizen duty gravitate toward virtually complete political indifference. Further study of these motivational differences among older persons stressing such factors as sex, party, education, and social and economic status is necessary before anything except rather tentative hypotheses can be made.

Voting in presidential elections, the level at which participation is greatest, is only one manifestation of voting behavior. Congressional and state elections held in years in which there is no presidential election uniformly attract less voter attention. And primary elections for the purpose of selecting party candidates for congressional and state offices generally stimulate the least voter participation.[19] To date, with a few exceptions,[20] the survey research approach has not been applied to nonpresi-

[17] Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–99.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 70.
[19] V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 131–68.
[20] Angus Campbell and Homer C. Cooper, *Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1956).

dential elections, either general or primary. For the study of older people, several questions may be raised. What proportion of participants in off-presidential-year general elections are older persons? What proportion of the select group of voters who participate in primary elections are aged? If participation by the aged is heavy, perhaps the previous estimates of the political importance of older people need further revision.

The Campbell and Cooper national survey of the election of members of the House of Representatives in 1954, the most extensive nonpresidential election study available, indicated that persons 55 and over maintained the same relatively high participation ratio established in the presidential elections of 1948 and 1952. They participated more heavily than persons in age groups 21–34 and 35–44, but less heavily than members of age group 45–54. Insofar as one election can be taken as indicative, the relationship of the ratio of participation of older persons to that of other age groups did show some changes. All age groups participated less heavily in 1954 than in 1948 or 1952. The drop-off among the youngest voters (21–34) was most marked, however, while the decline in participation among persons 35–44 paralleled but was heavier than that of the oldest group. Consequently, in a comparison of the oldest (55 and over) with the two youngest age groupings, older persons definitely did gain in political influence in this nonpresidential election. It should be noted, however, that older persons did show a much heavier decline in participation than the middle-aged group (45–54), but even when this was taken into account, older persons clearly made up a larger percentage of those participating than they had in the 1948 and 1952 presidential elections.[21]

In addition to the graduations of participation that exist in a comparison of presidential, congressional, and state elections, it is recognized that a very small minority of the adult population participates in the specialized political activities such as attending political rallies, fund-raising or money-giving, and actual work for or management of political parties or voluntary political organizations.[22] A vital but presently unanswered question is what percentage of the adults who are really politically active are older persons? Here popular political mythology, with its frequent references to "the old guard" suggests that a large number are older persons. Yet this has never been investigated systematically on a regional or national basis. The Elmira study indicated that the local leadership of the minority political party (which by 1948 had not tasted the spoils of local office for nearly two decades) was held by six men all of whom were over seventy years of age. Yet the same study showed that the precinct workers of the same party (Democratic) were younger than their Republican counterparts. Both

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[22] Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–40.

political parties in Elmira drew over 10 per cent of their workers from retired or widowed persons.[23] The participation of the aged in the more specialized political activities could be studied through survey research methods utilizing a national sample. An investigation of the ample biographical literature on old-time and modern political bosses could turn up interesting evidence at this level. Community studies of the pertinent biographical data of county party chairmen, members of state and county central committees, and precinct workers could supplement the broader studies suggested above. The many sociological studies of community power structures probably contain untapped data for such an inquiry.

Public affairs leadership may be treated as a function which is much broader in its scope of community influence than that of specialized political participation. The Katz and Lazarsfeld study of Decatur, Illinois, concluded that "public affairs leadership declines steadily, though very undramatically, with advancing age." [24] This study probably cannot be used as a basis for generalization about older persons because the findings related to women only. The study conducted by Floyd Hunter, in which the community leaders analyzed were all men, suggests that older men retain community influence rather tenaciously, but the prospect of gradual loss of influence in old age was also recognized.[25] A thorough study of the literature on community social structures could throw more light on this aspect of the behavior of older people.

Virtually all of the foregoing discussions of the growing population proportions of older people — their strategic location for state legislative politics in certain states, their high voting record in presidential elections and probable high participation record in nonpresidential general and primary elections, their higher motivation toward political participation, their possible roles as public affairs leaders — all these underscore the real as well as potential influence oldsters have in American politics. Therefore a crucial question is, how do older persons exercise their influence? Are older people as a group in American society any more self-seeking than other social groupings? Do they constitute a cohesive group in any sense? Do they vote as a bloc?

The answers that may be ventured are again necessarily tentative. The study of voter behavior in the city of Elmira, New York, in the 1948 election by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee represents the most extensive effort to date which gives attention to age differences. The Michigan national sample surveys of the 1948 and 1952 elections also add pertinent

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[23] Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 109–10.

[24] Elihu Katz and Paul I. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), p. 291.

[25] Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), pp. 29–30, 41.

information. Both the Elmira study and the second Michigan study indicated that a large proportion of oldsters who had indentified themselves with a political party the first time they voted still adhered to that party.[26] This tendency to retain the political allegiance of one's formative political years does not lend support to the concept of an elder citizens' voting bloc.

People did tend to discuss politics with persons in their own age group, although younger adults tended to show respect for the political opinions of their elders (an attitude which was not reciprocated by oldsters).[27] This apparent age cohesiveness was not based primarily upon age per se, however, but upon social factors such as family ties, occupational and eonomic status, and the political climate in the community. For example, the Elmira study showed that 90 per cent of adult family members living together in the same house made the same voting decision in late October of the 1948 presidential campaign. Furthermore, insofar as political discussion was engaged in, people tended generally to discuss politics with members of their own party.[28]

A noteworthy finding of the Elmira study concerned the influence of the community political climate. Where the political cohesiveness of primary social groups such as the family was weakened or destroyed, the prevailing political traditions of the community had a significant bearing on voting dispositions. This community influence worked to the disadvantage of the minority party. In heavily Republican Elmira, advancing age brought an increasing proportion of conversions of former Democrats to the Republican party, perhaps explaining in part the rather heavy proportion of Republican votes among the aged in that city.[29]

The heavy influence of social factors such as those discussed above probably seriously qualifies the popular conception that the aged are a cohesive voting bloc primarily interested in economic panaceas for themselves. However, the experiences of the depression years[30] suggest that if our society fails to meet the vital economic and social needs of the aged, older persons, like the members of any other social group, might well develop such political cohesiveness on the basis of mutual disillusionment and insecurity.

Perhaps one of the most difficult of the problems relating to the study of the political behavior of the aged is that of analysis of their alleged conservatism. In part the problem is a serious one of definition of the word conservatism; in large part the problem is one of insufficient social scientific

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[26] Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–61; Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–2.

[27] Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 101–4.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 100–101.

[30] Corson and McConnell, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–19.

data. As a result of their pioneering study of presidential voting in Erie County, Pennsylvania, in 1940, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet concluded that older persons demonstrated not so much political, but rather social conservatism.[21] The major voting behavior studies, the Erie County (1940), the Elmira (1948), and the two Michigan-sponsored ones (1948, 1952), indicate that Republicans comprise a majority among older voters.[22] Does this mean that the aged are more "conservative" than other persons? The image created by a political party in different social settings has a bearing on this. Could one argue that an aged Southern Democrat in Mississippi is more "liberal" than an aged Northern Republican in New Jersey or vice versa? The difficulty of using party labels as criteria for distinguishing liberals and conservatives is manifest. Within each of the major parties there is wide opportunity for taking what are generally considered to be liberal or conservative positions on contemporary social and economic questions. But from the point of view of a Fabian Socialist, the fact that older Americans vote overwhelmingly for the two major parties might be interpreted as conclusive evidence of the general conservatism of the American aged.

The Elmira study concluded that "age generations" did exist in American politics, but that party affiliation was less important than the social factors basic to party allegiance. The generation which came of age in the 1920's tended to be more Republican, but the underlying split in this generation was religion. The political generation which came of age in the 1930's tended to be more Democratic and here the basis for political division was socioeconomic. Although the formation of relatively stable political attitudes may come early in Europe, most young American adults do not make that adjustment until age thirty-five. This in part was attributed to the apolitical nature of young Americans.[23] The whole area concerning the early formulation and conditioning of the political attitudes and values of older persons still remains virtually unexplored.

As was discussed previously, the aged tend to retain their affiliation with the party for which they first cast a ballot. If conservatism is defined as rigid adherence to outdated ideas, would retention of party affiliation in old age brand the aged as conservative? Here again, exceeding caution is required. The contents of party programs change, sometimes radically, over the passage of years, and insofar as our scanty data permits generalization, the aged may accept such changes along with other age groups. This is another area for investigation. Several modern studies in sociology and psychology lend support to the view that older persons are capable of broad

[21] *The Peoples' Choice* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1944), pp. 24–25.

[22] *Ibid.*; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–101; Campbell and Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 37; and Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, p. 70.

[23] Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, *op. cit.*, pp. 301–2.

social adjustment and seriously challenge the assumption that there is a necessary relationship between conservatism and old age. For example, the Lorge and Helfant study of the sociopolitical verbal attitudes of a group of adolescents and their parents concluded that "for the age range of adults tested (36–64), there is no evidence of increasing conservatism in the older years. . . ." [34] Yet several of the sociological studies of American communities present a different picture of older persons. In *Plainville, U.S.A.*, for example, there are references to "a few old people" who have a "strangle hold" on much of "the money and land in the county," and are usually "no longer interested in the schools except to try to keep taxes down." [35] The latter view represents the observation of inhabitants, but similar views occur with frequency in other community studies.

Persons 55 and over tend to be rather steadfast in their voting preferences, ranking the lowest of all age groups as split-voters and as independents.[36] Older persons also indicate greater consistency in expressed pre-election intention and actual voting preference than persons in other age groups.[37] Although all of these behavior patterns reflect the greater political consistency of the aged, it cannot be implied that older persons are necessarily inflexible. Sociologists have pointed out that the aged can learn and that such learning can facilitate the acceptance of new ideas. Psychological testing provides evidence that older people are frequently more careful and deliberate than younger ones. Consequently, it has been argued that what is commonly referred to as the conservatism of the aged may be related to their tendency to be more deliberate rather than to inherent inflexibility.[38] The social environment may determine the political stability of an older person rather than age itself.

The information about the social and political attitudes of older persons often seems contradictory. Thorough investigation of the question of the alleged conservatism of older persons could include all of the sociological community studies, all of the major public opinion polls in which age differences were noted, and more extensive psychological testing.

Conclusion

The foregoing attempts at applying the results of modern political behavior and social psychological research to the task of evaluating the

[34] Irving Lorge and Kenneth Helfant, "The Independence of Chronological Age and Sociopolitical Attitudes," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLVIII (1953), 598.

[35] James West, *Plainville, U.S.A.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 110–11; see also, Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[36] Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Independent Vote: Measurement, Characteristics, and Implications for Party Strategy," *American Political Science Review*, XLVI (1952), 751.

[37] Campbell and Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

[38] Pollak, "Conservatism in Later Maturity and Old Age," *American Sociological Review*, VIII (1943), 175–79.

political influence of the aged rather obviously raise more questions than answers. The mere population statistics and demographic patterns are enough to underscore the importance of attempting to find more answers. The single area that appears to provide the most promising prospects for understanding the political behavior and attitudes of the aged is that of the investigation of the social environment in which the political attitudes of older persons are created and the social setting in which the aged may frequently find reinforcement for these attitudes. Further study of the political behavior of older persons may also provide material for a re-evaluation of current assumptions about state party organizations, their leaders and strategic campaign alternatives.

TECHNIQUES OF TEACHING POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE BEGINNING COURSE

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I

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS have long been aware that their teaching methods are in need of improvement. *Goals for Political Science* pointed out that in general "standard educational practices of fifty years ago still prevail" in most departments across the nation.[1] Even the threat of an increasing flood of students on the one hand and a decreasing supply of qualified teachers on the other have not resulted in any significant and widespread revision of time-honored methods. The situation is most critical in the beginning course. Indeed, if political science has a weak spot, it is most probably the way the beginning course is taught. It is here that student interest in the field is first aroused and held — or dulled and lost forever. The Committee reporting in *Goals* concluded that if the profession wished to retain "prestige and leadership" in the field of the social sciences, it must concentrate its attention "upon the problems of the beginning course," it must demonstrate "greater appreciation for, and alertness to, current educational philosophies," and it must pay "more attention to the strictly pedagogical aspects of [the] problem." [2]

Since *Goals* was published in 1951, the problem has become even more acute. The vast influx of students is no longer merely a threat; it is an actuality, and the pressure for improved teaching techniques, which was already strong, is steadily increasing. For the most part, however, what little attention has been devoted to the beginning course in recent years has been devoted to its content. Perhaps it is time to ask if there is not another and equally important approach. Content depends so much on the particular needs, resources, and limitations of individual departments that generalizations about it are not necessarily valid. In the present situation in which numbers constitute the problem of virtually every institution in the nation, concern about methods — about *how* to teach whatever content seems best to secure the particular objectives instructors have for their courses — seems much more important. Any worthwhile analysis of content must in any case await a final determination of course objectives, and as yet the profession has been slow in making that determination. An attack on methods, however, can be begun at any time with any content,

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[1] *Goals for Political Science.* Report of the Committee for the Advancement of Teaching, American Political Science Association (New York: Sloane, 1951), p. 278.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 216.

and it is not impossible that improved methodology may itself go a long way toward making present content more satisfactory.

This article is based on the results of an experimental program in teaching methodology carried on in the sophomore introductory course in political science at Duke University over the past two years under a grant from the Fund for the Advancement of Education. Stanford University, Emory University, Simmons College, Amherst College, and the Universities of Minnesota and North Carolina co-operated with Duke in certain parts of the program. What follows is more in the nature of an amateur's notes on the application of known techniques to particular problems, offered for the guidance of other amateurs, than an attempt to cover the whole area of possible experimentation in the beginning course. Considerable attention is paid to the technical problems involved in the program for the benefit of those readers who may be working on similar projects of their own.

II

The experiment was three-pronged. It involved the establishment of a testing program, the encouragement of independent reading, and the development of visual aids.

The testing program was premised on the belief that an information test given students at the beginning of the semester would serve to indicate the knowledge they brought into class with them and would thus provide instructors with an important diagnostic instrument. The results of such a test would not only enable the individual teacher to emphasize in his subsequent instruction the weak spots revealed by the test to exist in his classes; it would also enable instructors to pick out the best students, and the weakest as well, from all the beginning classes and perhaps to devise for them a different kind of beginning course. A similar test at the end of the course could be used to measure knowledge acquired during the semester.

Several different types of test could be used. A simple achievement test, designed to determine the amount of factual information students possessed about American government, seemed best for the purpose. Before the construction of such a test was undertaken, a check of published tests in the field was made. Although several were found to be available, none of them met the criteria which were felt to be necessary for an adequate information test. Such a test should be constructed in accordance with established testing standards, its items should each have been examined for validity and reliability, and it should differentiate between mental functions. Suitable tests meeting these criteria may have been developed for use within individual universities in the United States, but none are available for general use. Many of the published tests are over ten years old

and frequently include a large number of items which primarily measure knowledge of history instead of political science. They also tend to confuse reasoning-type items with information-type items. Some have not been validated and contain ambiguous phrases. Thus no existing test seemed to meet the requirements felt to be necessary for a good test.

With the advice of such professional test construction experts as Professor Irving Lorge of Columbia University, preparation of a simple five-response multiple-choice type test was therefore undertaken. Information in five areas of knowledge was covered: constitutional background, national government, state and local government, governmental programs and policies and politics. Test construction involves choice of the proper item type, writing actual test items, administering preliminary tests, validating items, and standardizing the valid items into a usable test form. Test experts warn particularly[3] that the item type chosen, for example, must not be confusing to the student and must be easy to administer, and that the same instructions should be used throughout the test, so that it will actually measure knowledge of the subject-matter and not the student's ability to read test instructions. In writing individual test items, trick questions must be avoided, as should all items which employ such words as "commonly," "sometimes," and "frequently." In preparing an information test, extreme care must be employed to write items that actually test student knowledge and not student emotions, biases, or prejudices. Items must also be written in such a way that they will not quickly become dated and so that they place emphasis on major facts and principles rather than on details. Too many items emphasizing detail must be avoided, lest the measure be of the detail-retaining capacity of students' minds instead of their knowledge. Finally, each item must be written in a uniform style and aim at both brevity and clarity.

Two problems of test construction present special difficulties. One arises at the very outset of the process. The several content areas covered in the course for which the test is designed must be identified and organized into sufficiently meaningful and manageable groups for test purposes, in order that the final test may give the proper relative weight to each subject-matter area and thus make it possible for the test to be used as a diagnostic instrument. The determination of these groups is to some extent limited by the organization of the text used in the course, but it also involves a consensus among the instructors teaching the course on its goals and objectives. The other problem arises at the other end of the process, in

[3] There is a sizable literature on test construction. See in particular E. F. Lindquist (ed.), *Educational Measurement* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Education, 1951), especially parts II and III; and Benjamin Bloom (ed.), *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. The Classification of Educational Goals* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1956).

checking items for validity and reliability. Machine equipment is the most efficient way to make item analysis. A graphic item-counter or an IBM machine is almost necsssary. An elaborate testing program thus is not really practical on a small campus, and even on a larger one it presents a problem to solve.

The preliminary forms of the Duke test, consisting of over three hundred items, were developed during the summer of 1956 and administered to five hundred students in beginning classes at Duke twice during the following academic year. Every item was subsequently tested for validity and reliability. Approximately one hundred of the original items were rejected. The remaining items have been administered in test form to fifteen hundred students at Duke, Stanford, Amherst, Simmons, Emory, and the Universities of Minnesota and North Carolina, and are now being tested once again for validity and reliability. Finally, the valid items will be divided into two balanced tests of approximately one hundred items each, which can be given in a fifty-minute class period. One test may be administered at the beginning of each semester as a diagnostic pre-test, the other may be administered at the end of the course as a part of the final examination, along with subjective questions added by each instructor. Thus both the knowledge students bring to class with them at the outset and the knowledge they gain during the semester may be measured, and the test results used to assist instructors in teaching more effectively.

Although the first goal of the program was confined to the development of an information test, it was felt that other types of tests could also be developed. Modern testing techniques have been used with success in other subject-matter fields to measure vocabulary and ability to read as well as to measure ability to reason. They have also been used to discover attitudes. This project early considered the possibilities of applying these same techniques to American government. It was quickly discovered, however, that before this could be done, agreement had to be reached upon what was to be measured. If the objective of the beginning course were solely to teach facts, then the information test alone would be enough. But if a further objective were to teach students how to think logically about political questions, then a reasoning test might be needed to measure the success of the course in reaching this goal. Furthermore, if good citizenship were made an objective, an attitude test might be developed which would measure the extent to which that objective was attained.

After considerable discussion, it was agreed that, in addition to the value of political science in a liberal arts education and the obvious desirability of teaching a basic body of facts, a further goal of instruction ought to be to teach students to think rationally about political questions. This meant training in the ability to analyze a given body of facts about politics, to synthesize arguments, and to reach conclusions in a logical manner.

Involved in these processes are at least ability to identify irrelevancies, organize material logically, spot ambiguities, and determine probable reliability of testimony. Consequently, it was decided to experiment with the construction of a reasoning test. The first steps in this endeavor have been taken and sometime during the coming academic year a draft test will be ready to administer.

There was much less agreement about instruction in citizenship and education for government service as course objectives and still less about instillation of attitudes. Consequently, it was decided that for the present the general objectives of the beginning course would be considered as contributing to a student's liberal education, developing a core of factual knowledge, and training in rational thinking, leaving to individual instructors the addition of other goals as they thought best. Thus tests in these latter areas were not considered at all in the Duke experiment.[4]

The second part of the experiment involved the development of a program of independent reading for students in the beginning course. A number of universities have developed independent study programs with notable success. Stanford's program was an outstanding example of what can be done along this line. But honors reading for a few selected students under tutorial direction is an entirely different thing than a program for the encouragement of independent reading for all beginning students. It has long been recognized within the profession that such reading is an important part of a student's education, but it has always been hard to decide on a satisfactory way to get students to read widely. There is perhaps uniform agreement that the familiar standard reading lists do not do the job. All too frequently titles are repeated on successive lists without much thought being given about the reason for their inclusion, and students do not make much use of the lists in any case. The project set out to find what might be better. It began by asking what should be read. And once the books had been selected, it tried to discover a way to encourage students actually to read them. Two things seemed necessary: more careful selection of the books to be recommended and more carefully planned methods of arousing student interest in reading them.

There could be no complete agreement in the profession about the "100 best books" to be read by the beginning student. Books on the list developed in the experimental program, however, were selected on the basis of a group judgment. Just as experts in test construction were brought in to advise about developing the tests, so experts in each of the fields covered in the beginning course were consulted as to what books they considered to be most pertinent in their fields. These experts included not only political

[4] For a discussion of these latter two objectives, see *Goals for Political Science*, *op. cit.*, chaps. 2 and 4.

scientists at a number of colleges and universities but staff members of government agencies and research bodies as well. Thus the books were those recommended by the people who were most qualified to give judgment on them. Most of the books chosen are recent. All are well written, and, taken together, they provide insights into most of the important problems of American government. The topics they cover include limited government, total government, majority rule and minority rights, federalism, political parties, campaigns and elections, the presidency, the Supreme Court, Congress, national administration, foreign relations, conservation, and agriculture.

To solve the problem of arousing student interest, the techniques developed and used by librarians and national book clubs to stimulate reader interest were tried. A series of eleven weekly bulletins, each containing short notices of the books on a single topic, were prepared and distributed to students. Each bulletin was prepared in the form of a 5" x 8" four-page printed booklet with a colored cover. Each week, one book on the list was chosen as the "Book of the Week," and posters featuring it were placed at several of the places in the libraries on the campuses where student traffic was heaviest. In conjunction with the bulletins, multiple copies of the books described therein were placed in special reserve collections in the libraries where they were made easily accessible to students. The lists have been used on other campuses, and copies of the lists may be had upon request. A year's experience has given considerable evidence that students respond well to such stimuli and are doing much more reading than previously.

Relatively few serious technical problems arose in developing the independent reading portion of the project. The total costs of the new reading program were considerably higher than that of the old mimeographed reading lists. The chief difficulty during the first year probably was to secure a large enough margin of "lead time" so that the book lists were ready for distribution at the opening of the week in which the topics they were related to were to be assigned.

In regard to visual aids, two major problems existed at the outset of the experiment: what kind of visual aids to develop, and how to develop them on a limited budget of time and money. After considerable discussion and review of existing moving pictures, and an exploration of the cost of making pictures suited to the subject matter of the course, they were discarded as not feasible. Moreover, despite a growing number of commercially produced films catalogued under political science and government headings, most of them were found either to be dated or of a scope or on a topic not suited to the needs of the course. Other visual aids — wall maps, charts, opaque projectors — were likewise rejected because, while they are very useful at times and for particular purposes, all are too expensive for exten-

sive use. Vue-graphs may be used successfully to meet special course needs, as they are being used in the beginning course at the University of California at Berkeley, but the cost prevents their widespread use, especially in smaller colleges. Film strips were found not as satisfactory as slides because they have many of the same defects as movies. Thus, partly through elimination and partly on their own merits, slides were agreed upon as the most feasible visual aids for practical use.

Indeed, the project's experience with visual aids suggests that the profession's past concern with moving pictures to the exclusion of slides has been a major error. Movies are inflexible, expensive to make and to use, soon out-dated, and rarely suited to general classroom use. In any case, most of the time they are not necessary, unless the subject shown must be moving to convey the thought. Maps, charts, and statistical tables are just as effective on a "still" as they are in a "movie." Only when movement is necessary is a moving picture more effective.

The chief objection pedagogically to movies is that they take control of the class from the teacher and make him fit his lecture to the movie rather than the movie to his lecture. This is an extreme statement, to be sure. In theory, it is perfectly possible to make a moving picture which would show exactly what the teacher wanted it to show. Movies that can be rented or purchased, however, seldom develop ideas in the way a particular teacher wants them developed. This is especially true at the college level, where there is less agreement about the right answers to governmental problems. In practice, few commercially available movies can be used successfully in college classes. Indeed, movies are not feasible visual aids at all unless they are made by the teacher who uses them, and costs make this prohibitive.

Once the barrier presented by movies was removed, the way was open to develop slides. Slides are cheap to make, flexible, easily kept up to date, and effective in teaching. Furthermore, modern slide projectors can be used in a lighted room. Thus, objection that room darkness is the principal drawback to the use of visual aids can be met. Slides can be made without extensive knowledge of photography, even though skill in that direction is a big advantage. There are, of course, many technical problems in making them, but they are not nearly as complex as those involved in making movies. Indeed, slides are quite feasible as a "do-it-yourself" project.

Approximately five hundred slides have been produced since the inception of the Duke project. The majority deal with American government, but two groups of slides have been made in the field of comparative government. American government slides were prepared in ten areas, each group carefully planned to supplement lecture materials. About 25 per cent of the slides were produced in color, and over one hundred and fifty were made from original drawings by professional artists. Primary sources were

widely used. As slides were developed, they were criticized for content by members of the Political Science Department at Duke and by a number of political scientists at other institutions. Although a great deal remains to be learned about the production of slides, already they have been found useful in supplementing and clarifying lecture presentations and thus have contributed to more effective teaching.

Four main questions in constructing slides had to be answered.

1. *What kinds of material lend themselves to slide presentation?*

Factual materials, such as statistics about the number of persons voting, the number of seats won in Congress, population movement, land use, and sources of revenue, lend themselves readily to visual presentation. Comparisons between the present and the past, between countries, and between different levels of government are also easy to make and are particularly useful. To visualize philosophic ideas and political concepts like democracy, communism, or dictatorship is harder but not necessarily impossible.

Maps also make effective slides. They have long been used in college teaching but as wall charts they are expensive and clumsy. Slides may be made of an entire atlas for the cost of a single set of wall maps. Moreover, slides are much easier to move from one classroom to another. Very little has been done commercially in producing maps on slides, but the amateur will not have much trouble in making his own map slides.

Whatever material is used, it is important to keep in mind that slides are intended to supplement the lecture and not supplant it. The lecture should be prepared first and then slides developed to illustrate it. This means that material should not be put on slides that can better be said by the instructor. It is a common practice in business and government visual presentations for the whole lecture to be placed on slides. The lecturer then has no role except to operate the projection machine. This type of teaching has no place in the college classroom. Visual presentation should be an aid to the instructor. Consequently, simple statements of fact which the instructor can deliver orally should not be put on slides.

Humorous material may distract the student's attention from the facts which the instructor wishes to convey. One should keep in mind that the purpose of a college lecture is not to entertain but to instruct. Therefore, slides should not be amusing but serious teaching tools.

Simple slides are most effective. Material containing too much printing and showing complicated graphs should not be put on a single slide. A more effective presentation is possible by breaking the material up into a series of slides. There is a definite limit to the amount of information that can be conveyed on a single slide. This depends partly upon the size of the screen as well as on the size of the material photographed, but simple slides are best.

2. *Where can materials for slides be found?*

Reference books, newspapers, magazines, and reports of such research bodies as the Brookings Institution, the Institute of Public Administration, the New York Regional Plan Association, and the American Assembly are full of material that could be used for slides. Slides also make it possible to use the visual resources of several texts in addition to the one required.

Government agencies, as one might expect, are a gold mine of information but usually require extensive mining operations. There is so much material, and it is difficult to locate. Indexing of government documents is notoriously poor. Public information officers of federal agencies rarely have technical data available, and the decentralization of most departments necessitates a great deal of legwork and consultation to dig material out. The data from the State Department for a single series of slides took ten days of work and consultation with some twenty people.

3. *How can material be translated into visual form?*

Fundamentally, this is a problem in photography. For the "do-it-yourself" enthusiast, this means a camera, tripod, lights, and in some instances a developer. Even for the less ambitious it means considering the problems involved in taking pictures.

One of the major technical decisions involved in slide production is whether to make black-and-white or colored slides. Color is much more pleasing to the eye and the extensive use of color seems to make color slides almost a must for college teaching. There seems to be an added advantage — the fact that colored slides can be sent to parent companies like Eastman for developing. There are some real disadvantages. If colors are used, they must be brilliant and in sharply contrasting tones. It is more difficult to judge the adaptability of materials for slides in color than in black-and-white. Frequently, color film will reveal defects in the material being photographed which do not appear in black-and-white. Color slides require more light and thus need a darker room for showing than black-and-white. This is particularly true with pastel colors. A black-and-white film printed on glass that has an emulsion side rather than Kodachrome or Ektachrome color film was found more useful largely because it could be used in a lighter room. Unfortunately, this type of slide is somewhat more expensive to make.

Many universities have their own photographic laboratories, and where they exist, they had best be used. If the services of a photographic laboratory are not available, a Polaroid camera is being advertised now that provides a complete slide-making system. Negatives are developed within minutes after they are taken. While these can be used only for black-and-white pictures, they can be used quite effectively to make slides for the

classroom. This project had no actual experience with this equipment but faculty members on the campus report good results.

4. *What problems are involved in classroom use?*

The best slides in the world will be of little use if not used properly. Certainly one of the major factors in successful use is the lighted room. After careful investigation of the capacities of various slide projectors, the Bell and Howell Robomatic was adopted. This is an automatic machine using a 500-watt bulb. It costs approximately $150 wholesale. There are a number of less expensive projectors on the market, but not all of them have a 500-watt bulb. This amount of light is needed for use in the ordinary lecture hall without darkening the windows. An automatic machine with remote control is better than a manual machine because slides may be inserted in a cartridge rather than individually.

It is not good practice to open the lecture with a slide presentation and continue it for the full fifty-minute period. Experiment confirmed that it is far better to talk without visual aids for a quarter of an hour or so, outlining the whole lecture and indicating the points slides will be used to illustrate. This can be followed with perhaps twenty minutes of slides and the period concluded with a summary, and if the size of the class permits, with discussion. Moreover, slides should be used slowly enough to give the student time to comprehend them fully. This means that not more than twelve to thirty slides should be used in twenty minutes. The more complicated the story which the slide presents, the longer time needed for viewing. Experience indicates there is greater danger of using too many slides than in not using enough.

III

Perhaps the most outstanding impression to be gained from the experimental program is that there are vast possibilities of improving teaching methods. Indeed, there are so many intriguing avenues of approach that no single experimental program could possibly travel them all. It is a job for the whole profession. No doubt a great many other projects to improve teaching in political science are now in process, but without central reporting, little is known about them. Some duplication of effort is probably taking place. One important need as the profession moves ahead is the establishment of an exchange point or clearing-house for information on activities and experiments in all aspects of teaching methodology.

But experiments do not lose their value altogther because they are not shared. Certainly those who participated in the experimental program benefited greatly from their participation. Quite apart from any immediate results observable, everyone involved in the project was forced to sharpen his own thinking both about the way he taught and the purposes of his teaching.

There well may be some advantages to be obtained from centralizing work in at least some experimental areas. The construction of a standardized informational test in American government and the development of reading lists present excellent opportunities along this line. And, as noted above, a great deal of information directly pertinent to visual aids is available from government agencies. What is needed is someone to devote time to digging it out and making it available to instructors in colleges and universities throughout the country. This is not an easy task but it can be done. It it were possible to have someone in Washington over a long period of time, working continuously with government agencies in the various subject-matter fields of interest to political scientists, an enormous amount of material usable for visual aids could be uncovered. Individual efforts, however, must of necessity be scattered and sporadic. A great possibility exists for the establishment of effective working relations between political scientists and government agencies which has hardly been exploited at all.

While it is too soon to report definitively on the program's success, it is possible on the basis of two years' experimentation to advance a number of tentative hypotheses which may serve to point the way to the solution of some of the problems raised in *Goals for Political Science*. These hypotheses are:

1. Clearly defining course objectives is vital to improvement in content as well as in method.

2. Statistically sound tests may be used to measure the degree to which these objectives are reached. Information tests, reasoning tests, and attitude tests can each be employed to measure different objectives.

3. Through the use of information tests at the beginning of the course to select potentially better students from poorer ones, it is possible to organize special sections for the more advanced students as well as for those who need more elementary instruction. The same test results can also be used to determine the areas of both weakness and strength in each class and thus permit instructors to build the content of their course accordingly.

4. Students may be encouraged to read independently by recommending carefully selected books and by presenting the book recommendations attractively and at periodic intervals during the course, instead of distributing single reading lists at the beginning of the course.

5. A great deal may be done with visual aids through the use of slides to bridge the hiatus between textbook and laboratory. Slides are relatively cheap to make, adaptable to the varying emphases of individual instructors, flexible in use, easy to keep up to date, and unlike moving pictures, they do not require the use of a darkened room.

Based on these hypotheses, a vast new territory of development in "the strictly pedagogical aspects" of instruction in political science may be opened. In all the areas of experimentation, the possibilities have scarcely been touched. But every attempt by political scientists to experiment with the use of new teaching methods will help the profession achieve, as the Committee on the Advancement of Teaching declared it must, "greater appreciation for, and alertness to, current educational philosophies" and thus to "retain leadership and prestige in the field of the social sciences. . . ."

COUNCIL–MANAGER GOVERNMENT: A REVIEW

WILLIAM A. SOMMERS*

IN THAT STILL REMARKABLE TEXTBOOK on American municipal government, *Shame of the Cities*, Lincoln Steffens noted that many readers wrote to him asking what they could do about conditions he had reported. His reply was: "As if I knew; as if 'we knew' — as if there were any one way to deal with this problem in all places under any circumstances. There isn't."[1] The reply is still true but part of the challenge implicit in Steffens' statement has been met. American cities now have better government than during Steffens' time and have partially solved the problem of ineffectiveness of governmental machinery in the face of the "shame." And the leading influence in the progress made by municipalities during the last half-century has been the council–manager form of municipal government.

Council–manager government had its roots in Staunton, Virginia, in 1908. A position of "general manager" was created for the city which was worked in with an otherwise old-fashioned government consisting of a two-house city council and a mayor. What we know now as the council–manager plan was first proposed in the charter for Lockport, New York, in 1911. Although the charter was not adopted, a similar plan was put into operation in Sumter, South Carolina, in 1912. Thereafter, growth was swift. The first large city to adopt the plan was Dayton, Ohio, which did so in 1914; and twelve years later the plan went into operation in Cincinnati. By 1930, 308 cities were covered by the plan; in 1940 the number had reached 526; and by the beginning of 1957, 1,456 cities had taken the plan unto themselves. While growth has been rapid, the surge since the end of World War II has been remarkable. In the decade of 1946–56 over 800 cities came into the fold and today council–manager government is the most popular form of government for cities of 25,000 or over.

The basic contribution of the council–manager plan to local government progress is the separation of policy-making from administrative operations and their assignment to elected representatives and appointed officials respectively. Much has been written about policy and administration. The subject needs no introduction. It has been discussed with intense interest since Woodrow Wilson brought out his work, *The Study of Public Administration*.[2] We have passed from the clear and definitive separation of policy and administration which was the import of Wilson's essay to the current

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[1] Lincoln Steffens, *Shame of the Cities* (New York: McClure, Phillips, 1904), p. 233.

[2] Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Public Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, II (1887), 197. Reissued in booklet form by Public Affairs Press (Washington) in 1955.

approach of Appleby[3] and Waldo,[4] who tell us that the two are but aspects of a whole approach, commingling in the heady wine of practice.

Be that as it may, the council–manager plan's unique contribution is the establishment of a formal polarity by which general policy matters flow to the consideration of elected representatives and administrative details gather themselves together at the desks of the appointed officials. The latter are also subject to, and perpetually accountable to, the former. And as Mr. Appleby points out, the two approaches mingle, sometimes even conflict. Not long ago in Peoria, for example, a councilman moved the council to a policy action on the momentous subject of how often the windows in city hall should be washed by the contract window-washer. After much talk and debate it was moved and is now policy, which is dutifully followed by the administration, that the windows are washed but once a month, regardless of condition. We generally regard the determination of the frequency of washing windows as a relatively obscure, minor administrative detail; but as Appleby truly says, policy determination is the prerogative of the elected representatives, the details and the level of generality notwithstanding.

The point is, however, that the council–manager form carries inherent in it a polarity of policy and administration which is usually written into the law and embodied in the city's administrative ordinances; eventually it becomes a fairly clear line in practice. Moreover, by establishing the polarity of policy and administration the forays of one branch into the other are more easily distinguished as such. Time and again a city manager may be called upon to explain actions which have bordered on the realm of policy determination and the city council will remind him of the separation of policy and administration as the basis of the council–manager plan. But the contribution goes beyond this. It allows a rational arrangement of city government in the provision of services governed by particular needs of each local unit.

By focusing more directly on the administrative factors in municipal government the work of municipal administration has been raised to the status of a profession. This is true not only in the field of public works where the discipline of engineering is itself a profession; it is also true in the areas of personnel, finance, planning, and public safety. And the growth of the council–manager plan has professionalized the city manager. More than ever before young men with considerable education in municipal administration and on-the-job experience are preparing for a professional career in local government. Today there are over three hundred trainees in city

[3] Paul Appleby, *Policy and Administration* (University: University of Alabama Press, 1949).
[4] Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York: Ronald, 1948).

manager cities serving what amounts to a professional apprenticeship in the art and technique of municipal administration.

This leads to one more point regarding the contribution of the council–manager plan. A major element in its success rests upon the assumption that there are general principles in municipal administration. While circumstances may vary between cities, the generality of the problems and the way things are done emerge in a consistent form. For example, a thorough investigation of the fire department's operation reveals that the two-platoon system of enforced idleness and the monolithic grip of the fire underwriters on fire department organization are problems which recur in city after city with impressive regularity. Thus it is possible to develop professional administrators who can move from one city to another and apply the principles successfully.

Verification of the generalities underlying municipal administration has been the contribution of political scientists working through universities and state municipal leagues as well as municipal research organizations. By applying imagination and judgment to the sometimes humdrum statistics of municipal government, working generalities have been established and vindicated. And it has been, by and large, through the operation of the council–manager form that the information for research has been obtained, and its results have been applied. Propositions like the short ballot, the single personnel officer, the merit system, the executive budget, work units and performance measurement, public reporting, one-man cars in police departments, and the integration of police and fire departments, have received impetus from idea to reality because of the council–manager plan.

Internal Development of the City Manager Profession

In the beginning the manager profession was composed of city engineers or public works administrators, and in some cases university professors drafted into the field. The concern then was about how to get things done, how to solve the individual problems which were largely in the public works domain. As one manager noted recently, before 1929 "the primary topic of discussion by managers was how to get specific things done, mostly in the field of public works." [5] And in the words of another old-timer in the field, Tom Reed:

> Beginning a managership then was a good deal like taking over an old house that had been carelessly maintained by the preceding tenants. It was necessary to sweep out the cobwebs and dust, exterminate the vermin and shore up the underpinning, before installing new parlor furniture and a modern kitchen.[6]

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[5] George E. Bean, "The Future of the Manager Profession," *Public Management*, XXXVII (1955), 28.

[6] Thomas H. Reed, "Trends in City Management," *Public Management*, XXXVII (1955), 267.

Reed goes on to make some wry comments about the state of the city he took over in 1916:

> The city's books were of the archaic single entry type which showed merely the inflow and outflow of cash. They provided no means of controlling the spending of appropriations or measuring the cost of any function or activity. The annual budget was a crude piece of guesswork. . . . The public works department was capable of nothing but minor street repairs and some very sketchy street cleaning. Garbage and refuse were collected by a company of scavengers on a customer–fee basis. They had been a law unto themselves, collecting where and when it was convenient for them, while their appearance which corresponded with the then current descriptions of Sicilian banditti frightened housewives out of their wits.[7]

The problem was to pull cities out of the slough of governmental meandering into the rising age of technological development. And raising the low level of local governmental service kept the city managers of those days with nose and shoulder to the grindstone, intent upon the immediate and specific problems. Gradually, particularly through annual conferences, the managers began to pool their solutions to immediate problems; and from 1915 to 1930 the results of the conferences and statistics gathered at that time were published for general distribution.

By 1929 the number of city managers reached nearly four hundred. The International City Managers' Association which had been formed in 1914 with eight city managers attending the first conference began to move into its own as the organ for professional municipal administrators. During the succeeding years much was done to collect, assimilate, and make available the data surrounding municipal administration. In 1934 the papers and statistics published from the conferences were transformed into the now authoritative *Municipal Year Book* which contains a wide variety of municipal data and highlights of current developments.

In the same year the Association announced that it could offer a "limited consulting service, maintain a standing committee on research, conduct an annual conference, publish *Public Management* a monthly journal devoted to the conduct of local government and the *Municipal Year Book* . . . answer inquiries for information on a wide range of problems."[8] By the mid-thirties the battle of immediate need had been won, for the Association had become a focus for answers on the practical problems of everyday municipal government.

The direction of the second phase of growth has been stated by Louis Brownlow in a preface to the Association's book, *The City Manager Profession*, published in 1934:

> What is more slowly coming to be recognized is that there is also a technique of administration. It is gradually coming to be admitted as consistent with the essential doctrines of democracy that there is a problem of management, of the co–ordination of the several

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 267.

[8] Clarence Ridley and Orin Nolting, *The City Manager Profession* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1934), p. 71.

functions and activities of local government, of integrated responsibility, for the municipal administration as a whole. . . .[9]

Here the experience of hundreds of city managers and the invaluable research and theorizing by university professors interested in the growth of modern municipal administration contributed significantly. As a climax of this phase, the Association published a series of books which are still landmarks in the techniques and principles of municipal administration. From 1935 to 1941 a number of manuals were brought out that dealt with the major areas and problems of municipal administration. They have been revised many times since, and presently eight of the series are enshrined as the ultimate references on municipal problems, i.e., technique of municipal administration, finance, personnel, planning, police, fire, public works, and recreation. The texts are not only valuable guides for administrators on the job; they are also basic sources for training in the city as well as in the university.

As the profession advanced techniques developed apace; and with more and more cities adopting the plan, problems arose that were beyond the initial concept of the manager plan, i.e., an effective tool for the right ordering of municipal affairs. The main problem centered around the change in government from the mayor–council form with its political struggle for leadership to the generalized policy-making council with its professional administrator. When this change occurred the question of who was to assume community leadership was apparently left unanswered. Of course, the problem was there from the beginning of the plan and had been discussed many times. But when the managers were able to push themselves away from the immediate problems of day-to-day operations, they were confronted, en masse, with this problem which was one of philosophy, not of technique. As far back as 1927 Leonard White had appraised the possibility of the city manager in the role of community leader and did not like what he saw. He predicted this tendency would "sound the death knell of the manager plan as now conceived, for a manager who undertakes civic leadership stakes his position on the acceptance of his program by the voters."[10] White's view was characterized by Stone in his researches as applying to the city manager the role of the "inconspicuous career civil servant." Stone concluded that as a general rule to have the manager shy away from his responsibility for community leadership was to "apply an inappropriate pattern to the variety of local traditions in America and it played into the hands of those who were in general 'agin the government' or jealous of expert administration as a matter of principle."[11]

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[9] *Ibid.*, p. xi.

[10] Leonard White, *The City Manager* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), p. 301.

[11] Harold A. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 246.

The political leadership of elected representatives should not be confused with the community leadership that covers the suggestion and recommendation of new programs and the discussion of them in community forums and, more essential, with the council itself. The matter received much attention from the city managers in action and in discussion at their annual conventions. But it was plain to see that in cities which needed reform and improvement and looked only for a way, the city manager could not help but provide leadership. If he didn't the plan failed; when he did, in most instances with tact and a developing art, the plan and the community prospered. The matter was well joined and summarily answered by a president of the ICMA and a city manager of long standing, C. A. Harrell. Speaking before the convention in 1948 he stated what was then coming to be accepted among city managers as the resolution of the problem:

> I believe therefore that we as city managers owe it to our communities to exercise more imagination and vision in initiating policy proposals for action by the council. We have the best interests of our cities at heart. That is our job and that is what we work for. We must broaden our concept of managerial duties and not wait for the council or even citizens to propose actions which we believe the council should consider. . . . The city manager — a community leader or not? I say yes.[22]

The City Manager Today

Today the city manager, his profession as well as his contributions to local government reform, all have arrived at a plateau of technical mastery and organizational development which will make possible continued strengthening of local government. But at the same time the managers have tended more and more to emphasize the art and philosophy of management. Such a development is not unlike that going on in industry and is undoubtedly encouraged by it, for the stages of awareness in industry cannot help but come into the pattern of the council–manager system. City managers have begun to look more closely at the setting of the council–manager form in the community as well as its operation in a democracy. Much has been done in recent years to answer the more serious criticisms that have been raised against the plan. City managers have also seen the rise of the administrative or general manager in the strong mayor cities which has been billed as an answer to the administrative needs of the sprawling city-states of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia. In the smaller cities where the mayor-administrator plan has been adopted it appears as a compromise in the community between those who favor council–manager government and those who are not willing to go whole hog or who oppose the council–manager form. It is in the development of sound answers to these problems that the new phase of city manager history will show itself.

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[22] C. A. Harrell, "The City Manager as a Community Leader," *Public Management*, XXX (1948), 294.

Probably the most crucial problem of the manager profession today lies in the fact that while it has spread to a large number of cities, its actual operation is not well known to the general body of citizens even in cities having the plan. Moreover, the acceptance of the plan has run up against particular pockets of resistance which grow more vocal as the plan becomes more successful. In organized labor there is a definite resentment of the plan at the local level and of the principles for which it stands. In many cities managers have met serious opposition on the part of trades and labor councils.[13] This condition may not be the same universally but it is sufficiently widespread to cause city managers concern. In Peoria, Illinois, which suffered for many years under an inefficient, at times corrupt, system of a strong mayor and aldermanic council elected from wards, the proposal for council–manager government has been vigorously opposed by the trades and labor council. The weekly labor paper has carried a stream of articles attacking council–manager government, the city manager, and those who openly defend the plan. Yet labor's pay in city employment has risen 23 per cent and the city of Peoria today employs more members of organized labor than it did at any time in the past. On the national level one has only to look through the pages of the AFL–CIO AFSCME magazine, *Public Employee*, to feel the opposition to the council–manager system with specific reference to the symbol of the city manager. One can also turn to the organizations of firemen and policemen and find much the same caliber of opposition.

There are basic reasons for this opposition. Under council–manager government a determined effort is usually made to organize workers for efficiency and work output as a measure of public economy. Efforts are constantly made under the manager plan to balance personnel expenditures with capital equipment which invariably runs into resistance from employee representatives. Moreover, the council–manager plan, by putting personnel control largely in the hands of the city manager, restricts the possibility of political favoritism. City managers have generally endorsed a strict adherence to the bid principle of the lowest possible bidder, union or non-union. They have also been sharply critical of the fire department organization by which manpower is wasted and an excessive cost is put on the taxpayer. To combat this operation many managers have supported the integration of fire and police services. Certainly these approaches have solidified opposition in many quarters.

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[13] A very illuminating discussion of this problem can be found in the June, 1957, issue of *Public Management* under the title of "Labor and the Council Manager Plan." Three views are presented. That of the city manager is given by George E. Bean, city manager of Peoria; the view of a labor official is written by Arnold Zander, president of the AFL–CIO Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees; the median view is represented by Rollin B. Posey, a former professor of political science and an official at a textbook publishing house. The issues are well drawn in the articles.

Difficulties usually arise when the city manager faces the issues directly, in a manner consistent with the facts. It is this approach which is the guiding strength of the council–manager plan, making it superior to other more political forms of local government. But such facing of the issues poses a dilemma for the city manager. To be true to the ethic of the plan the manager has no alternative. However, when facts are made the final arbiters in the recommendations of the city manager the opposition gains weight, seeking decisions made in a more partisan context. Public relations and all the other "smoothie" techniques of our age of the sugar pill will not serve to eliminate this kind of opposition.

But lest we be misadvised, opposition to the plan is not confined to labor or to groups of public employees. The ivied halls have also brought forth attacks. Probably the most effective of these was printed in *Public Administration Review* in the autumn of 1954 by Wallace S. Sayre.[14] A further discussion and rebuttal of Dr. Sayre's article followed in the summer issue of 1955, which was written by John E. Bebout, assistant director of the National Municipal League.[15] Together the articles form a good introduction to current thinking on the manager plan.[16]

Dr. Sayre ably presents some of the possible explanations for the city manager plan's halt near the water's edge of the bigger cities and he points to the growth of the strong mayor with an administrative assistant or general manager as the possible solution. He also gives city managers food for thought in some of his deftly stated criticisms of the council–manager plan. It is true that the latter has not cracked the population barrier in the 500,000 and over class of cities and there is little doubt that the overriding considerations in these oceans of governmental chaos are political and not administrative, as Dr. Sayre points out. Moreover, the good professor lays bare a criticism of the city manager organization itself that has more wisdom than the Association cares, perhaps, to admit. The critique occurs when Sayre comments on the growth of the "general manager" idea, saying:

> The mayor manager plan, will, as it evolves toward its own institutionalization, be confronted with dilemmas which can only now be partially anticipated. The plan may ultimately acquire its own protective guild of practitioners and advocates, transforming it into an inelastic plan unresponsive to the changing needs of the cities.[17]

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[14] Wallace Sayre, "The General Manager Idea for Large Cities," *Public Administration Review*, XIV (1954), 253–58.

[15] John E. Bebout, "Management for Large Cities," *Public Administration Review*, XV (1955), 188–95.

[16] One should also mention Robert Moses' statement in the *New York Times*, February 3, 1957, p. 28, that "Gadgets will not cure the more deep-seated troubles of municipalities. By gadgets I mean efficiency schemes like model charters, city managers. . . ." The legendary job-holder of New York City chooses to forget for pungency of phrase that even "gadgets" sometimes make worthwhile contributions toward human progress. They cannot, of course, equal the prodigious effort of persons — as witness Mr. Moses who has seen many "gadgets" come and go.

[17] Sayre, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

His reference to the International City Managers' Association in the "protective guild of practitioner" is unmistakable and, to some extent, justified. The danger has been pointed out by city managers themselves who feel that the Association may not rise above the level of a fact-gathering institution and a machine for making studies aimed at improving administrative efficiency. It has been stated by a past president of the Association in this way:

> In the growth and development of the Association, we have set up procedures and professionalization beyond the standards which will be generally accepted by the local governments we serve. This is one mark of a professional group and is to be expected and desired but over-professionalization carries with it the very serious danger of leaving behind the people we serve.[35]

The mayor–administrator idea which has made headway in the last few years is not an extension of the council–manager principle; rather, it is an attempt at compromise which tries to achieve both the political strength of the strong mayor and the administrative improvements which are closely associated with council–manager government. Perhaps the best argument for the plan arises when an existing strong mayor system, founded on political necessity arising out of its unwieldly size, is modified to provide for administrative improvement.

The greatest long-run advantage, however, of council–manager government over the "general manager" form lies in the demonstrated continuity of the former. While turnover in city managers is comparable to that in similar positions in public and private employment, the manager plan cannot be sustained if replacements are not available, who are disciplined in the principles of municipal administration and who subscribe to a common method of practice. The history of council–manager government shows that even with expected turnover of city managers most cities under the plan have preserved for them continuity of administration. The International City Managers' Association has been the key in developing standards and procedures and thus furnishing the thread of continuity to managerial practice.

But standards are only part of the story. The natural result of professional growth is to weave between members engaged in the same work a consistency in ethical responsibility. City managers adhere to an ethical standard which has evolved over the years. While there exists no real machinery for discipline among managers, the importance of professional standing and acknowledgment in the field has acted as a far more potent regulator of conduct than any board of discipline. Of course, sour apples are not unknown among city managers: however, the ideals of the profession have held up remarkably well. And with over fourteen hundred manager cities in operation there is an ample field from which replace-

[35] Bean, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

ments can be recruited while well-trained novices are becoming available in great numbers. Thus, a city, upon losing its present manager, can recruit from a field of trained and experienced people who have a common grounding in the principles of municipal operation and who subscribe to a general standard of conduct.

The council–manager plan has been freed of partisan shackles in its day-to-day operation. While the city manager does not shy away from the role of community leader nor completely ignore policy proposals, he has resisted the obvious temptation to dabble in the political, partisan conflicts which may engage the city council; and it is well understood that the city manager is not a political leader nor a partisan messenger boy for groups within the council or the community. The city manager, in other words, is not tied to the strings of a political mentor, be it mayor, council, or special interest group.

There is not enough experience in the operation of the general manager plan to assess the result as to administrative continuity, professional standards, and the separation from political identification and partisan struggles. However, the general manager setup does not bode well for such future developments. Being the appointee of the mayor, the administrator cannot long escape identification with the political success or failure ascribed to the mayor himself. And, in fact, it is difficult to see how his actions at the behest of the mayor cannot help but blend administrative fact with the political necessities of the mayor's own elective career. What professional reserve or reservoir of previous practice is to preserve the administrative sphere of operation from important political partisan inroads? These are merely conjectures on the future of the general manager plan but ones to be considered against the demonstrated accomplishments of the council–manager plan. They cannot be disregarded as easily as Dr. Sayre sometimes finds it necessary to do in pursuing his advocacy of the general manager plan.

Another of Dr. Sayre's sallies should not escape comment. It is contained in the last paragraph of his article:

> The distinctive contrasting feature of the council–manager plan — the selection of the chief administrator by the city council — was not only something of an historical accident in the United States; it was also a striking anomaly in a country in which the most distinctive political institution is the elected chief executive as the keystone of political, governmental, and managerial progress. The mayor manager idea has the great and lasting value that it brings the reorganization of our city governments back into a familiar focus, consistent with our efforts in the national and state governments. In this respect it is an indigenous political idea.[29]

This is an interesting, albeit romantic notion, particularly regarding "an indigenous political idea." One has but to review the growth of American local government to see that the elected chief executive is not all of a solid piece. School district government, county and township organization

[29] Sayre, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

afford little evidence of this "most distinctive political institution." The history of municipal government is so interwoven with executive boards and commissions that the figure of the chief executive is somewhat clouded in contrast to the clear picture given us by Dr. Sayre. In Peoria, for example, the strong mayor form was in continuous operation until the adoption of council–manager government in 1952. However, the functions of the library, the parks, the sanitary operation, playgrounds and recreation, health and tuberculosis control were all in the hands of semi-independent boards whose members were either elected or appointed and who in turn appointed a professional person to act as chief administrator. The mayor may have operated within a strong executive form but the functions over which he exercised direct administrative control were limited. And Peoria's case is not atypical. Boards, commissions, and appointed administrators are an integral part of local government in the United States, emphasizing the strong roots of the council–manager idea in our tradition. On the other hand, it is nice to have a practicing romanticist even in political theory.

The Future

Many of the developments previously discussed will loom large for the future of council–manager government and the city manager profession. The fact that organized labor is still reluctant to trust city managers and, in many cities, "carries the ball" in a frontal attack upon the plan is a trend that must be given more examination. What the managers' approach should be is hard to say. Certainly deeper eduction in the basic democracy and practicality of the council–manager plan would be a great help. No doubt the International City Managers' Association will have to research this phase in order to find the failure in communication and understanding that has developed. And help should be given by the colleges and universities which have aided the growth of council–manager government in the past.

The problems of the mayor–administrator plan must be faced with greater clarity by members of the city manager profession. Perhaps the mayor administrator is not really a challenge but rather the application of proven administrative devices to larger cities where the council–manager plan has not been able to gain a foothold. If this be true, city managers should discover why council–manager government has had so little success in larger cities and whether or not the plan will ever be able to operate in this area. And sooner or later city managers will have to decide on whether or not to include the people who are staffing the mayor–administrator plan in the city manager fold and accord them professional recognition. In any case the mayor–administrator plan, as indicated by Dr. Sayre's trenchant remarks, cannot be ignored by city managers without seriously impeding the future development of the city manager profession and its

continued service to local government in the United States. Here, again, the research facilites of universities and private research groups will be able to contribute much toward clarification of these issues.

Another trend is growing among city managers which will require future attention. It centers on the idea of job security and professional certification. One of the strongest claims to democratic responsibility held by the council–manager plan is the lack of tenure or contract on the part of the manager. He can be asked to resign at any time, or if the council finds it necessary, he can be fired, with or without reason. This is important because the lack of contract underlines the manager as the dependent agent of the council; it also serves as a necessary check against the centralized administrative authority delegated to the manager. However, some managers as well as interested citizens have advocated a contract or a formal relationship which would help the manager to greater job security. But this would give the manager a proprietary interest in his job while giving him a greater independence from the council than is prudent under democratic principles of local government. A related idea has to do with the "certification" of city managers.

The aim is to weed out those who may not have the proper background, training, or successful experience to be in the city manager profession. Again, this is advancing the cause of professionalization beyond the limit of the democratic principles involved. City councils cannot be bound as to whom they should choose for their manager and they certainly will not take it happily to have a professional organization "certify" likely candidates for the position. While both of these ideas may gain impetus as we grow more conscious of security, they should not be allowed anything more than token discussion among managers and their citizen advocates.

One last remark on the future. The problems to be met and the improvements in operation that must come require not only research and fact-finding but also, even more important, growth in the theoretical consideration of the plan. Theory must grow apace and more discussion of such theory should find its way into political journals and administrative magazines. One suspects that city managers would rather talk about how to improve public relations, clean more sewers per month, or build better mousetraps, etc., than discuss the ideas behind their vastly practical endeavors. But city managers will be hard put to solve their future problems if they are content to rest on the theory of their predecessors without re-examination and revision to fit today's need.

BOOK REVIEWS

Documents on International Affairs 1953. Edited by DENISE FOLLIOT. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xx, 515. $9.20.)

Survey of International Affairs 1953. By PETER CALVOCORESSI. (New York: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xi, 400. Maps. $7.70.)

Again students of world affairs have their debt to the Royal Institute of International Affairs increased. This time it is for the sponsorship of these two publications which continue its postwar "Survey" series begun in 1947.

Intended for use together, each of the current volumes is organized like its predecessors along parallel subject lines. The *Documents* incorporates some two hundred and eighty items of source material. The importance of including certain of them could be argued with Miss Folliot, but that is always the case with such a compilation.

Each book is divided into six major parts, nearly global in their continental inclusiveness, except that Africa is treated only by indirection and in connection with other areas. The year being 1953, Part One appropriately is concerned with "The Death of Marshal Stalin" and the impact of his unlamented exit on communist-dominated and noncommunist states. Part Six, "Latin America," a topic omitted from the three previous volumes of the "Survey," departs from the rigid chronology adhered to in the rest of the book, dipping back into 1952 and also covering the Tenth Inter-American Conference of 1954, and the disorders in Guatemala to June of that year. This chapter is particularly commendable for performing the difficult service of indicating major trends in Latin America as a whole, thereby giving the overview, as well as dealing with specific events. At the same time the writer carefully points out where generalities find exceptions and qualifications if applied to particular countries.

The *Survey of International Affairs 1953* ranges briefly across an encyclopedic mass of material, but for the most part without embarrassing overstatement or oversimplification. The writers (Mr. Calvocoressi assigned the chapter on "Latin America" to George Pendle, and that on "The Far East" to Dr. F. C. Jones) have primarily utilized for its preparation the world's leading newspapers and periodicals together with official documents issued by numerous governments and international organizations. As a result, thanks to the tradition of the Royal Institute and the skill of these authors, the *Survey* gives a perspective remarkably free from personal and/or national bias.

Writing for the most part in that low key believed to be the hallmark of objective reporting, the authors nevertheless manage in their narration to convey a sense of the conflict of those forces internally and internation-

ally which mold events, and something of the motivations and reactions of the actors involved. Though intricate events are presented with an astonishing economy of words, the writing often sparkles with an illuminatingly interpretive phrase or sentence. As an example, Mr. Calvocoressi says of M. Laniel, who emerged as prime minister from the French cabinet crisis of May and June, 1953: "He owed his success partly to the fact that the crisis was now in its thirty-sixth day and the Assembly was glad to give the benefit of the doubt and the burden of responsibility to a man about whom it knew little and nothing discreditable."

To compress the current events of the world for a single year into a single volume, including relevant details and pointing up significant interrelationships, is a formidable task, here enviably accomplished. Happily the obligatory effort to achieve conciseness succeeds without resulting in a lifeless skeleton of mere "fact" as a substitute for complex reality.

RAYMOND G. MCKELVEY.

Occidental College.

The Mexican Government Today. By WILLIAM P. TUCKER. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 484. $6.50.)

Professor Tucker has placed all Latin-Americanists in his debt for this volume if for no other reason than by the conscientious and assiduous way in which he accumulated an enormous amount of information about the operation of the Mexican administrative and political mechanism. Not since the much smaller and now much out of date volume by Mijares Palencia has anything of the kind been available.

Organizationally the volume is soundly built. Four chapters are given to "Background," seven to "Organization and Structure," four to "Internal and External Relations," four to "Public Utilites and Public Works," two to "Agriculture," three to "Social Services," three to "Governmental Subdivisions," and one to "Conclusions." The titles of the parts indicate the broad scope of the volume.

The author has used an amazing variety of source material. Not the least commendable in this respect is his wide consultation of dissertations, those repositories of often excellent materials which so often suffer the fate of being buried in university libraries, perhaps not unwept, unhonored, and unsung, but at least unconsulted by scholars.

The major criticism of the volume is its tendency to bog down in legal and constitutional detail and its failure to deal with the dynamics of Mexican politics. This latter failure is one which the author recognizes and

readily admits but which it is to be hoped can be remedied in a later edition. As it stands the volume is almost wholly descriptive; futher interpretation and evaluation would have improved it.

On net balance, however, it is a most useful addition to make to the Mexican shelf.

RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON.
University of California, Los Angeles.

Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930–1956. By VERNON L. FLUHARTY. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1957. Pp. 336. $6.00.)

This is a most useful book and yet at the same time subject to certain serious criticisms. Professor Fluharty, who most unfortunately died before the book saw the light of day, gives us a more detailed and painstaking analysis of the socio-politico-economic composition of the complex that was Colombia in the second quarter of this century than is available anywhere else, certainly in English and probably in Spanish. He quite properly sets in perspective the often too-glibly-taken conclusion that Colombia was a thoroughgoing democracy. What appeared superficially as an out-and-out democracy was in reality a complicated skein of competing forces and groups; this is brought out consummately well by Professor Fluharty.

Another commendable feature of the volume is that it gives the pro-Rojas Pinilla side of the ledger. The inept dictator, who fell only a few months ago (after the book's completion and presumably after its author's death) did, after all, have a case to be made out for his regime, a case that was lost sight of in the mounting tide of criticism, in and out of Colombia, of everything having to do with his administration. The author makes this case fully — it might almost be said he overmakes it.

On the other hand, it is at least doubtful that Colombia experienced during and because of the Rojas regime a genuine social revolution as the author implies. It is also doubtful that Rojas had much real mass support, especially during the latter part of his troubled years in office.

It is unfortunate that the book (and the author's life) could not have been continued beyond the time of Rojas' downfall. How substantially that might have changed the interpretation or the conclusions is problematical but at least it would have permitted a more rounded picture.

The volume is somewhat repetitive. There are occasional misspelled names or misused accents. These are trivial mistakes. Among the more serious charges are those that the treatment may be overweighted on the closing few years of the period at the expense of fuller coverage for the first decade and a half or so, and that the interpretation may be subject to question in certain respects.

This reviewer must most emphatically dissent, however, from the ungracious conclusion published in one review of the volume, that in any respect "it is the worst nonsense we have read in a long time." The volume must be used cautiously in some ways but it still is a most useful one.

RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON.

University of California, Los Angeles.

China and Soviet Russia. By HENRY WEI. (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand. 1956. Pp. xvi, 379. $7.75.)

China and Soviet Russia is a history of Sino–Soviet diplomatic relations from 1917 to 1956. Dr. Henry Wei's narrative seeks answers to these questions, among others: How did Soviet Russia transform weakness into strength and rise from an impotent to a dominant position in China? What is the nature and scope of the co-operation between Communist China and Soviet Russia? Is there any sign that the co-operation may not last? Students and administrators of technical and economic assistance programs will therefore be interested in Dr. Wei's appraisal of Soviet Russia's economic, scientific, and cultural activities in contemporary China. According to this account, the Russians gave particularly effective technical, economic, and other support to the Chinese Communists in the course of the Chinese civil war. For example, because of Russian aid, the author states that "towards the end of 1950 the railway system of China was brought into smooth and efficient functioning again and played an important part in the general pacification of the Country." In the years following Communist dominance in China, however, Dr. Wei believes that the major claims made for Sino–Soviet co-operation in the industrial and agricultural fields are very far from spectacular. The principal emphasis of Chinese–Soviet relations, he says, is in the field of culture and in this field "Soviet influence in China is performing a major operation on the body and soul of China, aiming at putting new brain and new blood into the Chinese system." The author concludes: "If, therefore, the Chinese Communists want to continue to hold power and to promote Sino–Soviet friendship, they cannot rely too much upon propaganda and the spread of Soviet influence. They must attend to the essential task and primary duty of improving the livelihood of the people and giving the people a sense of justice, freedom and security. If they fail to fulfill this duty, then not only will their propaganda and spread of Soviet influence be in vain, but their entire regime will collapse, perhaps after the fashion of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti's dynasty over two thousand years ago."

MERRILL R. GOODALL.

Claremont Graduate School.

Asien, Moskau und Wir. By KLAUS MEHNERT. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. Pp. 1956. 433. DM 16.80.)

Klaus Mehnert, one of the top German experts on Soviet Russia, has long been an observer of Asian affairs as well. He has now distilled the experience of three decades of study and first-hand observation, and the resulting book is submitted as his contribution to the current discussion in Germany as to what policy Bonn should adopt toward Asia.

One hopes that this work will appear in English before long, for though it is addressed to Germans it has some very interesting perspectives for other readers. It is, besides, an attractive book. Provocative (whether or not one always agrees), penetrating, imaginative, humorous, earnest, persuasive — it is all of these; and it is written, without losing in accuracy, in a swift, epigrammatic style that makes it a pleasure to read. Its diverse materials are organized topically and in such a way that the effect is kaleidoscopic yet never confusing.

Here are vivid word-pictures of Asia's lands and peoples, usually illustrating some aspect of their situation today, whether it be the continuance of tradition, hopeful progress on new paths, or old traditions uprooted. Much of what the author sees is somber and even alarming. He is deeply concerned, for example, with the economic and spiritual plight of Asian intellectuals, many of whom, he finds, are even more frustrated than were the Russian intelligentsia, the "superfluous men" of nineteenth-century Russian fiction.

Dr. Mehnert believes that for stemming Communism in Asia military assistance is of far less importance than economic development. His treatment of United States economic policies in Asia is generally quite sympathetic, although there are plain words of criticism, too. If, he says, our aid programs have produced small returns in Asian goodwill, this is due primarily to the American habit of "thinking out loud," debating in public print as to what returns we expect to get from our aid programs.

The author largely avoids any detailed discussion of Communist China — of which he has no first-hand experience. On the U.S.S.R., however, there is a great deal in the way of broad conclusions and also interesting details. Here we may read how a mistake in a very, very high place in the Kremlin resulted in the "Non-mechanized Cotton Harvest of 1955," which the author observed at first hand in Uzbekistan. There are perceptive remarks on Asian attitudes toward Russia, and interesting surmises as to how Asians may eventually react to what, by the author's account, appears to be a forced-draft Russification of Soviet Asia. Dr. Mehnert reports signs of uneasiness in the attitude of Russians toward Communist China, though he warns against exaggerating its importance in the short run.

In conclusion, he pleads eloquently for a German policy of advancing Asia's economic development. That the book has awakened interest among Germans is indicated by the fact of three editions in its first two months. Of the author's concrete recommendations, some — not all — are similar to what many other writers have said on the subject. On a bilateral basis, he favors "trade not aid" for the usual reasons of morale. He favors long-term bilateral agreements governing German purchase of Asian goods at fixed prices, and advocates reorientation of Germany's import trade, where feasible, from western countries to producers in non-Communist Asia. He emphasizes the need for many more training scholarships in Germany for young Asians, with special consideration for their social as well as economic needs while in training. He calls for greatly increased German assistance via the UN, with a consequently larger German representation in the UN organizations concerned. He exhorts young Germans to make careers of economic development work in Asia. And he says that Bonn must neglect no occasion to demonstrate to the Asians that Germany stands for peace.

Dr. Mehnert reports that Germany is very favorably regarded by Asians today, and attributes this to a number of factors. There is, first of all, the traditional German reputation for technical skill and efficiency, enhanced today by the economic strength of the Federal Republic. Moreover, Germany is not associated in Asian minds with colonialism. Another factor cited is that the Asian countries today, seated as it were at a card table with the Anglo–Saxon and Soviet blocs, would very much welcome the presence of a fourth who is "a good player, yet not so deeply involved nor so dangerously strong as the other two."

But there is still another consideration. Without exception, all the Asians Dr. Mehnert spoke to on his postwar tours were unanimous in the feeling that Germany divided is a serious threat to world peace. He quotes a high-ranking Indian official: "German reunification is World Problem No. 1." Here, says Dr. Mehnert, is a trump card for Bonn's foreign policy.

Further events have occurred since this book appeared a year ago, plus and minus factors in a great potential equation. Is Germany about to take on new importance as a factor in Asia's economic development? Conversely, will there be generated a new moral force — that of the Asian countries — working toward Germany's reunification? Students of Asian and of German affairs will be watching to see whether and how two great world problems might each contribute to the other's solution.

JOHN A. CONWAY.

Chevy Chase, Md.

Japanese People and Politics. By CHITOSHI YANAGA. (New York: John Wiley. 1956. Pp. ix, 408. $7.50.)

Since 1952 and the conclusion of peace the Japanese political system has been on its own, and an attempt to study it in its new phase has prompted the publication of several new books. However, Professor Yanaga's study is outstanding in that it is exceptionally well organized, readable for the "non-specialist" on Japan and makes frequent and helpful comparisons with the British, French, and American political systems with which the Western reader is more familiar.

Of prime significance are the first four chapters in which the author focuses the reader's attention — and rightfully so — upon the sociocultural behavior patterns in Japanese society that affect the political process. Such factors have been found to be so deep-rooted that despite more rapid change in postwar years, they remain evident and influential in political behavior. The concern that Yanaga gives to this phase of his study is evidenced by the fact that a little more than a quarter of his book is devoted to analyzing the Japanese people, their character and social structure. For such sociopolitical traits as authoritarianism, traditionalism, pragmatism, kinship feeling, status consciousness — to mention a few — play a decided role in the Japanese political system.

Once these fundamental influences are clearly defined, the author proceeds to illustrate their effect upon the nature and speed of the political change occurring between the Meiji Restoration (1868) and World War II, and finally those changes brought on by the Occupation and the post-Treaty period. All the fundamental elements of the post-Restoration political system such as constitutional development, the legislative structure, the new role of the citizen and the Emperor, the bureaucracy, political parties, and the creation of a national economy are thoroughly and coherently discussed. Thus, through the combination of an historical presentation of the evolutionary change in Japanese politics and an analysis of relative behavioristic patterns the reader is able to make some critical judgment of both the successes and failures of political democracy in Japan.

Although the author has made many efforts to avoid unfounded generalizations in his analysis of Japanese society, there are several instances which merit critical comment. For example, the author categorically denies the existence of racial antipathy, declaring: "Racism therefore has been unknown throughout her history and racial problems have never arisen in Japanese politics for racial groups have never existed to form a minority of any sort." The prevalent antipathy toward the Koreans and Chinese populace in Japan suggests a possible "exception." Although it may be argued that this antipathy is fundamentally political, it can also be viewed as racial

since it often transcends the bounds of political disapproval. Yanaga views the nature of Japanese politics as one of pronounced "moderation," noting that extremes are frowned upon and blurred compromises are more common. However, he should differentiate between the nature of the decision-making process, in which consensus is usually the keynote, and the nature of political decisions which have often been harsh and extreme, as evidenced by the Tokugawa policy of exclusion. Moreover, in the recent past even the decision-making process, at least on the national level, has been assuming more extreme proportions, as evidenced by occasions of physical violence in the Diet Chamber. Furthermore, in suggesting "assimilativeness" as a Japanese characteristic, Yanaga declares that "nothing which the Japanese borrowed from abroad remained in its original form." To a large extent this may be true, as evidenced by the changes made in the T'ang Penal Codes (702) when they were adopted. However, his strong statement implies that the Japanese never really copied but merely received suggestions; but such an idea cannot be maintained when one considers the nearly wholesale borrowing of such things as Chinese Buddhist architecture, and in more recent times, the frequent duplication of scientific contrivances.

Such "pitfalls" in generalities can hardly be avoided entirely, and by and large Yanaga avoids them. His work should be very useful for the specialist, the layman, and the student of government who may be considering ways to analyze political science in the light of other social science disciplines.

LEONARD GORDON.

University of Michigan.

Commentary on the Constitution of India. By DURGA DAS BASU. 3d ed. (Calcutta: S. C. Sarkar & Sons, Ltd. 1955. 2 Vols. Pp. lvi, 875; 847 $17.00.)

The Indian constitution is the longest in the world; it consists of three hundred and ninety-five articles and eight schedules. In part this extraordinary length was occasioned by the intricate political problems the constitution was intended to solve; but there was also an attempt to anticipate and solve legal problems which had arisen in other jurisdictions. For this latter purpose there was included an extensive section on fundamental rights as well as "directive principles" which are merely precatory in character.

Federalism and judicial review are common to India and the United States; other features of the Indian constitution are derived from British practice and local conditions. Mr. Basu has annotated to the Indian constitution some thousands of cases from Commonwealth and American

jurisdictions. This makes his work the most valuable single study in comparative constitutional law.

India has confronted issues very like our First Amendment problems; and there have been other instructive parallels. American precedents have been weighed, but not always adopted: both the original package doctrine and the concept of police power have been rejected. The question of most compelling interest is probably that of the technique of judicial review. In this area there are many unsolved problems, and it is a topic on which all English-speaking jurisdictions may well pool their experience. Mr. Basu's work will be very helpful for such comparative studies.

FRANCIS D. WORMUTH.
University of Utah.

Individual Freedom and Governmental Restraints. By WALTER GELLHORN. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Pp. viii, 215, $3.75.)

Professor Gellhorn's slim volume is another welcome contribution from a skilled writer in the field of civil liberties. These three essays are typical of the urbane, civilized prose which we have come to expect from Professor Gellhorn. He has not only the sophisticated mastery of the materials which makes the book authoritative, but also literary skills which make it a pleasure to read. Would that the bulk of professional political science literature be written with equal grace and distinction!

It is a pity that his publishers detracted somewhat from the book's merit. I have about exhausted my patience with displaced notes. The back-of-the-book notes were harder to tolerate in this case than in some others. I estimate that I spent as much time in looking at the "rear-notes" as I did in reading the text.

If I am guilty of overfastidiousness in this matter (and perhaps harshness to the publishers) I doubt if the same charge will be leveled with regard to my views concerning the jacket blurbs. I realize that books must be sold, that even university presses have budgets and overhead, but surely there are limits to the amount of good taste which ought to be sacrificed to sales-appeal. It seems almost degrading to a serious author to reduce his efforts by "who-done-it" exploitation. It was shoddy to adorn Professor Gellhorn's serious words with such sales gobbledygook as "This book tells about — The Case of the Trembling Titoist. . . . The Communist carpenter who could not shuffle off to Buffalo . . . ," etc., etc.

The essays examine the current state of three areas in which individual rights clash with government authority. My favorite was the first — "Changing Attitudes Toward the Administrative Process" — because it seemed the wisest and most original in conception. The second was entitled

"Restraints on Book Reading," while the third considered the problem of the increasing incidence (and arbitrariness) of occupational licensing.

In the first essay Professor Gellhorn contrasts the anti-public-administration attitudes of the mid-thirties with contemporary examples of disenchantment with the administrative process. He seeks to discover whether there is anything more to the difference between the two sets of criticisms than merely a matter of whose ox is being gored. His answer is an unqualified "yes." It is not merely the fact that "liberals" and "conservatives" or "reactionaries" have traveled full-circle, so that currently some of the former adherents of wide discretion for administrative decision-making have become some of the most vociferous critics of administrative omnicompetence; nor that some of those who presumably trembled before the "dictatorial" powers of NLRB and SEC bureaucrats during the New Deal have come to be numbered among the most outspoken defenders of recent drastic extensions of the power of such public administrators as censors and security officers.

Professor Gellhorn finds more significant differences. While the older public administration of the "alphabet agencies" dealt principally with economic activities, the contemporary public administration being attacked by "liberals" is chiefly concerned with personal rather than property rights. Moreover, the decision of security officers and censors is much more conclusive of private rights than were the decisions of the NLRB and similar bodies. Whereas in the thirties judicial review was limited, today in many areas where personal liberty has been severely curtailed, virtually *no* judicial review is available. There is also a great difference in the consequences flowing from the old and new administrative determinations. The usual, judicially reviewable penalty imposed by the "alphabet agencies" was merely a demand to "cease and desist." Decisions which find a man to be disloyal or to be a security risk, or a refusal to issue a passport or a visa, or banning a book, or deporting an alien, are far graver penalties. The personnel of the older agencies are likely to be experts, while security officers, *et al.*, though they may have become specialists, are not experts. "No well defined educational process or routinized training has equipped them, as distinct from judges and jurors, to determine the delicate issues of philosophy, aesthetics, psychology, or political theory that arise in contemporary administration."

The second essay discusses the increasing number of restraints on reading flowing from acts of every level of government. Gellhorn casts doubts upon the rationale and the wisdom of such restraints; he re-emphasizes the late Professor Chaffee's notion about the impossibility of defining obscenity precisely enough so as to provide adequate standards for censors; he criticizes the manner in which the Post Office and the Customs Bureau uses, or misuses, the Foreign Agents Registration Act; and he asks pertinent

questions about the wisdom of destroying foreign propaganda, and the exclusionary authority of these agencies with respect to writings deemed obscene or seditious. He recommends in place of censorship which is "negative," a positive program. "What we need in this country is not less reading but more; not fewer poor books but more good books, not repression, but liberation."

The third essay presents a useful summary of the ever-increasing number of restraints upon making a living resulting from state and local licensing laws. On the whole, Professor Gellhorn finds such laws bad. In many cases these laws represent a form of legal monopoly reflecting the demands of private associations. They confer economic advantage upon the already licensed and tend to reduce movement from state to state in many occupations (because many licensing laws practically exclude all but local talent). Often the criteria demanded have little relevance to the occupation involved — "passing" a Wasserman test for a photographer, or requiring American citizenship of such vocations as barbers, masseurs, chauffeurs, pool-hall operators, chiropodists, tree surgeons, and embalmers. Most recently the criterion of "loyalty" has been added in many states with the result that veterinarians, pharmacists, and professional boxers and wrestlers have to sign non-Communist oaths. Finally our attention is called to the potential (and often actual) explosives to be found in the standard of "good character" often used in licensing statutes.

One may always find matters for carping in any book. Even in this excellent volume I found the author's use of statistics in the discussion of alien exclusion and deportation somewhat misleading. I have also some reservations about the emphasis given to certain points, but obviously these are matters of opinion.

ALEX GOTTFRIED.

University of Washington.

On Political Goals. By GEORGE CATLIN. (New York: St. Martin's Press. 1957. Pp. 150. $2.75.)

This is a series of seven lectures delivered by McGill's Professor G. E. G. Catlin in the 1956 Weil Lectures at the University of North Carolina. While the title is accurate, it may be somewhat misleading, for these lectures present Professor Catlin's view of the appropriate foundations for a sound foreign policy for America and "Anglo-Saxony" in the cold war. A very good chapter deals with the "Conditions of Co-existence." The first condition is for the Russians themselves to abandon that Leninist tradition inimical to coexistence. This may come through either internal liberalization and demilitarization, or a growth of scepticism among literate Russians about their Messianic mission. Coexistence also requires that Western

statesmen accept as their unyielding policy foundation the mandate to keep the peace. If the West can also become tolerant of Russian institutional differences, cold war antagonisms can be shifted out of military realms into political, economic, and propaganda struggles. The chapter ends with a question: "Would we then all become Communists, even in the American Middle West, in order to accelerate world pacification? What would be our attitude to a world tyranny that offered peace? Would part of the West even consider abandoning neutrality and joining in a united popular front in order to attack America and speed matters up? Or would we contemplate Resistance, even on behalf of a world which had hitherto displayed an entire inability, even a contemptible inability, to know its own mind?"

Professor Catlin is not ultimately pessimistic, however. For he argues that the West is not really morally bankrupt, even though he finds that the quality of American leadership often gives that impression. And in one of the best discussions of this type, there follows an analysis in which "the American philosophy" is criticized, paradoxically, for being "at core Marxist," and having therefore "no spiritual weapons left with which to fight Marxism." From this follows a very telling criticism of the American reduction of all policy questions to alliances for the preservation of the special American way of allocating and distributing scarce values. A following chapter discusses the international implications of internal racial and segregation policies.

One of the first essential steps out of these international doldrums must come with an effective supranational organization of the North Atlantic cultural community into an actual political reality. This is not seen as merely desirable, but rather as a precondition for survival. The nation–state is over, the hemispheric regional unit is immanent. The West may not indulge itself in the luxury of old-fashioned national sovereignty. "The moral is that we must prepare public opinion for these great changes. In the United States the position is too often . . . that these changes are greatly favoured so long as they are strictly confined to other people. . . . The gravest day would be that, not only for herself but for humanity, when the United States was found to have lost confidence in herself and had ceased to be true to that for which once she stood. Let us hope that America will never be weighed in the balance and found wanting."

Where can there be found the strength, nobility, and wisdom for the great American effort the rest of the world literally awaits? In the last chapter ("There is Another Country") Professor Catlin discusses the need for something more than a "Public Philosophy": a "public drama to capture men's whole souls better than Hegelian Marxism has done. Its theme must be to proclaim the dignity of man and its problem to manifest in what that

dignity consists. It is not necessary that vast masses should be converted or convinced. Most of the great changes of the world have been wrought by a dedicated few. . . . Politics rests upon a few people having a strong sense of responsibility — and commanding the support of many."

This is a serious effort by one of our most acute living political scientists. It raises most of the really serious questions in international relations, and discusses them in a way that must command our attention. Although some parts (such as the assumption of the preponderance of Western deterrence) are dated, the book generally abounds with wise precepts and should be especially useful as supplementary reading for courses in international relations. If there is a new edition the title might well be changed to "On World Political Goals."

HARVEY WHEELER.

Washington and Lee University.

Government by Committee. By K. C. WHEARE. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1955. Pp. 264. 25/–.)

One of the principal results of the rediscovery of Arthur Bentley, and the work of David Truman and Earl Latham (among others) on the group basis of politics, has been the proliferation of case studies of the political process. In tracing the intricate pattern of relationships among individuals and groups in the political process, such studies tend to emphasize the impact of intergroup conflict upon the shaping of public policy. The result is to purvey a by no means inaccurate, yet by no means balanced, impression of the decision-making process in government. It is an old and tired saw that newspapers report conflict and pass over evidences of the harmonious adjustment of divergent group interests. It is equally true that it is the nature of published introspections of participants in government, and the congressional investigations which provide much of the raw material for case studies in the political process, to deal with fancied or real instances of program failure, and frustration of public purposes attributable to the machinations of private interest groups.

K. C. Wheare, with every show of trepidation in the face of his task, attempts what he calls a "reconnaissance from the air" of the varieties of a particular species of institution for blending the experience, skills, and interests of public and private individuals and groups into policy. In the light of Sir Frederick Pollock's statement that "the appointment of a committee is generally the first step of any number of English people gathered together for any common purpose," it is, perhaps, not surprising that the Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration at Oxford, and Fellow of All Souls College should undertake the most comprehensive

effort thus far to categorize governmental committees, and the roles which committee members fill.

Wheare lists six types of committees and seven committee roles. The ordering principle for differentiating between committee types is that of function. Employed by Wheare, this results in committees to (1) advise, (2) inquire, (3) negotiate, (4) legislate, (5) administer, and (6) scrutinize and control. Committee roles are defined in terms of skills, group attachment, and committee position: (1) the official, (2) the layman, (3) the expert, (4) the party man, (5) the interested party, (6) the chairman, and (7) the secretary. He makes no pretense that the categories of committees are self-contained and avoid infringement one upon another. This is true, too, of committee roles. Committees to inquire are usually also committees to advise, and persons fulfilling the role of experts are usually interested parties, or officials, in addition.

The study consists of an introductory chapter, a chapter on committee roles, followed by individual chapters on each type of committee, and a summarizing chapter which concludes that the best use can be made of committees "if they are wisely led and wisely fed." The individual chapters on committee types fund Wheare's personal and vicarious experience, and present his shrewd analysis of the appropriate uses of committees and the potential and limitations of committees for the attainment of various purposes. In a sense this is a handbook for that expanding body of public servants, in government, in public corporations, in universities, who find committee-membership an important part of their professional activities, and for those who seek to employ committees as the congealing force in policy formation.

What Wheare has not succeeded in doing, and perhaps has not attempted, is to develop a taxonomy either of committees, or of the broader range of institutions for overcoming the centrifugal forces which play within and around government, sufficiently precise to be used as a working guide by students of politics who wish to depict the effect not only of intergroup conflict, but intergroup co-operation upon the formation of public policy.

CORNELIUS P. COTTER.

Stanford University.

The Civil Service in Britain and France. Edited by WILLIAM A. ROBSON. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1956. Pp. vii, 191. $3.50.)

The termites which burrowed from the floor, up through my bookcase, and into the middle of the copy of *The Civil Service in Britain and France* probably singled it out from other volumes between which it stood because of its "made in England" flavor. The essays Professor Robson has collected

— some originally printed in the Autumn, 1954, issue of *The Political Quarterly* marking the span of one hundred years since the Trevelyan–Northcote Report and others specially written for the book — cannot be characterized as being so dry as to attract the termites' attention on that account. To the contrary, the fare must have been refreshingly different, for other than in Professor Robson's opening essay on "Bureaucracy and Democracy," practically no reference is made to American practices.

If the subterranean burrowers had selected for their interrupted meal the sparse coverage on the French civil service compressed in two short studies covering but little more than twenty pages, it might have been attributed to their acumen in concluding that the deletion from the volume would not have been missed. In this their judgment would have been wrong, for these two concluding essays contributed by P. Chatenet and André Bertrand neatly distinguish the bases upon which the civil service rests in France and the diverse paths in recruitment and training followed in the United Kingdom and France.

The termites did choose to center their attention upon the essays dealing with the Foreign and Commonwealth Service and the Colonial Service, perhaps evidencing their collective judgment that more dead wood was to be found in these branches of the service, despite the defenses, respectively, of Ernest Davies and A. Creech Jones. As the Colonial Service has been constituted Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service since 1954, the termites should have meted to it the same treatment as other civil servants — or does the vestige of an exclusive difference susceptible only to the palate of a termite yet remain?

It is somewhat consoling that even with the physical gaps the unwelcome visitors left in this slim but provocative volume, their depredations did not mar the interplay between former Prime Minister Attlee ("Civil Servants, Ministers, Parliament and the Public") and Sir Edward Bridges ("The Reforms of 1854 in Retrospect") on whether ministerial responsibility shields the civil servant from public censure. Nor did they in any way interfere with R. K. Kelsall of the London School of Economics supplementing Sir Laurence Helsby's gloss of the higher civil service in his "Recruitment to the Civil Service." Kelsall's recent statistics in "The Social Background of the Higher Civil Service" demonstrate that the English administrative class is still recruited primarily from groups of superior social status. The trend toward greater representation of those of lower-middle- and working-class origin, arising out of more widely dispersed educational opportunities and promotions from the ranks, must overcome troublesome economic and sociological factors before a condition approximating equal representation may be achieved.

The over-all impression left by this collection of essays is the debt owed by the United States to English practice. In a quiet and unheralded way,

many of the reforms incorporated into the English civil service over the last century have made their appearance on this side of the Atlantic, albeit sometimes in different garb. Did our present trend toward civil service decentralization have its genesis in English relaxation of Treasury control which, as Sir Thomas Padmore relates, started early in World War II with an abandonment over control of complement ("Civil Service Establishments and the Treasury")? Should we anticipate the transplanting of Whitley Councils, or at least the spirit of Whitleyism which Douglas Houghton in "Whitley Councils in the Civil Service" points out has in fact supplanted the need for recourse to many of the formalities of the Whitley machinery? To raise these and comparable questions is not to answer them, but merely to indicate the importance of maintaining contact with British and French experience. What is recorded in future commentary upon the detail of American practice may already have been written in bold.

NORMAN MELLER.

University of Hawaii.

Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. By ALEXANDER L. GEORGE and JULIETTE L. GEORGE. (New York: The John Day Company. 1956. Pp. vi, 362. $6.00.)

This volume, written by two behavioral scientists, is a psychological study of Woodrow Wilson and his friend, confidant and adviser — Colonel Edward M. House. Although the Wilson–House relationship is a topic admirably suited for such a study, few scholars of the Wilson era will find this account entirely satisfactory. Those who have worked in the documentary collections utilized by the Georges in their research will question the author's treatment of a number of aspects of the Wilson–House relationship and their failure to include a discussion of certain other phases of this intriguing friendship.

The authors' analysis of Wilson and his career, which comprises the major portion of the book, is based on the "thesis that underlying Wilson's quest for political power and his manner of exercising it was the compelling need to counter the crushing feelings of inadequacy which had been branded into his spirit as a child." The authors present a forceful and at times convincing argument for their hypothesis both by citing data drawn from their extensive research and by speculating freely regarding Wilson's motives. They thus portray Wilson as a person driven by subconscious forces to striving for power and dominance over others. Unfortunately, certain information — such as his deep religious convictions and his desire to emulate British prime ministers — which would tend to refute, or at least modify, their characterization of Wilson is insufficiently developed or

ignored. The Georges acknowledge, however, that their interpretation of Wilson's personality "is necessarily a matter of opinion. No incontrovertible proof can be offered."

Although the authors submit Wilson to an extremely critical examination, a similar approach is not followed in studying House. Their analysis of the honorary Texas colonel, his motives, and activities, is based largely on two autobiographical accounts written by House and the voluminous diary which he dictated to his secretary. Possibly it is for this reason that the ingratiating Texan appears in a very favorable light.

From this account House appears of greater and Wilson of far less stature than is generally accredited them by their associates and students of American government. Wilson's defeats appear to overshadow his many remarkable achievements. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile this account with the fact that at the time this volume was published, a survey conducted among fifteen hundred American historians and political scientists showed that they ranked Wilson as one of our four outstanding Presidents.

HENRY A. TURNER.

University of California, Santa Barbara.

Portrait of a Statesman. By DENNIS BARDENS. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1956. Pp. 326. $6.00.)

Had this biography of Sir Anthony Eden been a study of an American politician written by an American, it would take its place in the campaign biography category. Because both the politician and the author are British the categorization is perhaps not applicable, though it is most certainly descriptive. Mr. Dennis Bardens, an English journalist and radio-television editor states that he has attempted to picture Sir Anthony Eden as he sees him and describes his effort as an "unauthorized" biography. It is interesting to note that the work appeared in England in 1955, shortly after Mr. Eden succeeded Mr. Churchill and had won the General Election which confirmed this succession. The American edition appeared in 1956, when Sir Anthony's career took a turn Mr. Bardens could not have known about when he wrote. Even so, the difference of one year gives point to the author's awareness "of the inadequacies of this book," and his belief that "one day another biography may have to be written of Sir Anthony Eden."

This untimely superannuation is not the whole cause of the inadequacy of this book; it must have appeared basically inadequate even in 1955. Its greatest faults are two: a thoroughly pedestrian style and an essential failure to explain the motivations behind Sir Anthony's actions.

It is always something of a surprise to find a journalist writing in such a commonplace manner: the reader begins to wonder if Sir Anthony's

own speaking and writing style (dull by Mr. Bardens' admission) has not made itself felt. The author obviously has broad acquaintance with source material pertinent to Mr. Eden's career, but he has failed to assimilate it in a palatable fashion; there is a campaign-like haste about the book which makes it seem compiled rather than written. Neither can the reader feel that Mr. Bardens really understands Sir Anthony sufficiently to explain the motivation of the statesman's actions and beliefs. Why, for instance, did he not resign his Foreign Office portfolio until after the rape of Abyssinia had been committed and even approved, though he was plainly opposed to it? Mr. Bardens says that he had had many opportunities to resign, but does not make it clear why he remained in a position untasteful to him. Perhaps the answer lies with Mr. Eden, not with the author; Mr. Bardens admits clearly and correctly that there is an elusive element in Sir Anthony's psychic make-up that makes it difficult to know what makes him tick. Finally, it should be noted that the book does not live up to its title; it is less the biography of a statesman than the personal, somewhat chatty story of a man. For example, seven pages are given over to Mr. Eden's second marriage, while so important an event as the Munich conference is hastily dismissed in four short notices.

Despite these reservations, this study has admirable qualities. The value of Mr. Eden's role in international politics is never exaggerated: Mr. Bardens points out that he was often unsuccessful in solving problems, though his conscientious efforts are given their due. The appraisal of Mr. Eden's political associates seems balanced: The author is not intimidated by Mr. Churchill or his myth, though Chamberlain probably gets less kind treatment from Mr. Bardens than he did from Mr. Eden. The book also derives some interest from the vast accumulation of minutiae about Sir Anthony, an interest that would be considerably increased by a better presentation. One can be unreserved in praising the honesty of Mr. Bardens' appraisal of his subject: that Mr. Eden is without humor and human warmth and that his speeches are painfully dull and his temper violent the author does not hesitate to say repeatedly. Neither does he shortchange Mr. Eden's virtues: courage, honesty, patience, integrity, and experience. The fact that the reader is not clear as to Mr. Bardens' position regarding Sir Anthony is perhaps eloquent of the book's objectivity.

CHARLES A. LE GUIN.

University of Idaho.

NEWS AND NOTES

The American Society for Public Administration's Committee on Research Needs and Resources headed by Donald C. Stone, Dean of the School of Public and International Affairs, has been appointed. The Committee will survey research now underway, mark out areas of need, indicate priorities, and analyze resources available for the job. Research roles of universities, government, research bureaus, public affairs organizations, individual researchers, and ASPA itself will be considered. Members of the Committee appointed from the West are as follows: Ernest A. Engelbert, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles; Roy V. Peel, Head, Department of Political Science, University of Utah; John M. Pfiffner, School of Public Administration, University of Southern California; and, George A. Shipman, Director, Institute of Public Affairs, University of Washington.

The University of Colorado, Boulder, is offering a graduate program for the degree of Master of Science in Public Administration. Combinations of courses are available which enable students to organize their programs around their principal focus of interest. Among the courses available to students with the necessary background are political science courses such as Public Administration, Administrative Organization and Management, Administrative Theory, Public Personnel Administration, Municipal Administration, Governmental Planning, State Government and Administration, Administration of Natural Resources, Administrative Law, Problems in Local Administration, Problems in State Administration, Problems in Federal Administration, Government Regulation of Business, American Political Thought, and others. Among the economics courses offered are Public Finance, Economic Planning, Economics of Public Utilities, Labor Economics, and others. Various courses are also available in the Schools of Business, Engineering, and Law.

The minimum requirements for graduation are as follows: thirty semester hours including selected research projects, or twenty-four semester hours including a Master's thesis. The number of hours completed by each student is determined by his background and by the results of a qualifying examination. A comprehensive oral examination is given after all other requirements have been completed.

Graduate scholarships which provide tuition, and University fellowships which carry a stipend of up to $1,200 and tuition are available to students of distinctive ability. Part-time employment is usually available in the Department of Political Science, in the University's Bureau of State and Community Service, and in the offices of the Colorado Municipal League.

Requests for additional information should be addressed to the Director, Graduate Program in Public Administration, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado.

The Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University is offering an intensive summer training program on American Overseas Operations. The co-directors, Dean Harlan Cleveland and Professor Gerard Mangone, of the Maxwell School, announce that the program is especially designed for policy-level persons planning to work abroad for government, business, or philanthropic-religious agencies. The dates of the Institute are August 11 to August 29, 1958.

A new informal journal of research ideas and problems appeared in September and will appear bimonthly. It is called *Political Research: Organization and Design* (PROD) and is edited and published at Princeton, New Jersey. Dr. Alfred de Grazia is managing editor. Scholars active in PROD's publication are: Professor Karl Deutsch (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Professor Richard C. Snyder (Northwestern University); Professor Chilton Bush (Stanford University); Mr. Carl Stover (The Brookings Institution); and Mr. Ben Gedalecia (Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborn). Others will be named shortly.

PROD collects and circulates among its readers the ideas of political and behavioral scientists about research that might advance man's knowledge of political behavior. It is more a free expression of what may be promising inquiries than it is a medium for elaborate designs, research memoranda, or reports of completed work.

PROD aims to put new theories before the field, ease communications among scholars, let it be known who is working on what, and improve research in political science. It will contain articles on the outstanding research groups in the United States and abroad, carrying accounts of their programs.

Every political scientist, or anyone else, is cordially invited to address himself to the pages of PROD with a contribution of fifteen hundred words or less. For further information address all correspondence to PROD, Post Office Box 294, Princeton, New Jersey.

Kenneth C. Cole has resigned the executive officership of the Political Science Department, University of Washington. He will be a visiting professor at Stanford University during the winter and spring quarters.

Neal D. Houghton, University of Arizona, will be a visiting professor of political science at the University of Washington for the winter and spring quarters.

Dell G. Hitchner has returned to the Department of Political Science, University of Washington, after a year's leave of absence to serve as a United States specialist with the American Embassy, London. He will be acting executive officer of the Department during the winter and spring quarters.

John S. Reshetar, who has joined the Department of Political Science, University of Washington, spent the month of June, 1957, in the Soviet Union on a grant from the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants.

Fred A. Sondermann, Assistant Professor of Political Science, has returned to Colorado College, Colorado Springs, after a year's leave of absence. During the 1956-57 academic year Professor Sondermann studied sociology and anthropology at Stanford University under a grant from the Ford Foundation's International Relations Training Fellowship Program. In the summer of 1956 he was visiting assistant professor at the Social Science Foundation, University of Denver.

The annual meeting of the Pacific Northwest Political Science Association will be held May 2 and 3 on the campus of Montana State University, Missoula, Montana. Paul Beckett, Washington State College, president of the association, will preside. Vice-president Charles Schleicher, University of Oregon, is program chairman. Thomas Payne of Montana State University is handling convention arrangements.

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